Moral hazard, targeting and contract duration in agri-environmental policy

Journal of Agricultural Economics

Volumn 63, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 56-64

  Fraser, Rob ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KENT   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Agri environmental policy; Contract duration; Moral hazard; Targeting

Indexed keywords

AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; CHEATING BEHAVIOR; COMPLIANCE; CONTRACT FARMING; MORALITY; SMALLHOLDER;

EID: 84855738569     PISSN: 0021857X     EISSN: 14779552     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1477-9552.2011.00327.x     Document Type: Article

References (14)

1. Choe, C. and Fraser, I. Compliance monitoring and agri-environmental policy', Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 50, (1999) pp. 468-487.
2. Fraser, R. W. Moral hazard and risk management in agri-environmental policy', Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 53, (2002) pp. 475-487.
3. Fraser, R. W. On the use of targeting to reduce moral hazard in agri-environmental schemes', Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 55, (2004) pp. 525-540.
4. Hart, R. and Latacz-Lohmann, U. Combating moral hazard in agri-environmental schemes: a multiple-agent approach', European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 32, (2005) pp. 75-91.
5. Heyes, A. G. Implementing environmental regulation: Enforcement and compliance', Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 17, (2000) pp. 107-129.
6. Kampas, A. and White, B. Administrative costs and instrument choice for stochastic non-point source pollution', Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 27, (2004) pp. 109-133.
7. Lankoski, J. and Ollikainen, M. Agri-environmental externalities: a framework for designing targeted policies', European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 30, (2003) pp. 50-75.
8. Lankoski, J., Lichtenberg, E. and Ollikainen, M. Agri-environmental program compliance in a heterogeneous landscape', Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 47, (2010) pp. 1-22.
9. Natural England (2010) NE227 - Higher Level Stewardship: Environmental Stewardship Handbook, Third Edition. Available at: Last accessed: 5/12/2011.
10. Ozanne, A. and White, B. Equivalence of input quotas and import charges under asymmetric information in agri-environmental schemes', Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 58, (2007) pp. 260-268.
11. Ozanne, A., Hogan, T. and Colman, D. Moral hazard, risk aversion and compliance monitoring and agri-environmental policy', European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 38, (2001) pp. 329-347.
12. Pope, R. D. and Just, R. E. On testing the structure of risk preferences in agricultural supply analysis', American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 73, (1991) pp. 743-748.
13. Rice, J. B. and Sen, A. 'Moral hazard and long-term guaranteed contracts: Theory and evidence from the NBA (2008). Available at: Last accessed: 5/12/2011.
14. Yano, Y. and Blandford, D. Use of compliance rewards in agri-environmental schemes', Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 60, (2009) pp. 530-545.