Hidden action, risk aversion and variable fines in agri-environmental schemes

Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics

Volumn 52, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 203-212

  Ozanne, Adam ^a   White, Ben ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA   (Australia)

Author keywords

Agri environmental policy; Monitoring; Risk aversion

Indexed keywords

AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; DESIGN; POLICY MAKING; RISK ASSESSMENT;

EID: 43149098969     PISSN: 1364985X     EISSN: 14678489     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8489.2008.00408.x     Document Type: Article

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