An exact double-oracle algorithm for zero-sum extensive-form games with imperfect information

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

Volumn 51, Issue , 2014, Pages 829-866

  Bosansky, Branislav ^a   Kiekintveld, Christopher ^b   Lisy, Viliam ^a   Pěchoucek, Michal ^a  

^a CZECH TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY IN PRAGUE   (Czech Republic)

^b 500 W University Avenue   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATION THEORY; COMPUTER GAMES; ITERATIVE METHODS; LINEAR PROGRAMMING;

ALGORITHM FOR SOLVING; ALGORITHMIC FRAMEWORK; COMPUTATIONAL GAME THEORIES; EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS; EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES; IMPERFECT INFORMATION; ITERATIVE ALGORITHM; THEORETICAL GUARANTEES;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 84920616794     PISSN: 10769757     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1613/jair.4477     Document Type: Article

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