A double oracle algorithm for zero-sum security games on graphs

10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2011, AAMAS 2011

Volumn 1, Issue , 2011, Pages 305-312

  Jain, Manish ^a   Korzhyk, Dmytro ^b   Vaněk, Ondřej ^c   Conitzer, Vincent ^b   Pěchouček, Michal ^c   Tambe, Milind ^a  

^a University of Southern California   (United States)

^b Duke University   (United States)

^c CZECH TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY IN PRAGUE   (Czech Republic)

Author keywords

Double oracle; Game theory; Minimax equilibrium; Zero sum games

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; GAME THEORY; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; SCHEDULING;

APPROXIMATE SOLUTION; DISTRIBUTED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; DOUBLE ORACLE; MINIMAX; NETWORK SECURITY PROBLEMS; OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS; SCHEDULING PROBLEM; ZERO-SUM GAME;

NETWORK SECURITY;

EID: 84899460757     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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