Utilizing the broader agency perspective for studying headquarters-subsidiary relations in multinational companies

Journal of International Business Studies

Volumn 46, Issue 1, 2015, Pages 104-113

  Hoenen, Anne Kristin ^a   Kostova, Tatiana ^b  

^a VIENNA UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Austria)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

agency theory; headquarters subsidiary roles and relations; multinational corporations (MNCs) and enterprises (MNEs); principal agent

Indexed keywords

EID: 84920587170     PISSN: 00472506     EISSN: 14786990     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1057/jibs.2014.31     Document Type: Review

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