Investor engagement : Investors and management practice under shareholder value

Investor Engagement : Investors and Management Practice under Shareholder Value

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-240

  Martin, Roderick ^a   Casson, Peter D ^b   Nisar, Tahir M ^a  

^a CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY   (Hungary)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Boards of directors; Corporate governance; Institutional convergence; Institutional investors; Investor engagement; Investors; managerial interests; private equity; Venture capital funds

Indexed keywords

EID: 84920423961     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199202607.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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