Finance, Corporate Governance and the Management of Labour: A Conceptual and Comparative Analysis

British Journal of Industrial Relations

Volumn 41, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 557-582

  Gospel, Howard ^a   Pendleton, Andrew ^b  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b MANCHESTER METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041832120     PISSN: 00071080     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8543.00287     Document Type: Conference Paper

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