How institutions affect behavior: Insights from economics and psychology

Social Psychology and Economics

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 213-237

  Bohnet, Iris ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84920384518     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203726594     Document Type: Chapter

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