Faith and fidelity: Originalism and the possibility of constitutional redemption

Texas Law Review

Volumn 91, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 147-173

  Solum, Lawrence B ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84876482584     PISSN: 00404411     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (126)

1. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right's Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545-546 (2006).
2. Id. at 568-69.
3. Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011-2044 (2012) (reviewing JACK M. BALKIN, Living Originalism (2011) and DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010))
4. Jamal Greene, How Constitutional Theory Matters, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1183-1194 (2011).
5. Jack M. Balkin, constitutional redemption: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, constitutional redemption].
6. Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, Living Originalism].
7. See Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063-1090 (1981) (using "originalism" as a description of Judge Robert Bork's constitutional adjudication)
8. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204-234 (1980) [hereinafter Brest, Misconceived Quest] (explaining originalism and its interaction with the "written Constitution").
9. E-mail from Paul Brest, Professor of Law, Emeritus and Former Dean, Stanford Law School, to Lawrence B. Solum, John Carroll Research Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center (Dec. 2, 2009) (on file with author).
10. Brest P, Misconceived Quest, supra note 8, at 204.
11. For example, a search on Google Books' Ngram Viewer reveals no use of the term before 1980 and a steady increase in the use of the word "originalism" in books published after the early 1980s. NGRAM VIEWER, GOOGLE BOOKS, http://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=Originalism&year_start=1975&year_end=2008&corpus=0&smoothing=3 (search "originalism" from 1975 to 2008 in the "English" database on Google Books).
12. Edwin Borchard, The Supreme Court and Private Rights, 47 YALE L.J. 1051, 1063 (1938).
13. Howard Jay Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment: 2, 48 YALE L.J. 171, 189-90 (1938).
14. Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?: The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 5 (1949) (exploring the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's clauses "at the time the Amendment was adopted").
15. 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 671-72.
17. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 626 (2005).
18. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 729 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
19. Balkin J M, Living Originalism, supra note 6, at ch. 1.
20. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
21. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEXAS L. REV. 693 (1976).
22. Raoul Berger, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 3-4 (2d ed. 1997).
23. Edwin Meese III, U.S. Att'y Gen., Speech Before the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 1, 9 (Paul G. Cassel ed., 1986) [hereinafter Meese, Speech Before the American Bar Association], available at http://www.fed-soc.org/resources/page/the-great-debate (advocating a Jurisprudence of Original Intention)
24. see also Edwin Meese III, The Case for 'Originalism', THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (June 6, 2005), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2005/06/the-case-for-originalism
25. Lynette Clemetson, Meese's Influence Looms in Today's Judicial Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/17/politics/17meese.html?_r=1.
26. Brest P, Misconceived Quest, supra note 8.
27. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 929 (2009) (citing Brest's argument against "original intentions originalism" as an influential voice in legal scholarship)
28. Balkin J M, Living Originalism, supra note 6, at 101-02, (explaining that original meaning originalists sought to address the problems raised by critics, including Paul Brest, "by focusing not on the mental states of framers or ratifiers but on the general and publicly shared meanings of the text at the time of enactment").
29. Brest P, Misconceived Quest, supra note 8, at 214.
30. Id. at 216-17.
31. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985).
32. This is not an intellectual history of the originalism debates, and I am not claiming that either Brest or Powell articulated the first or best version of the claims they made. No string cite can do justice to the literature. There were many influential critics of original intentions originalism; one of the most important was Ronald Dworkin.
33. See Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 470 (1981) (characterizing original intention jurisprudence as a way "of fleeing from substance in constitutional decisions" that is certain to "end in failure").
34. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 611 (1999) [hereinafter Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists] ("The received wisdom among law
35. professors is that originalism is dead ").
36. Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984).
37. Id. at 1022-23.
38. Id. at 1051-52.
39. Id. at 1069-70 (arguing that "the struggle between the New Deal Presidency and the Old Court" is "not entirely unprecedented," but rather "represents a variant on institutional themes that revealed themselves at earlier moments of extreme constitutional stress and great legal achievement").
40. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005)
41. Akhil Reed Amar, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998).
42. Cass R. Sunstein, Originalism for Liberals, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 1998, at 31, 32, available at http://www.tnr.com/article/books-and-arts/originalism-liberals# (reviewing AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 35, and AKHIL REED AMAR & ALAN HIRSCH, FOR THE PEOPLE (1998)).
43. E-mail correspondence between Jack M. Balkin, Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law School, and Lawrence B. Solum (on file with author).
44. See generally, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599, 607-08 (2004) (providing an account of the transition from "old" to "new" originalism).
45. See, e.g., Barnett R E, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, supra note 30, at 620-29, 648 (discussing the evolution of originalism from original intention to original meaning).
46. The account that is offered in the text is correct so far as the author knows, but there is no history of this period of originalism based on interviews with all the major participants.
47. Antonin Scalia, U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Address Before the Attorney General's Conference on Economic Liberties in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986), in OFFICE OF LEGAL POL'Y, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK 101, 106 (1987)
48. see also Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 554-55 (2003) (noting that "most originalists have accepted Justice Scalia's suggestion").
49. See Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 875 (1992) (explaining which evidence may be considered to assess the Constitution's "original public meaning" at the time of its drafting). For extended discussions of "original public meaning,"
50. see Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1127-33 (2003), and
51. Samuel T. Morison, The Crooked Timber of Liberal Democracy, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 461, 465, 478-81 (reviewing RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004)).
52. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 552-56 (1994) (discussing the standard methodology of originalism and the hierarchy of originalist source materials).
53. See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation, 25 FED. L. REV. 1, 21 (1997) [hereinafter Goldsworthy, Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation] (arguing that even "non-originalists" incorporate originalist principles while others, like Ronald Dworkin, are really moderate originalists)
54. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Case for Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM 42, 43, 51-55 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011) (comparing provisions in the American and Australian Constitutions to indicate the necessity of originalist principles in constitutional interpretation)
55. Lawrence B. Solum, Goldsworthy on the New Originalism, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Nov. 2, 2007), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2007/11/goldsworthy-on-.html (quoting Jeffrey Goldsworthy's critique of a discussion of originalism by Lawrence Solum).
56. Goldsworthy J, Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 44, at 1, 21.
57. Randy E. Barnett, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004).
58. Keith E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION (1999)
59. Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation (1999) [hereinafter Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation].
60. See Barnett R, supra note 46, at 4 (stating the government's commitment to a written constitution requires it to adhere to the original meaning of the text)
61. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 47, at 35-36 (stating that one implication of originalism is that the Constitution reflects the public's understanding of the document, not what the greatest minds of the era hoped or believed it to say).
62. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 47, at 5
63. Barnett R, supra note 46, at 118-20 (discussing the necessity of constitutional construction to determine the meaning of vague text in the Constitution that cannot be otherwise accurately interpreted).
64. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007) [hereinafter Balkin, Abortion].
65. Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and constitutional redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427 (2007) [hereinafter Balkin, Original Meaning].
66. Id. at 435.
67. Balkin J M, Abortion, supra note 50, at 303-04.
68. See Balkin J M, Original Meaning, supra note 51, at 444-45 (discussing the development of early originalist theory).
69. See Balkin J M, Living Originalism, supra note 6, at 102 (describing an early originalist belief that all judicial decisions inconsistent with the Framers' intentions were illegitimate).
70. See Balkin J M, Living Originalism, supra note 6, at 7 (describing Scalia's view that new phenomena can be incorporated into constitutional law by use of analogy, but acts that were constitutional at the time of adoption cannot not be unconstitutional today).
71. See, e.g., Margaret Talbot, Supreme Confidence, NEW YORKER, Mar. 28, 2005, at 40, 56, available at http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2005/supreme_confidence/ ("Though Scalia says that he would have voted with the majority in Brown, it's hard to see an originalist justification for it. (He sometimes acknowledges as much, saying that a faulty-that is, a non-originalist-method can occasionally produce good results, a Scalian variation on 'Even a broken watch is right twice a day.')").
72. See Randy E. Barnett, It's a Bird, It's a Plane, No, It's Super Precedent: A Response to Farber and Gerhardt, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1232, 1236-37 (2006) (criticizing Dan Farber's views about the heightened constitutional importance of some "bedrock" precedent because of the stability and certainty derived from that precedent) (citing Daniel Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1173 (2006)).
73. See Balkin J M, Living Originalism, supra note 6, at 8 (observing that proponents of applying the original expected application of the Constitution often accept conflicting "nonoriginalist" precedent when it is well established).
74. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 856 (1995) (arguing that originalism is attractive because it comports with the belief that rule of law requires judges to follow externally imposed rules; as such, originalist judges defer to already established choices rather than resolving cases in accord with their personal beliefs).
75. See, e.g., Balkin J M, Living Originalism, supra note 6, at 22, 54 (describing "framework originalism," where institutional decisions created within a basic constitutional "framework" and shaped by popular opinion function as the primary constraints on judicial discretion).
76. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Incorporation and Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 409, 413 (2009) (arguing that fidelity to the law requires adherence to conventions of existing legal practice, which recognize that the linguistic meaning of the Constitution constrains those who engage in constitutional practice).
77. See, e.g., Balkin J M, Living Originalism, supra note 6, at 6-7 (illustrating originalist views on limiting interpretative discretion through adherence to past text).
78. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 917, 919 (2008) (advancing a "pragmatic" argument for originalism on the basis that desirable, entrenched laws should take precedence over ordinary legislation because entrenched laws establish a structure of government that preserves democratic decision making, individual rights, and other beneficial goals).
79. Balkin J M, Living Originalism, supra note 6, at 13.
80. Id. at 21-22.
81. Id. at 22.
82. Id. at 22-23.
83. Balkin J M, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 5, at 228.
84. Balkin J M, Living Originalism, supra note 6, at 149-59 (citing definitions and usage at the time of adoption as evidence of the semantic meaning of "commerce").
85. Balkin J M, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 5, at 229 ("Fidelity to the Constitution... requires fidelity to the original meaning of the text ").
86. Id. at 103-04.
87. James E. Gilman, FIDELITY OF HEART: AN ETHIC OF CHRISTIAN VIRTUE 4 (2001).
88. Balkin J M, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 5, at 106.
89. Id. at 123.
90. Id. at 5-6.
91. Id. at 25.
92. Id. at 25-26.
93. Id. at 249.
94. Id. at 49 ("[T]his is a story about progress within the constitutional system.").
95. Id. at 2.
96. Howard Lee Mcbain, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION: A CONSIDERATION OF THE REALITIES AND LEGENDS OF OUR FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1927).
97. Id. at 33.
98. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
99. Id. at 442-43 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819)) (citations omitted).
100. Charles A. Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REV. 673 (1963).
101. Id. at 735-36.
102. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 437 (1986).
103. David A. Strauss, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 3 (2010).
104. Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1754 (2007).
105. See Strauss D, supra note 92, at 3 (discussing the evolution of the constitutional system into a common law system).
106. See Dworkin R, supra note 29, at 470, 516 (rejecting originalism and procedural fairness in favor of decisions of principle based upon ideas of equality)
107. see also Ronald Dworkin, LAW'S EMPIRE 225 (1986) (elaborating upon legal theory and a conception of law as integrity).
108. See Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEXAS L. REV. 1753, 1753 (1994) (discussing the use of pluralistic theories of interpretation that allow for multiple legitimate methods of interpreting the Constitution).
109. I believe that Jack Balkin first made this claim in 2007. Lawrence B. Solum, Blogging from APSA: The New Originalism, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Sept. 3, 2007, 5:57 AM), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2007/09/blogging-from-a.html (recounting Balkin's discussion of originalism at the APSA conference).
110. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
111. Justice Scalia has occasionally characterized his views in this way. Scalia Vigorously Defends a 'Dead' Constitution, NPR (April 28, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ story.php?storyId=90011526.
112. Balkin J M, Living Originalism, supra note 6, at ch. 9.
113. Id. at ch. 10.
114. Id. at ch. 11. 103.
115. Id. at 155.
116. Id. at 149.
117. Randy E. Barnett, Jack Balkin's Interaction Theory of "Commerce," 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 623, 628 (emphasis omitted).
118. Id. at 648-50.
119. Jack Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 868.
120. See Balkin J M, Living Originalism, supra note 6, at 341 n.2 (attributing the tools or "the modalities of constitutional argument" to Bobbitt)
121. see also Philip Bobbitt, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982) [hereinafter, BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE] (articulating, in Book I, five modalities to act as the archetypes of constitutional argument)
122. Philip Bobbitt, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991) (using six modalities of constitutional argument to provide an analytic perspective on the traditional problems of American constitutional law).
123. See Balkin J M, supra note 107, at 824 ("Lawyers may... make appeals to national ethos ")
124. id. at 868 ("[W]e must bring the traditional lawyer's tools-text, history, structure, precedent, ethos, and consequences-to bear to decide on the best account of [the meaning of 'commerce.']").
125. See Walter Benn Michaels, The Fate of the Constitution, 61 TEXAS L. REV. 765, 770 (1982) (reviewing PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 109) (describing Bobbitt's "American ethos" as an alternative to "constitutional ethos" where a dilemma arises because "ethical argument is already an account of the meaning historical argument is supposed to help you locate").
126. Balkin J M, Living Originalism, supra note 6, at 341-42 n.2.