Pocketbook Protests: Explaining the Emergence of Pro-Democracy Protests Worldwide

Comparative Political Studies

Volumn 47, Issue 11, 2014, Pages 1503-1530

  Brancati, Dawn ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

and the economy; democracy; protests

Indexed keywords

EID: 84906728852     PISSN: 00104140     EISSN: 15523829     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0010414013512603     Document Type: Article

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