Ukraine imports democracy: External influences on the Orange Revolution

International Security

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 45-83

  McFaul, Michael ^a,b,c  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 37348999616     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.2007.32.2.45     Document Type: Review

References (163)

1. Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," International Organization, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Autumn 1978), pp. 881-912.
2. Exceptions include Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999);
3. Thomas Carothers, In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy toward Latin America in the Reagan Years (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991);
4. Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994);
5. Richard Youngs, International Democracy and the West: The Role of Governments, Civil Society, and Multinational Business (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004);
6. Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000);
7. Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004);
8. John M. Owen IV, "The Foreign Imposition of Domestic Institutions," International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Spring 2002), pp. 375-409;
9. Jon C. Pevehouse, "Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization," International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Summer 2002), pp. 515-549;
10. Laurence Whitehead, "International Aspects of Democratization," in Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 3-46;
11. Peter Burnell, ed., Democracy Assistance: International Cooperation for Democratization (London: Frank Cass, 2000);
12. and Jeroen de Zeeuw and Krishna Kumar, eds., Promoting Democracy and Postconflict Societies (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2006).
13. Philippe C. Schmitter, "An Introduction to Southern European Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 5.
14. Geoffrey Pridham, "International Influences and Democratic Transition: Problems of Theory and Practice in Linkage Politics," in Pridham, ed., Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe (Leicester, U.K.: Leicester University Press, 1991), p. 18.
15. For the first comprehensive quantitative study of the impact of U.S. Agency for International Development democracy assistance programs, for example, see Steven E. Finkel, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Results of a Cross-National Quantitative Study," Final Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development, January 2006), ver. 34.
16. See Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom, Funding Civil Society: Foreign Assistance and NGO Development in Russia (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006);
17. Sarah L. Henderson, Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia: Western Support for Grassroots Organizations (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003);
18. Sarah E. Mendelson and John K. Glenn, eds., The Power and Limits of NGOs (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002);
19. and Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, eds., Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000).
20. Assessments of rule of law assistance are fewer. See Erik Jensen and Thomas Heller, eds., Beyond Common Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the Rule of Law (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004);
21. and Thomas Carothers, ed., Promoting Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006).
22. The only book on political party assistance is Thomas Carothers, Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006).
23. National-level, aggregate assessments include Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad;
24. and Thomas Carothers, Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996).
25. See Michael McFaul, "Democracy Promotion as a World Value," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Winter 2004-05), pp. 147-163.
26. See especially George W. Bush, "President Sworn-In to Second Term," January 2, 2005, http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/ 20050120-1.html.
27. See especially Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (Brussels: European Union, December 12, 2003).
28. Obviously, cases of military intervention introduce foreign actors into the drama directly. As the contemporary cases of Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate, however, even foreign agents with armed forces are severely constrained in shaping local political change when they lack powerful domestic allies.
29. Distinguishing between the causes of transition from the causes of consolidation is common in the literatures on democratization and revolution.
30. Democracy, in other words, develops in fits and starts, and not always on a gradual path.
31. These were official figures provided to the author by staff members in the Office of the Coordinator for U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, U.S. Department of State.
32. For a positive assessment of Western intervention, see Jeffrey Clark, "Elections, Revolution, and Democracy in Ukraine: Reflections on a Country's Turn to Democracy, Free Elections, and the Modern World" (Washington, D.C.: Development Associates, October 2005).
33. For critics of the Western, and especially U.S., intervention, see Patrick J. Buchanan, "Who's in Charge of Russia Policy?" Antiwar.com, December 29, 2004, http://antiwar.com;
34. Sergei Markov, "Oranzhevaya Revolutsiya - primer revolutsii global'nogo soobshchestva XXI veka," in Mikhail Pogrebinskii, Oranzhevaya Revolutsiya: Versii, Khronika, Dokumenty (Kiev: Optima, 2005), pp. 52-75;
35. Jonathan Steele, "Ukraine's Postmodern Coup d'Etat," Guardian, November 26, 2004;
36. Anatol Lieven, "Ukraine and Europe: A Shotgun Wedding Is Bound to Fail," International Tribune, December 21, 2004;
37. and "Congressman [Ron Paul] accuses U.S. Government of Supporting Viktor Yushchenko," ICPS Newsletter, No. 258 (December 20, 2004).
38. On these regimes, see Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April 2002), pp. 51-65.
39. See Andrew Wilson, Ukraine's Orange Revolution (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2005), chap. 6.
40. On the symbolic codification of the Orange Revolution, see Laura Arzhakovska, Revolyutsiya Duxa (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2005);
41. and the movie Ukraiha: proriv do demokratii (Kiev: O. Dovzhnko, Fond Rozvitku Ukrains'kogo Kino/Pro TV, 2005).
42. Mark K. Beissinger, "Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions," Perspective on Politics, Vol. 5, No. 2 (June 2007), pp. 259-276;
43. Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, "Favorable Conditions and Electoral Revolutions," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 17, No. 4 (October 2006), pp. 5-18;
44. Michael McFaul, "Transitions from Postcommunism," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 16, No. 3 (July 2005), pp. 5-19;
45. and Joshua Tucker, "Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions," Perspective on Politics (forthcoming).
46. Ukraine's Freedom House scores jumped from partially free in 2004 to free in 2005.
47. Barbara Geddes, "What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?" Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 1 (June 1999), pp. 115-144.
48. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960).
49. Those emphasizing elites and the benefits of pacts include Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, Vol. 4 (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986);
50. and Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," Comparative Politics, Vol. 23, No. 1 (October 1990), pp. 1-21.
51. Those downplaying pacts and giving greater attention to masses include Nancy Bermeo, "Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict during the Democratic Transitions," Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 3 (April 1997), pp. 305-322;
52. Ruth Collier, Paths towards Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999);
53. Elisabeth Jean Wood, Forging Democracy from Below: Insurgent Transitions in South Africa and El Salvador (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000);
54. and Michael McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World," World Politics, Vol. 54, No. 2 (January 2002), pp. 212-244.
55. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
56. Barry R. Weingast, "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 2 (June 1997), pp. 245-263, at p. 246.
57. The idea of a galvanizing event as a necessary condition for societal coordination is presented in ibid., p. 251.
58. Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, p. 4.
59. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Eastern Europe (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
60. Daniel Brumberg, "Liberalization versus Democracy," in Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway, eds., Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), pp. 15-36;
61. and Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 2 (January 2004), pp. 139-153.
62. A more nuanced hypothesis might be that competitive authoritarian regimes that emerged from partial democracies are more vulnerable than competitive authoritarian regimes that emerged from full-blown autocracies.
63. Levitsky and Way, "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism." 32. On the model, see Lucan A. Way, "Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine," World Politics, Vol. 57, No. 2 (January 2005), pp. 231-261.
64. Anders Åslund, "The Ancien Régime: Kuchma and the Oligarchs," in Åslund and Michael McFaul, eds., Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), pp. 9-28.
65. Polling data cited from Taras Kuzio, "Everyday Ukrainians and the Orange Revolution," in Åslund and McFaul, Revolution in Orange, p. 61.
66. Beatriz Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
67. See Razumkov Centre Sociological Survey, as reported in "2004 Presidential Elections: How Ukrainians Saw Them," National Security and Defence, No. 10 (2004), p. 19;
68. and Natalya Panina, ed., Ukrainian Society, 1994-2005: Sociological Monitoring (Kiev: Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences and Democratic Initiatives, 2005), p. 25.
69. Mikhail Pogrebinsky, director, Kiev Center for Political Studies and Conflictology, and campaign adviser to Viktor Yanukovych, interview by author, Kiev, November 2005.
70. Wilson, Ukraine's Orange Revolution, p. 95.
71. Interview with Ihor Smeshko, chief of the Ukrainian Secret Service, in The Orange Revolution, documentary film written, directed, and produced by Steve York (Washington: York Zimmerman, 2007).
72. Yurii Lutsenko, MP and a key organizer of the Maidan protests, interview by author, Kiev, November 2005.
73. C.J. Chivers, "How Top Spies in Ukraine Changed the Nation's Path," New York Times, January 17, 2005.
74. See Marc Morjé Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chap. 4.
75. Wilson, Ukraine's Orange Revolution, p. 123.
76. Roman Bezsmertny, Our Ukraine MP; and Alexander Moroz, MP and chairman of the Socialist Party, interviews by author, Kiev, July 2002.
77. Yuliya Tymoshenko, interview by author, Kiev, February 2006.
78. On the misplaced emphasis on leaders in such situations, see Kurt Schock, "Nonviolent Action and Its Misconceptions: Insights for Social Scientists," PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (October 2003), pp. 705-712.
79. Razumkov Centre Sociological Survey, as reported in "2004 Presidential Elections," p. 9.
80. Tracing the effects of campaign messages and techniques is difficult even in older democracies. See Henry E. Brady and Richard Johnston, eds., Capturing Campaign Effects (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006).
81. Of course, he did have a program, including a list of presidential decrees that he promised to enact should he be elected. These future actions, however, were not emphasized. After the election, two-thirds of the electorate reported that they had never heard about these decrees. See Razumkov Centre Sociological Survey, as reported in "2004 Presidential Elections," p. 10.
82. Donald R. Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet, "Sociotropic Politics: The American Case," British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 11, No. 2 (April 1981), p. 132.
83. Ihor Gryniv, Our Ukraine MP and campaign manager, interview by author, Kiev, November 2005.
84. The government-sponsored Ukrainian Institute of Social Research and the Russian firm Foundation for Social Opinion (known by the Russian acronym FOM) also conducted exit polls. FOM discontinued its exit poll in the first round because more than 40 percent of all voters refused to reveal how they voted. See Tetiana Sylina, "Exit Poll: A Long Ordeal," National Security and Defence, No. 10 (2004), pp. 24-28.
85. See http://www.dif.org.ua.
86. Yevgen Poberezhny, deputy chairman of the board of the Committee of Voters of Ukraine, interview by author, Kiev, November 2005.
87. Ihor Popov, chairman of the Committee of Voters of Ukraine, interview by author, Kiev, March 2005.
88. Democratic Initiatives, "Final Results of the National Exit Poll 2004 for the 2nd Round of the Presidential Election in Ukraine," November 27, 2004, mimeo.
89. On the second round of the presidential elections, see, for instance, CVU, "Report of the Committee of Voters of Ukraine on Observation of Voting and Vote Tabulation on November 21, 2004," http://www.cvu.org.ua/doc.php? lang?eng&mid?docs&id?828.
90. On the OSCE monitoring mission's report following the second round of elections, see International Election Observation Mission, "Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions," November 22, 2004, http:// www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2004/11/3811_en.pdf. Election monitoring efforts of NGOs to gather evidence of falsification were facilitated by the multiparty composition of the local election commissions. This method of forming election commissions put Our Ukraine members and supporters in the room in most election districts when counts were taking place. This method of constituting CEC commissions was another attribute of competitive authoritarianism. Full-blown autocracies do not allow opposition parties to participate in vote counting.
91. Roman Knyazevich, Central Election Commission member, interview by author, Kiev, March 2005.
92. Ibid.
93. Mikhola Katarynchuk and Yuri Kliuchkovsky, Our Ukraine MPs who argued the Our Ukraine case before the Supreme Court, interview by author, Kiev, November 2005.
94. Olena Prytula, editor, Ukrainska Pravda, interview by author, Kiev, June 2002.
95. Marta Dyczok, "Was Kuchma's Censorship Effective? Mass Media in Ukraine before 2004," Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 58, No. 2 (March 2006), pp. 215-238.
96. For the percentages, see International Renaissance Foundation (IRF), Promotion of the Fair and Open Election of 2004 (Kiev: IRF, January 2005), pp. 14-19.
97. Adrian Karatnycky, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 2 (March/ April 2005), pp. 35-52.
98. Some FM stations, such as Radio Continent, Radio NART, and Radio Takt in Vinnytsia rebroadcast Radio Liberty, which Liberty officials claimed reached 8 percent of the population. See Olena Prytula, "The Ukrainian Media Rebellion," in Åslund and McFaul, Revolution in Orange, pp. 113-115.
99. Internet access in 2004 was limited. Half of internet news readers lived in Kiev. "Media Sustainability Index, 2004" (Washington, D.C.: IREX, 2004), pp. 208-209, 11, http://www.irex.org/ program/MSI_EUR/2004/MSI-2004- Ukraine.pdf.
100. Tetyana Lebedeva, head of the board, Independent Association of Broadcasters, interview by author, Kiev, November 2006.
101. Prytula, "The Ukrainian Media Rebellion," p. 110.
102. Taras Stetskiv, MP and Our Ukraine campaign manager; and Gryniv, interviews by author, Kiev, November 2005.
103. According to Stetskiv, Our Ukraine began purchasing tents and supplies a month before the protest began. See his remarks in York, The Orange Revolution.
104. Pora, "Civil Society and the Presidential Elections," Times of Change, No. 11 (November 27, 2004).
105. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), chap. 9.
106. Dmytro Potekhin and Pyotr Kosuchev, Znayu leaders, interviews by author, Kiev, March 2005.
107. Vladislav Kaskiv, Yellow Pora leader and one of the advocates for seizing the building, interview by author, Kiev, March 2005; and Lutsenko, an opponent of seizing buildings, interview by author. See also the testimonials of Our Ukraine leaders David Zhvania and Roman Bezsmertny, in York, The Orange Revolution.
108. Carlos Pascual, U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, 2000-03, interview by author, Kiev, June 2002.
109. Richard Youngs, "Ukraine," in Ted Piccone and Youngs, eds., Strategies for Democratic Change: Assessing the Global Response (Washington, D.C.: Democracy Coalition Project, 2006), p. 104.
110. Ambassador John Tefft, U.S. deputy assistant secretary for European and Eurasian affairs, "Ukraine's Election: Next Steps," testimony before the House International Relations Committee, 108th Cong., 2d sess., December 7, 2004, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/39542.htm.
111. Ibid.
112. Daniel Williams, "Putin Opposes Rerun in Ukraine: Kuchma Gets Support in Election Crisis," Washington Post, December 3, 2004.
113. See U.S. Ambassador Stephen Pifer, U.S. deputy assistant secretary for European and Eurasian affairs, testimony before the House International Relations Committee, 108th Cong., 2d sess., May 12, 2004, p. 3.
114. Michael Wines, "Report of Arms Sale by Ukraine to Iraq Causes Consternation," New York Times, November 7, 2002.
115. This is the "boomerang" effect discussed in Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998).
116. Sergei Markov, interview by author, Moscow, September 2005.
117. These numbers are reported in Jackson Diehl, "Putin's Unchallenged Imperialism," Washington Post, October 25, 2004.
118. Russian public relations experts who worked for Yanukovych included Marat Gelman, Sergei Markov, Vyacheslav Nikonov, and Gleb Pavlovksy.
119. See comments of Maj. Gen. Nicholas Krawciw at a panel discussion titled "Ukraine's Armed Forces: On the Way to Join NATO?" at the American Enterprise Institute event "Ukraine's Choice: Europe of Russia?" held in Washington, D.C., on December 10, 2004.
120. U.S. Ambassador John E. Herbst, interview by author, Kiev, November 2005. See also Celeste A. Wallander, Ukraine's Election: The Role of One International NGO (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2005).
121. Herbst, interview by author.
122. Tymoshenko and Lutsenko, interviews by author.
123. United Press International, "Russian Troops in Ukraine Capital," November 24, 2004.
124. Nikolai Petrov and Andrei Ryabov, "Russia's Role in the Orange Revolution," in Åslund and McFaul, Revolution in Orange, p. 151.
125. Ibid.
126. Because tracing causality in this sector is so difficult, few have tried. Serious attempts include Carothers, Confronting the Weakest Link;
127. and Sarah E. Mendelson, "Democracy Assistance and Political Transition in Russia: Between Success and Failure," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001), pp. 68-106.
128. Kathryn Stevens, director, Office of Democracy and Governance USAID Ukraine; Chris Holzen, resident director, Ukraine, International Republican Institute;
129. David Dettman, resident director, Ukraine, National Democratic Institute; and Stetskiv - all interviews by author, Kiev, November 2005.
130. Anonymous board member of a major Russian corporation who gave funds to the Yushchenko campaign, interview by author, Moscow, June 2005.
131. The U.S. firm Aristotle International provided some marginal campaign advice to Our Ukraine. The Russian firm Image Kontakt, headed by Aleksei Sitnikov, also worked for Yushchenko. Sitnikov and Dettman, interviews by author.
132. The head of NDI's office in Kiev, David Dettman, used to work for Aristotle International and most certainly facilitated the initial contacts between Our Ukraine and that firm. Interestingly, in the 2006 parliamentary election, this company worked for Kuchma's former chief of staff, Viktor Medvedchuk. Likewise, Yanukovych and his Party of Regions dumped the Russian consultants for the 2006 contest and hired one of the Washington's most prominent Republican firms, Davis Manafort, which had previously worked for Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush. See Jeremy Page, "Revolution Is Reversed with a Little Spin from the West," Times (London), March 28, 2006.
133. Stetskiv and Katarynchuk, interviews by author.
134. Dettman and Holzen, interviews by author.
135. To measure the impact of these programs on party development would require surveying recipients of this technical assistance and then comparing the results to the ideational and organizational development of parties not exposed to this kind of aid. Such data do not exist.
136. Lorne Craner, president, International Republican Institute; and Steve Nix, director, FSU Programs, International Republican Institute, interviews by author, Washington, D.C., October 2005.
137. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Adrian Karatnycky, William Miller (former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine), and Lech Walesa are examples of private citizens with close ties to Our Ukraine who played active roles in shaping Western debates regarding the Orange Revolution.
138. Eric Boyle, regional director, Kiev regional office, Eurasia Foundation; Yevhen Bystrytsky, executive director, International Renaissance Foundation; Juhani Grossman, senior program officer, Civic Participation in Elections in Ukraine, Freedom House; Petro Koshukov, co-director of Znayu project; and Inna Pidluska, president, Europa XXI Foundation - interviews by author, Kiev, November 2005.
139. Jan Maksymiuk, "Yuliya Tymoshenko Now Faces Criminal Charges from Russia," Ukrainian Weekly, Vol. 69, No. 36 (September 9, 2001).
140. On this technology, see Eric C. Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).
141. The figures are listed in IRF, Promotion of the Fair and Open Election of 2004.
142. Popov and Poberezhny, interviews by author. On this method for exposing fraud, see Larry Garber and Glenn Cowan, "The Virtues of Parallel Vote Tabulations," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 4, No. 2 (April 1993), pp. 95-107.
143. Koshukov and Potekhin, interviews by author.
144. Grossman and several Ukrainian recipients of these funds, interviews by author.
145. Vadim Galaychuk, general director, Moor and Krosondovich, and coordinator for Our Ukraine Election Monitoring Program, interview by author, Kiev, November 2005.
146. See Democratic Initiatives Foundation, http://www.ukma.kiev.ua/pub/DI/.
147. IRF, Promotion of the Fair and Open Election of 2004.
148. "Declaration by the Presidency of the European Union on Ukraine," November 22, 2004, http://www.um.dk/en/servicemenu/News/ NewsArchives2004/DeclarationByThePresidencyOf TheEuropeanUnionOnUkraine.htm.
149. "Remarks by United States Senator Richard Lugar on the Ukrainian Presidential Elections," Kiev, November 22, 2004, http://kiev.usembassy. gov/files/041122_lugar-qa_eng.html.
150. Quoted in William Branigin, "U.S. Rejects Tally, Warns Ukraine," Washington Post, November 25, 2004.
151. Lutsenko, Tymoshenko, and Pora student leaders, interviews by author.
152. Sue Folger, Ukrainian director, Internews-Ukraine, interview by author, Kiev, November 2005.
153. When translating the spoken broadcast into sign language, Dmytruk told her viewers that the announcer was not telling the truth.
154. Andrei Shevchenko, Channel 5, and Kateryna Myasnykova, executive director, Independent Association of Broadcasters, interviews by author, Kiev, November 2005; and Natalya Ligachova, project director and chairman of the board, Telekritika, interview by author, Kiev, February 2006.
155. Nadia Diuk, senior program officer, National Endowment for Democracy, interview by author, Washington, D.C., October 2005; and Olena Prytula, editor, Ukrainska Pravda, interview by author, Kiev, March 2005.
156. Remarks by Andrij Ihnatov, board member, Maidan Inform, at a workshop on the Orange Revolution, International Renaissance Foundation, Kiev, March 18, 2005.
157. Andriy Kohut, board member, Black Pora, interview by author, Kiev, March 2005.
158. Potekhin, interview by author.
159. Potekhin and Kosuchev from Znayu, and Kaskiv and Yevgen Zolotarev from Yellow Pora, all participants in these transnational meetings, interviews by author.
160. Altogether, in the year before the 2004 vote, the International Renaissance Foundation, the local Ukrainian arm of the Soros Foundation, contributed $1,653,222 to nongovernmental organizations implementing election-related projects. See IRF, Promotion of the Fair and Open Election of 2004, p. 1. Yellow Pora received several IRF grants.
161. USAID officials and Pora members, interviews by author, Kiev, March and November 2005.
162. Tymoshenko, Lutsenko, Gryniv, Galaychuk, Stetskiv, Katarynchuk, and Yellow and Black Pora activists, interviews by author.
163. Tymoshenko, interview by author.