Direct reciprocity under uncertainty does not explain one-shot cooperation, but demonstrates the benefits of a norm psychology

Evolution and Human Behavior

Volumn 35, Issue 5, 2014, Pages 358-367

  Zefferman, Matthew R ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b University of Tennessee and National Institute for Mathematical and Biological Synthesis   (United States)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Norm psychology; Reciprocity; Repeated games

Indexed keywords

EID: 84905720004     PISSN: 10905138     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2014.04.003     Document Type: Article

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