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Journal of Evolutionary Biology
Volumn 19, Issue 5, 2006, Pages 1380-1382
Reciprocity: You have to think different
Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]
Indexed keywords

ALTRUISM; ANIMAL; ANIMAL BEHAVIOR; BIOLOGICAL MODEL; COOPERATION; EVOLUTION; GAME; GENETIC SELECTION; HUMAN; NOTE; PUNISHMENT;
EID: 33747217444     PISSN: 1010061X     EISSN: 14209101     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1420-9101.2006.01159.x     Document Type: Note
Times cited : (15)
References (12)
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  • 2
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  • 3
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    • Boyd, R.1
  • 4
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    • The evolution of reciprocity when conditions vary
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    • Boyd, R. 1992. The evolution of reciprocity when conditions vary. In: Coalitions in Humans and Other Animals, (F. Dewaal & A. H. Harcourt, eds), pp. 473-492. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
    • (1992) Coalitions in Humans and Other Animals , pp. 473-492
    • Boyd, R.1
  • 5
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    • The evolution reciprocity in sizable groups
    • Boyd, R. & Richerson, P.J. 1988. The evolution reciprocity in sizable groups. J. Theor. Biol. 132: 337-356.
    • (1988) J. Theor. Biol. , vol.132 , pp. 337-356
    • Boyd, R.1    Richerson, P.J.2
  • 6
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    • Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups
    • Boyd, R. & Richerson, P.J. 1992. Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups. Ethol. Sociobiol. 13: 171-195.
    • (1992) Ethol. Sociobiol. , vol.13 , pp. 171-195
    • Boyd, R.1    Richerson, P.J.2
  • 7
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    • The folk theorem for repeated games with discounting and incomplete information
    • Fudenberg, D. & Maskin, E. 1986. The folk theorem for repeated games with discounting and incomplete information. Econometrica 54: 533-554.
    • (1986) Econometrica , vol.54 , pp. 533-554
    • Fudenberg, D.1    Maskin, E.2
  • 8
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    • Cooperation and punishment, mainly in humans
    • Gardner, A. & West, S. 2004. Cooperation and punishment, mainly in humans. Am. Nat. 164: 753-764.
    • (2004) Am. Nat. , vol.164 , pp. 753-764
    • Gardner, A.1    West, S.2
  • 9
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    • Repeated games: A state space approach
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  • 12
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.