Belief elicitation in the laboratory

Annual Review of Economics

Volumn 6, Issue , 2014, Pages 103-128

  Schotter, Andrew ^a   Trevino, Isabel ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

decision theory; experiments

Indexed keywords

EID: 84905678588     PISSN: 19411383     EISSN: 19411391     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-economics-080213-040927     Document Type: Article

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