On eliciting beliefs in strategic games

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 71, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 98-109

  Palfrey, Thomas R ^a   Wang, Stephanie W ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Beliefs; Experiment; Forecasting; Game theory; Scoring rules

Indexed keywords

EID: 67349196387     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.03.025     Document Type: Article

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