Measuring the willingness to pay to avoid guilt: Estimation using equilibrium and stated belief models

Journal of Applied Econometrics

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 437-453

  Bellemare, Charles ^a   Sebald, Alexander ^b   Strobel, Martin ^c  

^a UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

^c MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79953010213     PISSN: 08837252     EISSN: 10991255     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/jae.1227     Document Type: Article

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