Do players correctly estimate what others do? Evidence of conservatism in beliefs

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 47, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 71-85

  Huck, Steffen ^a   Weizsäcker, Georg ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

Beliefs; Elicitation; Experiments; Prediction accuracy

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038789790     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00170-6     Document Type: Article

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