Secure quantum key distribution

Nature Photonics

Volumn 8, Issue 8, 2014, Pages 595-604

  Lo, Hoi Kwong ^a   Curty, Marcos ^b   Tamaki, Kiyoshi ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VIGO   (Spain)

^c NTT Basic Research Laboratories   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

PERSONAL COMPUTING; QUANTUM THEORY;

LATEST DEVELOPMENT; SECURE COMMUNICATIONS; SECURE QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTIONS; SECURITY MODEL; STATE OF THE ART;

QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY;

EID: 84905215112     PISSN: 17494885     EISSN: 17494893     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1038/nphoton.2014.149     Document Type: Review

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