The universal composable security of quantum key distribution

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

Volumn 3378, Issue , 2005, Pages 386-406

  Ben Or, Michael ^a,d,f   Horodecki, Michal ^b,f   Leung, Debbie W ^c,d,f   Mayers, Dominic ^c,d   Oppenheim, Jonathan ^a,e,f  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GDA SK   (Poland)

^c CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^d Research Institute   (United States)

^e UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

^f ISAAC NEWTON INSTITUTE FOR MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

SECURITY OF DATA;

COMPOSABLE SECURITY DEFINITIONS; QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION (QKD); UNIVERSAL COMPOSABILITY THEOREM;

QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY;

EID: 24144445587     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-30576-7_21     Document Type: Conference Paper

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