Time-shift attack in practical quantum cryptosystems

Quantum Information and Computation

Volumn 7, Issue 1-2, 2007, Pages 73-82

  Qi, Bing ^a   Fung, Chi Hang Fred ^a   Lo, Hoi Kwong ^a   Ma, Xiongfeng ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Eavesdropping; Quantum cryptography; Single photon detector

Indexed keywords

AVALANCHE PHOTODIODES; PARTICLE BEAMS; PHOTONS;

CURRENT TECHNOLOGY; EAVESDROPPING; FULL INFORMATIONS; QUANTUM CRYPTOSYSTEMS; SIGNAL PULSE; SINGLE-PHOTON DETECTORS; SYNCHRONIZATION PULSE; TIME MULTIPLEXING;

QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY;

EID: 33846202211     PISSN: 15337146     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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35. For example, Alice/Bob may produce one key with QKD system and another key with conventional cryptosystem. They can produce the final key by doing a "XOR" operation. Eve has to break both the two systems to get the final key.