The power of congress over the rules of precedent

Duke Law Journal

Volumn 50, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 503-

  Harrison, John ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347315081     PISSN: 00127086     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1373096     Document Type: Review

References (5)

1. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
2. Chief Justice Taney noted: I do not, however, object to the revision of [a question he had believed decided by earlier cases], and am quite willing that it be regarded hereafter as the law of this court, that its opinion upon the construction of the Constitution is always open to discussion when it is supposed to have been founded in error, and that its judicial authority should hereafter depend altogether on the force of the reasoning by which it is supported. Id. at 470 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
3. 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. "Whether or not we would agree with Miranda's reasoning and its resulting rule, were we addressing the issue in the first instance, the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now." Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336 (citations omitted). In dissent, Justice Scalia asserted that only stare decisis was propping up Miranda. The Court, he maintained, could not say, "'We reaffirm today that custodial interrogation that is not preceded by Miranda warnings or their equivalent violates the Constitution of the United States.' It cannot say that, because a majority of the Court does not believe it." Id. at 2337 (Scalia, J., dissenting).