Settling up in CEO compensation: The impact of divestiture intensity and contextual factors in refocusing firms

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 35, Issue 8, 2014, Pages 1124-1143

  Pathak, Seemantini ^a   Hoskisson, Robert E ^b   Johnson, Richard A ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON   (United States)

^b RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI   (United States)

Author keywords

CEO compensation; divestitures; refocusing; settling up; strategic change

Indexed keywords

INDUSTRY;

CEO COMPENSATIONS; DIVESTITURES; REFOCUSING; SETTLING UP; STRATEGIC CHANGES;

STRATEGIC PLANNING;

EID: 84904048458     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.2153     Document Type: Article

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