A bargaining game analysis of international climate negotiations

Nature Climate Change

Volumn 4, Issue 6, 2014, Pages 442-445

  Smead, Rory ^a   Sandler, Ronald L ^a   Forber, Patrick ^b   Basl, John ^a  

^a NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TUFTS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CLIMATE CHANGE; EMISSION; EMISSION CONTROL; GREENHOUSE GAS; NUMERICAL MODEL; UNITED NATIONS;

EID: 84901623306     PISSN: 1758678X     EISSN: 17586798     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1038/nclimate2229     Document Type: Article

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