Climate clubs: Can small groups of countries make a big difference in addressing climate change?

Review of European Community and International Environmental Law

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 177-192

  Weischer, Lutz ^a   Morgan, Jennifer ^a   Patel, Milap ^a  

^a WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ACTION PLAN; EMISSION CONTROL; FINANCE; INCENTIVE; INVESTMENT; LABOR MOBILITY; TRADE RELATIONS; UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE;

EID: 84870202565     PISSN: 09628797     EISSN: 14679388     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/reel.12007     Document Type: Article

References (101)

1. See, e.g., S. Barrett and R.N. Stavins, 'Increasing Participation and Compliance in International Climate Change Agreements', 3:4 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics (2003), 349, at 351.
2. C. Riedy and I.M. McGregor, 'Climate Governance is Failing Us: We All Need to Respond', 8:3 PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies (2011), 1, at 3
3. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), The Emissions Gap Report: Are the Copenhagen Accord Pledges Sufficient to Limit Global Warming to 2° C or 1.5° C? A Preliminary Assessment (UNEP, 2010), at 52.
4. See, e.g., R. Eckersley, 'Moving Forward in the Climate Negotiations: Multilateralism or Minilateralism?', 12:2 Global Environmental Politics (2012), 24;
5. M. Naím, 'Minilateralism', Foreign Policy (July/ August 2009), 135;
6. G.B. Asheim, C.B. Froyn, J. Hovi, and F.C. Menz, 'Regional versus Global Cooperation for Climate Control', 51:1 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (2006), 93;
7. M.J. Hoffmann, Climate Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response after Kyoto (Oxford University Press, 2011).
8. F. Biermann, P. Pattberg, H. van Asselt and F. Zelli, 'The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures: A Framework for Analysis', 9:1 Global Environmental Politics (2009), 14, at 25.
9. J.E. Aldy, S. Barrett and R.N. Stavins, 'Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architectures', 3:4 Climate Policy (2003), 373, at 378
10. R.O. Keohane and D.G. Victor, 'The Regime Complex for Climate Change', 9:1 Perspectives on Politics (2011), 7, at 18
11. See F. Biermann et al., n. 5 above, at 29.
12. See H. Shue, 'The Unavoidability of Justice', in: A. Hurrell and B. Kingsbury (eds.), The International Politics of the Environment: Actors, Interests and Institutions (Oxford University Press: 1992), 373;
13. E.B. Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony and Intergenerational Equity (United Nations University, 1989).
14. See O.R. Young, 'Global Environmental Change and International Governance', 19:3 Millennium: Journal of International Studies (1990), 337;
15. G. Porter and J. Welsh, Global Environmental Politics (Westview Press, 1991);
16. G. Plant, 'Institutional and Legal Responses to Global Climate Change', 19:3 Millennium: Journal of International Studies (1990), 413.
17. See R.O. Keohane and D.G. Victor, n. 7 above, at 9.
18. S.O. Ladislaw, A Post-Copenhagen Pathway (Centre for Strategic and International Studies, January 2010), found at: , at 5.
19. See H. Winkler and J. Beaumont, 'Fair and Effective Multilateralism in the Post-Copenhagen Climate Negotiations', 10:6 Climate Policy (2010), 638, at 641.
20. On the advantages of the UNFCCC regime, also see J. Depledge and F. Yamin, 'The Global Climate-change Regime: A Defence', in: D. Helm and C. Hepburn (eds.), The Economics and Politics of Climate Change (Oxford University Press, 2009), 433.
21. See H. Winkler and J. Beaumont, n. 13 above, at 649.
22. See J. Depledge and F. Yamin, n. 13 above, at 451;
23. R. Eckersley, n. 4 above.
24. Decision 1/CP.13, Bali Action Plan (FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, 15 March 2012). Note that all but three of the 17 existing clubs analyzed below were started or, in the case of G8 and G20, began to consider climate change in 2005 or later.
25. Decision 1/CP.16, The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 15 March 2011), Section I, paragraph 4.
26. See, e.g., M. Naím, n. 4 above, at 136.
27. Emissions reduction targets for individual countries can of course not be directly drawn from climate science. They depend on what one considers to be 'dangerous climate change', on the models and assumptions used and on political decisions as to which emissions trajectories are preferable and how reductions need to be apportioned among countries. As a minimum, we suggest that the targets for members of a transformational climate club should be in line with the IPCC's suggestions for achieving a greenhouse gas concentration of 450 parts per million volume (ppm), providing a 50% chance of meeting the 2°C target: Reductions of 25-40% below 1990 levels by 2020 and 80-95% by 2050 for industrialized countries and substantial deviation from the baseline for developing countries. S. Gupta et al., 'Policies, Instruments and Co-operative Arrangements', in: B. Metz et al. (eds.), Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 745, Box 13.7 at 776. It has been suggested that 'substantial deviation' would mean 15-30% below baseline by 2020 for non- Annex I countries as a group, with significant differentiation within that group.
28. See M. den Elzen and N. Höhne, 'Reductions of Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Annex I and Non-Annex I Countries for Meeting Concentration Stabilisation Targets', 91:3-4 Climatic Change (2008), 249. These targets are a minimum for a transformational club in the sense that they might need to be more ambitious - for instance, if one considers 1.5°C warming or a greenhouse gas concentration of 350 ppm the threshold to avoid dangerous climate change. If the club includes targets other than emissions reductions, they should be consistent with ambitious emissions reductions - for example, for renewable energy, we would suggest the deployment levels of the International Energy Agency's (IEA) Energy Technology Perspectives 2012 2°C Scenario as a minimum, with a share of around 45% renewable energy (including large hydro) in global electricity generation by 2035 and 57% by 2050.
29. See IEA, Energy Technology Perspectives 2012: Pathways to a Clean Energy System (IEA, 2012). However, as demonstrated in the IPCC's special report on renewable energy sources, there is a large range of renewable energy deployment levels in different greenhouse gas mitigation scenarios, reaching up to 61% of global electricity generation in 2030 and 95% in 2050, depending on assumptions about the cost and potential of renewables as well as other options, such as nuclear energy or carbon capture and storage.
30. See M. Fischedick et al., 'Mitigation Potential and Costs', in: O. Edenhofer et al. (eds.), IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 791, at 799. Determining the exact appropriate targets for participating countries will thus be up to the club members, but should be informed by ambitious mitigation scenarios.
31. Eckersley also criticizes clubs focused on the large emitters only as 'elitist, procedurally unjust, and likely to be self-serving' and suggests that 'inclusive minilateralism' should include a more diverse set of countries representing 'the most capable, the most responsible, and the most vulnerable'. See R. Eckersley, n. 4 above, at 26.
32. Decision 1/CP.17, Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/ 9/Add.1, 15 March 2012), at paragraph 2.
33. G20 Leaders' Statement: 2009 Pittsburgh Summit (24-25 September 2009), found at: , at paragraph 24.
34. D. Koplow and S. Kretzman, G20 Fossil Fuel Subsidy Phase Out: A Review of Current Gaps and Needed Changes to Achieve Success (Earth Track Inc./Oil Change International, November 2001), found at: .
35. For a somewhat more optimistic assessment, compare K. Lang, The First Year of the G-20 Commitment on Fossil-fuel Subsidies: A Commentary on Lessons Learned and the Path Forward (IISD Global Subsidies Initiative, January 2011), found at: .
36. 'Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy', G8 Summit Heiligendamm 2007 Summit Declaration (7 June 2007), found at: , at paragraph 49;
37. G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit Leaders Declaration (8 July 2008), found at: , at paragraph 23.
38. 'Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable Future', G8 Leaders Declaration (8 July 2009), found at: , at paragraph 65.
39. The G8's recognition of the 2°C target is repeated verbatim in Declaration of the Leaders, The Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate Change, found at: , at 2;
40. see also Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU), 'Results of the G8 Summit 2009' (January 2012), found at: .
41. A. Vihma, 'Friendly Neighbor or Trojan Horse? Assessing the Interaction of Soft Law Initiatives and the UN Climate Regime', 9:3 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics (2009), 239;
42. UNFCCC Executive Secretary, Press Release, 'G8 Document Reenergizes Multilateral Climate Change Process under the United Nations' (7 June 2007), found at: .
43. See .
44. See Clean Energy Ministerial website, found at: .
45. S.I. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and H. van Asselt, 'Introduction: Exploring and Explaining the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate', 9:3 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics (2009), 195, at 200.
46. P. Suding and P. Lempp, 'The Multifaceted Institutional Landscape and Processes of International Renewable Energy Policy', Newsletter for the International Association for Energy Economics (Second Quarter, 2007), 4.
47. For a discussion on technology-oriented agreements, see H. de Coninck, C. Fischer, R.G. Newell and T. Ueno, 'International Technology-oriented Agreements to Address Climate Change', 36:1 Energy Policy (2008), 335.
48. See, e.g., R.B. Jackson et al., 'Protecting Climate with Forests', 3:4 Environmental Research Letters (2008), 1, at 2 37 For the purpose of this statistical analysis of club membership, the EU is counted as a 'country'.
49. F. Zelli, 'The Fragmentation of the Global Climate Governance Architecture', 2:2 WIREs Climate Change (2011), 255, at 259;
50. J. McGee and R. Taplin, 'The Role of the Asia Pacific Partnership in Discursive Contestation of the International Climate Regime', 9:3 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics (2009), 213.
51. See .
52. Statement of the Chair of the Leaders' Representatives of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate on Global Partnership Technology Action Plans and Clean Energy Analysis (July 2009), found at: .
53. Technology Action Plan Executive Summary, Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (December 2009), found at: .
54. For a review of different proposals, see D. Bodansky, International Climate Efforts beyond 2012: A Survey of Approaches (Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2004).
55. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), Fostering Low Carbon Growth: The Case for a Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement (ICTSD, November 2011).
56. Ibid;., at ix.
57. Ibid;., at 33.
58. Ibid;., at 63
59. D.G. Victor, Global Warming Gridlock: Creating More Effective Strategies for Protecting the Planet (Cambridge University Press, 2011).
60. Ibid;., at 244.
61. Ibid;., at 245.
62. Ibid, at 248.
63. Draft Protocol to the Convention Prepared by the Government of Australia for Adoption at the Fifteenth Session of the Conference of the Parties, Note by the Secretariat (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/5, 6 June 2009).
64. German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU), World in Transition: A Social Contract for Sustainability (WBGU, 2011).
65. Ibid;., at 290-291.
66. Ibid;., at 291.
67. Ibid;., at 311.
68. B. Blechman and B. Finlay, 'What Climate Control can Learn from Past Efforts to Limit Nuclear Dangers', in: R. Greenspan Bell and M.S. Ziegler (eds.), Building International Climate Cooperation: Lessons from the Weapons and Trade Regime for Achieving International Climate Goals (World Resources Institute, 2012), 71, at 87.
69. On the importance of a shared vision, see R. Greenspan Bell and M.S. Ziegler, 'Lessons from the Weapons and Trade Regime for Achieving International Climate Goals', in: R. Greenspan Bell and M.S. Ziegler, n. 56 above, 1, at 25.
70. The possible WTO law implications of all of the measures taken under a climate club would have to be analyzed individually and will depend heavily on the concrete design of these measures, which is beyond the scope of this article. However, if the environmental exception contained in Article XX(g) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Marrakesh, 15 April 1994; in force 1 January 1995) ('GATT') were to be used to justify differences in treatment, it would have to be shown that the measure closely relates to the environmental objective - namely the reduction of global greenhouse gases. See, e.g., UNEP and IISD, Environment and Trade: A Handbook (UNEP/IISD, 2005), at 37.
71. For an assessment of the benefits and challenges involved in linking emissions trading schemes, see C. Flachsland, R. Marschinski and O. Edenhofer, 'To Link or Not to Link: Benefits and Disadvantages of Linking Cap-and-Trade Systems', 9:5 Climate Policy (2009), 358;
72. K. Tangen and H. Hasselknippe, 'Converging Markets', 5:1 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics (2005), 47.
73. J. Monkelbaan, Trade Preferences for Environmentally Friendly Goods and Services (ICTSD 2011).
74. Doha Ministerial Declaration (WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001), at paragraph 31(iii).
75. World Bank, International Trade and Climate Change: Economic, Legal and Institutional Perspectives (World Bank, 2008), at 75-77. The World Bank list is a climate-focused subset based on a list of 153 environmental goods submitted by the 'Friends of Environmental Goods' - a group composed predominantly of developed countries (Canada, the EU, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Chinese Taipei, Switzerland and the United States). Neither list has been accepted by all negotiating countries.
76. See M. Sugathan, Liberalisation of Climate-friendly Environmental Goods: Issues for Small Developing Countries (ICTSD Information Note 14, October 2010).
77. R. Vossenaar, Climate-related Single-use Environmental Goods (ICTSD, September 2010).
78. See M. Sugathan, n. 62 above.
79. P. Wooders, Greenhouse Gas Emission Impacts of Liberalizing Trade in Environmental Goods (IISD, October 2009);
80. World Bank, n. 62 above.
81. J. Funk Kirkegaard, T. Hanemann and L. Weischer, It Should be a Breeze: Harnessing the Potential of Open Trade and Investment Flows in the Wind Energy Industry (Peterson Institute for International Economics/WRI, December 2009);
82. J. Funk Kirkegaard, T. Hanemann, L. Weischer and M. Miller, Toward a Sunny Future? Global Integration in the Solar PV Industry (Peterson Institute for International Economics/WRI, May 2010).
83. Ibid;.
84. GATT, n. 58 above, Article I requires that 'any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties'.
85. For legal analyses on the compatibility of climate-related trade preferences and WTO law, see A. Green and T. Epps, 'Is There a Role for Trade Measures in Addressing Climate Change?' 15:1 UC Davis Journal of International Law and Policy (2008), 1, at 8;
86. G. Hufbauer, S. Charnovitz and J. Kim, Global Warming and the World Trading System (Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2009);
87. M. Kennedy, Legal Options for a Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement (ICTSD, 2012).
88. R. Steenblik and M. Geloso Grosso, Trade in Services Related to Climate Change: An Exploratory Analysis, OECD Trade and Environment Working Paper 2011/03 (OECD, May 2012).
89. Agreement on Government Procurement (Marrakesh, 15 April 1994; in force 1 January 1995).
90. G. van Calster, 'Green Procurement and the WTO: Shades of Grey', 11:3 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law (2003), 298;
91. H. van Asselt, N. van der Grijp and F.H. Oosterhuis, 'Greener Public Purchasing: Opportunities for Climate-friendly Government Procurement under WTO and EU Rules', 6:2 Climate Policy (2006), 217.
92. On the relationship between eco-labels, procurement and world trade law, see also Centre for International Environmental Law (CIEL), Eco-labeling Standards, Green Procurement and the WTO (CIEL, March 2005).
93. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (Marrakesh, 15 April 1994; in force 1 January 1995).
94. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto, 11 December 1997; in force 16 February 2005), Article 11.2(a).
95. This raises a whole set of issues, which have been outlined in, e.g., T. Houser et al., Leveling the Carbon Playing Field: International Competition and US Climate Policy Design (WRI, 2008).
96. For a proposal to agree on principles governing BCAs among a club of countries in 'Trade and Climate Code' and apply a 'grace period' during the negotiations of the Code during which club members will not launch WTO disputes regarding BCAs against each other, see G. Hufbauer, S. Charnovitz and J. Kim, n. 72 above, at 103.
97. M. Wilke, Feed-in Tariffs for Renewable Energy and WTO Subsidy Rules: An Initial Legal Review (ICTSD, November 2011).
98. A similar code of good practice on climate policy more generally, including some provisions on clean energy subsidies, has been suggested by G. Hufbauer et al., n. 68 above, at 103.
99. See D. Bodansky, n. 42 above;
100. S. Barrett and R.N. Stavins, n. 1 above;
101. D.G. Victor, n. 47 above.