What should default reasoning be, by default?

Computational Intelligence

Volumn 13, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 165-187

  Pelletier, Francis Jeffry ^a   Elio, Renée ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA   (Canada)

Author keywords

Cognitive science; Default reasoning; Foundations; Nonmonotonic reasoning; Psychologism

Indexed keywords

COGNITIVE SYSTEMS; PHYSIOLOGICAL MODELS; THEOREM PROVING;

DEFAULT REASONING; NONMONOTONIC REASONING;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 0031141258     PISSN: 08247935     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0824-7935.00037     Document Type: Article

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