Political corruption, public procurement, and budget composition: Theory and evidence from OECD countries

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 34, Issue , 2014, Pages 372-389

  Hessami, Zohal ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

Author keywords

Budget composition; Corruption; Public procurement; Rent creation; Rent seeking

Indexed keywords

EID: 84899655736     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.02.005     Document Type: Article

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