Corruption and government size: A disaggregated analysis

Public Choice

Volumn 97, Issue 1-2, 1998, Pages 107-120

  Goel, Rajeev K ^a   Nelson, Michael A ^a,b  

^a ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b SLOVAK UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE IN NITRA   (Slovakia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032329426     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1004900603583     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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