Profit or patients’ health benefit? Exploring the heterogeneity in physician altruism

Journal of Health Economics

Volumn 32, Issue 6, 2013, Pages 1105-1116

  Godager, Geir ^a,b   Wiesen, Daniel ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OSLO   (Norway)

^b AKERSHUS UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL   (Norway)

^c UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

Author keywords

Health care quantity; Mixed logit regression; Payment incentives; Physician altruism; Physician behavior

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ALTRUISM; ARTICLE; BODY WEIGHT; HUMAN; MEDICAL FEE; MEDICAL SERVICE; MEDICAL STUDENT; PROFIT; REMISSION; THEORETICAL STUDY; CLINICAL PRACTICE; CONFIDENCE INTERVAL; CONTROLLED STUDY; DECISION MAKING; DOCTOR PATIENT RELATION; ECONOMICS; PHYSICIAN; PSYCHOLOGY; RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIAL; REIMBURSEMENT; STATISTICAL MODEL;

ALTRUISM; CHOICE BEHAVIOR; CONFIDENCE INTERVALS; HUMANS; LOGISTIC MODELS; PHYSICIAN'S PRACTICE PATTERNS; PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONS; PHYSICIANS; REIMBURSEMENT, INCENTIVE; STUDENTS, MEDICAL;

EID: 84898683073     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: 18791646     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2013.08.008     Document Type: Article

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