How payment systems affect physicians' provision behaviour-An experimental investigation

Journal of Health Economics

Volumn 30, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 637-646

  Hennig Schmidt, Heike ^a   Selten, Reinhard ^a   Wiesen, Daniel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Capitation; Fee for service; Incentives; Laboratory experiment; Physician payment system

Indexed keywords

ECONOMICS; EXPERIMENTAL STUDY; HEALTH SERVICES; INCENTIVE; SERVICE PROVISION;

ARTICLE; CAPITATION FEE; CONTROLLED STUDY; EXPERIMENTAL STUDY; HEALTH CARE COST; HEALTH ECONOMICS; HEALTH INSURANCE; HUMAN; MEDICAL FEE; MEDICAL SERVICE; MOTIVATION; PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT; PHYSICIAN ATTITUDE; PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT;

CAPITATION FEE; CHOICE BEHAVIOR; FEE-FOR-SERVICE PLANS; HEALTH SERVICES MISUSE; HUMANS; PHYSICIAN INCENTIVE PLANS; PHYSICIAN'S PRACTICE PATTERNS;

EID: 79960910222     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: 18791646     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2011.05.001     Document Type: Article

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