Treatment and referral decisions under different physician payment mechanisms

Journal of Health Economics

Volumn 30, Issue 5, 2011, Pages 880-893

  Allard, Marie ^a   Jelovac, Izabela ^b   Léger, Pierre Thomas ^a  

^a HEC MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

^b GATE Lyon Saint Etienne   (France)

Author keywords

Ability; Altruism; Capitation; Fee for service; Fundholding

Indexed keywords

ALTRUISM; HETEROGENEITY; INCENTIVE;

ALTRUISM; ARTICLE; CAPITATION FEE; CONTROLLED STUDY; FUNDING; GENERAL PRACTITIONER; HEALTH CARE COST; HEALTH INSURANCE; HUMAN; MEDICAL FEE; MEDICAL SPECIALIST; PATIENT REFERRAL; PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT;

ALTRUISM; CAPITATION FEE; CLINICAL COMPETENCE; COST CONTROL; DECISION MAKING; FEE-FOR-SERVICE PLANS; GATEKEEPING; GENERAL PRACTICE; GENERAL PRACTITIONERS; HUMANS; MODELS, ECONOMETRIC; PHYSICIAN INCENTIVE PLANS; PHYSICIAN'S PRACTICE PATTERNS; REFERRAL AND CONSULTATION;

EID: 80052855733     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: 18791646     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2011.05.016     Document Type: Article

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