Patterns of moral judgment derive from nonmoral psychological representations

Cognitive Science

Volumn 35, Issue 6, 2011, Pages 1052-1075

  Cushman, Fiery ^a   Young, Liane ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Attribution; Causation; Doctrine of doing and allowing; Doctrine of double effect; Intention; Morality; Omission bias; Theory of mind

Indexed keywords

ADOLESCENT; ADULT; ARTICLE; BEHAVIOR; DECISION MAKING; HUMAN; MORALITY; PERCEPTION; THEORY OF MIND;

ADOLESCENT; ADULT; HUMANS; INTENTION; JUDGMENT; MORALS; SOCIAL PERCEPTION; THEORY OF MIND;

EID: 79960769122     PISSN: 03640213     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1551-6709.2010.01167.x     Document Type: Article

References (68)

1. Alicke, M. (1992). Culpable causation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63(3), 368-378.
2. Alicke, M. (2000). Culpable control and the psychology of blame. Psychological Bulletin, 126(4), 556-574.
3. Bargh, J. A. (1999). The unbearable automaticity of being. American Psychologist, 54(7), 462-479.
4. Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic and statistical considerations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1173-1182.
5. Baron, J., & Ritov, I. (2004). Omission bias, individual differences, and normality. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 94, 74-85.
6. Baron, J., & Ritov, I. (2009). Protected values and omission bias as deontological judgments. In D. M. Bartels, C. W. Bauman, L. J. Skitka, & D. Medin (Eds.), Moral judgment and decision making (Vol. 50, pp. 133-167). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
7. Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1992). Cognitive adaptations for social exchange. In J. Barkow, L. Cosmides, & J. Tooby (Eds.), The adapted mind (pp. 163-228). New York: Oxford University Press.
8. Cushman, F. A. (2008a). Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment. Cognition, 108(2), 353-380.
9. Cushman, F. A. (2008b). The origins of moral principles. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard University.
10. Cushman, F. A. (in press). Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment. Cognition, 108, 353-380.
11. Cushman, F. A., Dreber, A., Wang, Y., & Costa, J. (2009). Accidental outcomes guide punishment in a 'trembling hand' game. PLoS ONE, 4(8), e6699. doi.
12. Cushman, F. A., & Greene, J. D. (in press). The philosopher in the theater. In M. Mikulincer & P. R. Shaver (Eds.), Social psychology of morality: The origins of good and evil. Washington, DC: APA Press.
13. Cushman, F. A., Knobe, J., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2008). Moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments. Cognition, 108(1), 281-289.
14. Cushman, F. A., Young, L., & Hauser, M. D. (2006). The role of conscious reasoning and intuitions in moral judgment: Testing three principles of harm. Psychological Science, 17(12), 1082-1089.
15. Darley, J. M., & Shultz, T. R. (1990). Moral rules - their content and acquisition. Annual Review of Psychology, 41, 525-556.
16. Dwyer, S. (2004). How good is the linguistic analogy Available at: Accessed February 25, 2004.
17. Fincham, F. D., & Jaspers, J. (1979). Attribution of responsibility to the self and other in children and adults. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(9), 1589-1602.
18. Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (1992). Ethics: Problems and principles. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
19. Foot, P. (1967). The problem of abortion and the doctrine of double effect. Oxford Review, 5, 5-15.
20. Greene, J. D., Cushman, F. A., Stewart, L. E., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2009). Pushing moral buttons: The interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment. Cognition, 111(3), 364-371.
21. Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004). The neural bases of cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment. Neuron, 44, 389-400.
22. Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 293, 2105-2108.
23. Greenwald, A., & Banaji, M. (1995). Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes. Psychological Review, 102(1), 4.
24. Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108, 814-834.
25. Haidt, J., & Hersh, M. A. (2001). Sexual morality: The cultures and emotions of conservatives and liberals. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 31(1), 191-221.
26. Haidt, J., Koller, S. H., & Dias, M. G. (1993). Affect, culture, and morality, or is it wrong to eat your dog? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65(4), 613-628.
27. Hart, H. L. A., & Honore, T. (1959). Causation in the law. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
28. Hauser, M. D. (2006). Moral minds: How nature designed a universal sense right and wrong. New York: Harper Collins.
29. Hauser, M. D., Cushman, F. A., Young, L., Jin, R., & mikhail, J. M. (2007). A dissociation between moral judgment and justification. Mind and Language, 22(1), 1-21.
30. Hauser, M. D., Young, L., & Cushman, F. A. (2008). Reviving Rawls' linguistic analogy. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 107-143). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
31. Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley.
32. Henrich, N., & Henrich, J. (2007). Why humans cooperate: A cultural and evolutionary explanation. New York: Oxford University Press.
33. Hirschfeld, L. A., & Gelman, S. A. (1994). Mapping the mind. Domain specificity in cognition and culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
34. Knobe, J. (2003). Intentional action in folk psychology: An experimental investigation. Philosophical Psychology, 16, 309-324.
35. Knobe, J. (2006). The concept of intentional action: A case study in the uses of folk psychology. Philosophical Studies, 130, 203-231.
36. Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F. A., Hauser, M. D., & Damasio, A. (2007). Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgments. Nature, 446, 908-911.
37. Kohlberg, L. (1981). Essays on moral development, Volume 1: The philosophy of moral development. New York: Harper Row.
38. Lieberman, D., Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (2003). Does morality have a biological basis? An empirical test of the factors governing moral sentiments relating to incest. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences, 270(1517), 819.
39. Loewy, A. H. (2003). Criminal law. St. Paul, MN: Thompson West.
40. Mikahil, J. (2007). Universal moral grammar: Theory, evidence, and the future. Trends in Cognitive Science, 11(4), 143-152.
41. Mikhail, J. M. (2000). Rawls' linguistic analogy: A study of the 'generative grammar' model of moral theory described by John Rawls in 'A theory of justice'. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Cornell University.
42. Nichols, S. (2002). Norms with feeling: Toward a psychological account of moral judgment. Cognition, 84, 221-236.
43. Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84(3), 231-259.
44. Piaget, J. (19651932). The moral judgment of the child. New York: Free Press.
45. Pinker, S. (2007). The stuff of thought. New York: Viking.
46. Pizarro, D. A., Uhlmann, E., & Bloom, P. (2003). Causal deviance and the attribution of moral responsibility. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39, 653-660.
47. Quinn, W. S. (1989). Actions, intentions, and consequneces: the doctrine of doing and allowing. The Philosophical Review, 145, 287-312.
48. Rachels, J. (1975). Active and passive euthanasia. New England Journal of Medicine, 292, 78-80.
49. Rai, T., & Holyoak, K. (2010). Moral principles or consumer preferences? Alternative framings of the trolley problem. Cognitive Science, 34(2), 311-321.
50. Ritov, I., & Baron, J. (1990). Reluctance to vaccinate: Omission bias and ambiguity. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 3, 263-277.
51. Ritov, I. I., & Baron, J. (1999). Protected values and omission bias. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 79(2), 79-94.
52. Robinson, P., & Kurzban, R. (2007). Concordance & conflict in intuitions of justice. Minnesota Law Review, 91(6), 1829-1907.
53. Royzman, E., & Baron, J. (2002). The preference for indirect harm. Social Justice Research, 15(2), 165-184.
54. Saxe, R., Carey, S., & Kanwisher, N. (2004). Understanding other minds: Linking developmental psychology and functional neuroimaging. Annual Review of Psychology, 55, 1-27.
55. Shenhav, A., & Greene, J. (2010). Moral judgments recruit domain-general valuation mechanisms to integrate representations of probability and magnitude. Neuron, 67(4), 667-677.
56. Shultz, T. R., Schleifer, M., & Altman, I. (1981). Judgments of causation, responsibility, and punishment in cases of harm-doing. Canadian Journal of Behavioral Science, 13(3), 238-253.
57. Shultz, T. R., Wright, K., & Schleifer, M. (1986). Assignment of moral responsibility and punishment. Child Development, 57(1), 177-184.
58. Sperber, D. (1995). Introduction. In D. Sperber, D. Premack, & A. Premack (Eds.), Causal cognition (pp. xv-xx). Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
59. Spranca, M., Minsk, E., & Baron, J. (1991). Omission and commission in judgment and choice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 27(1), 76-105.
60. Thomson, J. J. (1985). The trolley problem. The Yale Law Journal, 94(6), 1395-1415.
61. Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 35-57.
62. Turiel, E. (1983). The development of social knowledge: Morality and convention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
63. Waldmann, M. R., & Dieterich, J. H. (2007). Throwing a bomb on a person versus throwing a person on a bomb: Intervention myopia in moral intuitions. Psychological Science, 18(3), 247-253.
64. Wegner, D. (2002). The illusion of conscious will. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
65. Weiner, B. (1995). Judgments of responsibility: A foundation for a theory of social conduct. New York: Guilford Press.
66. Wheatley, T., & Haidt, J. (2005). Hypnotic disgust makes moral judgments more severe. Psychological Science, 16(10), 780-784.
67. White, P. A. (1990). Ideas about causation in philosophy and psychology. Psychological Bulletin, 108(1), 3-18.
68. Young, L., Cushman, F. A., Hauser, M. D., & Saxe, R. (2007). The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(20), 8235-8240.