Shared rewarding overcomes defection traps in generalized volunteer's dilemmas

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 335, Issue , 2013, Pages 13-21

  Chen, Xiaojie ^a   Gross, Thilo ^b   Dieckmann, Ulf ^a  

^a INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS   (Austria)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Evolutionary dynamics; Shared rewarding; Voluntary contribution; Volunteer's dilemma

Indexed keywords

EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY; EVOLUTIONARY THEORY; NUMERICAL METHOD; THEORETICAL STUDY;

ARTICLE; CONFLICT; COST; DEFECTION TRAP; GROUP SIZE; GROUP STRUCTURE; HUMAN; HYSTERESIS; MATHEMATICAL COMPUTING; NON VOLUNTEER; PRIORITY JOURNAL; REWARD; SHARED REWARDING; SOCIAL STRUCTURE; THEORETICAL STUDY; VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION; VOLUNTARY PROGRAM; VOLUNTEER; VOLUNTEER DILEMMA;

EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS; SHARED REWARDING; VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION; VOLUNTEER'S DILEMMA;

HUMANS; MODELS, THEORETICAL; SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS; VOLUNTEERS;

EID: 84880373291     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.06.014     Document Type: Article

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