Distributed protocols for leader election: A game-theoretic perspective

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 8205 LNCS, Issue , 2013, Pages 61-75

  Abraham, Ittai ^a   Dolev, Danny ^b   Halpern, Joseph Y ^c  

^a MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^c Cornell University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BIT-COMMITMENT PROTOCOLS; CRYPTOGRAPHIC ASSUMPTIONS; DISTRIBUTED PROTOCOLS; EX POST NASH EQUILIBRIUM; GAME-THEORETIC PERSPECTIVES; PSEUDO RANDOM NUMBER GENERATORS; SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM; UNIDIRECTIONAL RINGS;

CRYPTOGRAPHY; RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 84893757305     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-41527-2_5     Document Type: Conference Paper

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