Computationally restricted unmediated talk under incomplete information

Economic Theory

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 283-320

  Urbano, Amparo ^a   Vila, Jose E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VALENCIA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Bayesian Nash equilibrium; Computational complexity; Correlated equilibrium; Unmediated communication

Indexed keywords

EID: 0742267975     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0378-z     Document Type: Article

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