Perfect implementation

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 71, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 121-140

  Izmalkov, Sergei ^a   Lepinski, Matt ^b   Micali, Silvio ^c  

^a NEW ECONOMIC SCHOOL   (Russian Federation)

^b BBN TECHNOLOGIES   (United States)

^c USA   (United States)

Author keywords

Mechanism design; Privacy; Trust

Indexed keywords

EID: 78650897918     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.003     Document Type: Article

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