Regret freedom isn't free

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 7109 LNCS, Issue , 2011, Pages 80-95

  Wong, Edmund L ^a   Levy, Isaac ^a   Alvisi, Lorenzo ^a   Clement, Allen ^b   Dahlin, Mike ^a  

^a University of Texas at Austin   (United States)

^b MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR SOFTWARE SYSTEMS   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BEST RESPONSE; BYZANTINE FAILURES; BYZANTINE FAULT TOLERANCE; FAULT TOLERANT DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS; FUNDAMENTAL LIMITATIONS; PEER TO PEER; SOLUTION CONCEPTS;

DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS; FAULT TOLERANCE; FAULT TOLERANT COMPUTER SYSTEMS; PEER TO PEER NETWORKS;

RATIONAL FUNCTIONS;

EID: 84055212583     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-25873-2_7     Document Type: Conference Paper

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