When selfish meets evil: Byzantine players in a virus inoculation game

Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing

Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages 35-44

  Moscibroda, Thomas ^a   Schmid, Stefan ^a   Wattenhofer, Roger ^a  

^a ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Byzantine Nash Equilibria; Game Theory; Price of Anarchy; Price of Malice; Selfishness; Virus Propagation

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SIMULATION; COMPUTER SOFTWARE; COMPUTER VIRUSES; DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS; SYSTEMS ANALYSIS;

BYZANTINE NASH EQUILIBRIA; PRICE OF ANARCHY; PRICE OF MALICE; SELFISHNESS; VIRUS PROPAGATION;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 33748677680     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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