BAR fault tolerance for cooperative services

Proceedings of the 20th ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, SOSP 2005

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 45-58

  Aiyer, Amitanand S ^a   Alvisi, Lorenzo ^a   Clement, Allen ^a   Dahlin, Mike ^a   Martin, Jean Philippe ^a   Porth, Carl ^a  

^a University of Texas at Austin   (United States)

Author keywords

byzantine fault tolerance; game theory; peer to peer; reliable systems

Indexed keywords

ACCEPTABLE PERFORMANCE; BUILDING SERVICES; BYZANTINE FAULT TOLERANCE; COOPERATIVE SERVICES; MALICIOUS NODES; PEER TO PEER; RATIONAL BEHAVIOR; RELIABLE SYSTEMS;

FAULT TOLERANCE; GAME THEORY; PEER TO PEER NETWORKS; SPECIFICATIONS;

FAULT TOLERANT COMPUTER SYSTEMS;

EID: 84885635827     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1095810.1095816     Document Type: Conference Paper

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