Paradox and the Knowledge Account of Assertion

Erkenntnis

Volumn 78, Issue 5, 2013, Pages 977-978

  Pelling, Charlie ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84883801000     PISSN: 01650106     EISSN: 15728420     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10670-012-9360-0     Document Type: Article

References (6)

1. Brown, J. (2010). Knowledge and assertion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81, 549-566.
2. DeRose, K. (2002). Assertion, knowledge, and context. The Philosophical Review, 111, 167-203.
3. Hawthorne, J. (2004). Knowledge and lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Pelling, C. A self-referential paradox for the truth account of assertion. Analysis. (forthcoming).
5. Weiner, M. (2005). Must we know what we say? The Philosophical Review, 114, 227-251.
6. Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.