Dubious assertions

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 146, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 269-272

  Sosa, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

Knowledge account; Moore's paradox; Norms of assertion

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350461932     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-008-9255-8     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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