Two more for the knowledge account of assertion

Analysis

Volumn 71, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 684-687

  Benton, Matthew A ^a  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861731061     PISSN: 00032638     EISSN: 14678284     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anr085     Document Type: Review

References (11)

1. Douven, I. 2006. Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility. Philosophical Review 115:449-85.
2. Kvanvig, J. L. 2009. Assertion, knowledge, and lotteries. In Williamson on Knowledge, eds P. Greenough and D. Pritchard, 140-60. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3. Maitra, I. and B. Weatherson. 2010. Assertion, knowledge, and action. Philosophical Studies 149:99-118.
4. Moore, G. E. 1993. Moore's paradox. In G. E. Moore: Selected Writings, ed. T. Baldwin, 207-12. London: Routledge.
5. Slote, M. 1979. Assertion and belief. In Papers on Language and Logic, ed. Jonathan Dancy, 177-91. Keele: Keele University Library.
6. Reprinted in Slote, M. 2010. Selected Essays, 94-102. New York: Oxford University Press.
7. Turri, J. 2010. Prompting challenges. Analysis 70:456-62.
8. Turri, J. 2011. The express knowledge account of assertion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89:37-45.
9. Unger, P. 1975. Ignorance: A Defense of Scepticism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
10. Weiner, M. 2005. Must we know what we say? Philosophical Review 114:227-51.
11. Williamson, T. 2000. Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.