Common p-Belief: The General Case

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 73-82

  Kajii, Atsushi ^a   Morris, Stephen ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030642458     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0513     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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