Fast equilibrium selection by rational players living in a changing world

Econometrica

Volumn 69, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 163-189

  Burdzy, Krzysztof ^a   Frankel, David M ^a   Pauzner, Ady ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Dynamic games; Equilibrium selection; Payoff shocks; Risk dominance

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001301881     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00181     Document Type: Article

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