The robustness of equilibria to incomplete information

Econometrica

Volumn 65, Issue 6, 1997, Pages 1283-1309

  Kajii, Atsushi ^a   Morris, Stephen ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Higher order beliefs; Incomplete information; Refinements; Robustness

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000462179     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2171737     Document Type: Article

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