Audience features and the strategic timing of trade disputes

International Organization

Volumn 68, Issue 4, 2014, Pages 877-911

  Chaudoin, Stephen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84891698206     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818314000174     Document Type: Article

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