"Empire by Invitation" in the American Century

Diplomatic History

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 189-217

  Lundestad, Geir ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0011839263     PISSN: 01452096     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-7709.00163     Document Type: Article

References (230)

1. See Henry R. Luce, "The American Century," in this issue.
2. Luce refers several times to the twentieth century as the American Century. Still, it is obvious that he thought this label applied only to a limited extent to the first four decades since the United States had then failed to assume its leadership role. Thus, he wrote that as to the "golden opportunity handed to us on the proverbial silver platter . . . we bungled it in the 1920's and in the confusions of the 1930's we killed it." Obviously, Luce's article was primarily a plea that the United States now finally assume its global leadership role, not an analysis of what had already taken place. Luce's "American Century" has often been compared with Henry Wallace's "Century of the Common Man" presented in 1942-1945. For a recent account using these two concepts as organizing principles for much of the analysis see Donald W. White, The American Century: The Rise & Decline of the United States as a World Power (New Haven, 1996), particularly 8-12.
3. Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952" The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Newsletter 15 (September 1984): 1-21. A revised and improved version with the same title was published in Journal of Peace Research 23 (September 1986): 263-77. Then, the argument was further revised in "The American 'Empire' 1945-1990," in my The American "Empire" and Other Studies of US Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective (Oxford-Oslo, 1990), 31-115, particularly 54-70.
4. Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952" The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Newsletter 15 (September 1984): 1-21. A revised and improved version with the same title was published in Journal of Peace Research 23 (September 1986): 263-77. Then, the argument was further revised in "The American 'Empire' 1945-1990," in my The American "Empire" and Other Studies of US Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective (Oxford-Oslo, 1990), 31-115, particularly 54-70.
5. Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952" The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Newsletter 15 (September 1984): 1-21. A revised and improved version with the same title was published in Journal of Peace Research 23 (September 1986): 263-77. Then, the argument was further revised in "The American 'Empire' 1945-1990," in my The American "Empire" and Other Studies of US Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective (Oxford-Oslo, 1990), 31-115, particularly 54-70.
6. Akira Iriye, The Globalizing of America, 1913-1945, Vol. 3, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations (Cambridge, England, 1995), 23-30.
7. Klaus Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918-1919 (Chapel Hill, 1985-), 11, 30-39, particularly 52-54.
8. The quotation is from Anthony Lentin, "The Treaty That Never Was: Lloyd George and the Abortive Anglo-French Alliance of 1919," in The Life and Times of David Lloyd George, ed. Judith Loades (Bangor, 1991), 124. For other good accounts of the American guarantee to France see Lloyd Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (Cambridge, England, 1987), particularly 108-13; Melvyn P. Leffler, The Elusive Quest: America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security, 1933-1033 (Chapel Hill, 1979), 3-18; P.M. H. Bell, France and Britain, 1900-1040: Entente and Estrangement (London, 1996), 117-26; A. Lentin, "Several Types of Ambiguity: Lloyd George and the Paris Peace Conference," Diplomacy & Statecraft 6 (March 1995): 223-51, particularly 242-43; and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, France and the United States: From the Beginnings to the Present (Chicago, 1976), 102-20. For an older account see Louis A. R. Yates, United States and french Security, 1917-1921 (New York, 1957).
9. The quotation is from Anthony Lentin, "The Treaty That Never Was: Lloyd George and the Abortive Anglo-French Alliance of 1919," in The Life and Times of David Lloyd George, ed. Judith Loades (Bangor, 1991), 124. For other good accounts of the American guarantee to France see Lloyd Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (Cambridge, England, 1987), particularly 108-13; Melvyn P. Leffler, The Elusive Quest: America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security, 1933-1033 (Chapel Hill, 1979), 3-18; P.M. H. Bell, France and Britain, 1900-1040: Entente and Estrangement (London, 1996), 117-26; A. Lentin, "Several Types of Ambiguity: Lloyd George and the Paris Peace Conference," Diplomacy & Statecraft 6 (March 1995): 223-51, particularly 242-43; and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, France and the United States: From the Beginnings to the Present (Chicago, 1976), 102-20. For an older account see Louis A. R. Yates, United States and french Security, 1917-1921 (New York, 1957).
10. The quotation is from Anthony Lentin, "The Treaty That Never Was: Lloyd George and the Abortive Anglo-French Alliance of 1919," in The Life and Times of David Lloyd George, ed. Judith Loades (Bangor, 1991), 124. For other good accounts of the American guarantee to France see Lloyd Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (Cambridge, England, 1987), particularly 108-13; Melvyn P. Leffler, The Elusive Quest: America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security, 1933-1033 (Chapel Hill, 1979), 3-18; P.M. H. Bell, France and Britain, 1900-1040: Entente and Estrangement (London, 1996), 117-26; A. Lentin, "Several Types of Ambiguity: Lloyd George and the Paris Peace Conference," Diplomacy & Statecraft 6 (March 1995): 223-51, particularly 242-43; and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, France and the United States: From the Beginnings to the Present (Chicago, 1976), 102-20. For an older account see Louis A. R. Yates, United States and french Security, 1917-1921 (New York, 1957).
11. The quotation is from Anthony Lentin, "The Treaty That Never Was: Lloyd George and the Abortive Anglo-French Alliance of 1919," in The Life and Times of David Lloyd George, ed. Judith Loades (Bangor, 1991), 124. For other good accounts of the American guarantee to France see Lloyd Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (Cambridge, England, 1987), particularly 108-13; Melvyn P. Leffler, The Elusive Quest: America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security, 1933-1033 (Chapel Hill, 1979), 3-18; P.M. H. Bell, France and Britain, 1900-1040: Entente and Estrangement (London, 1996), 117-26; A. Lentin, "Several Types of Ambiguity: Lloyd George and the Paris Peace Conference," Diplomacy & Statecraft 6 (March 1995): 223-51, particularly 242-43; and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, France and the United States: From the Beginnings to the Present (Chicago, 1976), 102-20. For an older account see Louis A. R. Yates, United States and french Security, 1917-1921 (New York, 1957).
12. The quotation is from Anthony Lentin, "The Treaty That Never Was: Lloyd George and the Abortive Anglo-French Alliance of 1919," in The Life and Times of David Lloyd George, ed. Judith Loades (Bangor, 1991), 124. For other good accounts of the American guarantee to France see Lloyd Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (Cambridge, England, 1987), particularly 108-13; Melvyn P. Leffler, The Elusive Quest: America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security, 1933-1033 (Chapel Hill, 1979), 3-18; P.M. H. Bell, France and Britain, 1900-1040: Entente and Estrangement (London, 1996), 117-26; A. Lentin, "Several Types of Ambiguity: Lloyd George and the Paris Peace Conference," Diplomacy & Statecraft 6 (March 1995): 223-51, particularly 242-43; and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, France and the United States: From the Beginnings to the Present (Chicago, 1976), 102-20. For an older account see Louis A. R. Yates, United States and french Security, 1917-1921 (New York, 1957).
13. The quotation is from Anthony Lentin, "The Treaty That Never Was: Lloyd George and the Abortive Anglo-French Alliance of 1919," in The Life and Times of David Lloyd George, ed. Judith Loades (Bangor, 1991), 124. For other good accounts of the American guarantee to France see Lloyd Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (Cambridge, England, 1987), particularly 108-13; Melvyn P. Leffler, The Elusive Quest: America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security, 1933-1033 (Chapel Hill, 1979), 3-18; P.M. H. Bell, France and Britain, 1900-1040: Entente and Estrangement (London, 1996), 117-26; A. Lentin, "Several Types of Ambiguity: Lloyd George and the Paris Peace Conference," Diplomacy & Statecraft 6 (March 1995): 223-51, particularly 242-43; and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, France and the United States: From the Beginnings to the Present (Chicago, 1976), 102-20. For an older account see Louis A. R. Yates, United States and french Security, 1917-1921 (New York, 1957).
14. The quotation is from Anthony Lentin, "The Treaty That Never Was: Lloyd George and the Abortive Anglo-French Alliance of 1919," in The Life and Times of David Lloyd George, ed. Judith Loades (Bangor, 1991), 124. For other good accounts of the American guarantee to France see Lloyd Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (Cambridge, England, 1987), particularly 108-13; Melvyn P. Leffler, The Elusive Quest: America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security, 1933-1033 (Chapel Hill, 1979), 3-18; P.M. H. Bell, France and Britain, 1900-1040: Entente and Estrangement (London, 1996), 117-26; A. Lentin, "Several Types of Ambiguity: Lloyd George and the Paris Peace Conference," Diplomacy & Statecraft 6 (March 1995): 223-51, particularly 242-43; and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, France and the United States: From the Beginnings to the Present (Chicago, 1976), 102-20. For an older account see Louis A. R. Yates, United States and french Security, 1917-1921 (New York, 1957).
15. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 215; William R. Keylor, "The Rise and Demise of the Franco-American Guarantee Pact, 1919-1921," Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History 15 (1988): 367-77; Leffler, The Elusive Quest, 3-39, particularly 30-33.
16. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 215; William R. Keylor, "The Rise and Demise of the Franco-American Guarantee Pact, 1919-1921," Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History 15 (1988): 367-77; Leffler, The Elusive Quest, 3-39, particularly 30-33.
17. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, 215; William R. Keylor, "The Rise and Demise of the Franco-American Guarantee Pact, 1919-1921," Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History 15 (1988): 367-77; Leffler, The Elusive Quest, 3-39, particularly 30-33.
18. Michael J. Hogan, Informal Entente: The Private Structure of Cooperation in Anglo-American Economic Diplomacy, 1918-1928 (Columbia, MO, 1977), 20-37, particularly 20-22.
19. Ibid., 20; Duroselle, France and the United States, 110-13.
20. Ibid., 20; Duroselle, France and the United States, 110-13.
21. Duroselle, France and the United States, 111-12.
22. Frank Costigliola, Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919-1933 (Ithaca, 1984), 139, 149-50, 154-5-5. In the 1920s American exports to Europe were higher than they had been before the First World War, but, not very surprisingly, smaller than they had been in the years 1916-1920. Although the United States maintained a favorable balance of trade, in the 1920s imports from Europe increased more than U.S. exports, also compared with the years during the war. For this, see U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States. Colonial Times to 1970. Part 2 (Washington, 1975), 903, 906.
23. Frank Costigliola, Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919-1933 (Ithaca, 1984), 139, 149-50, 154-5-5. In the 1920s American exports to Europe were higher than they had been before the First World War, but, not very surprisingly, smaller than they had been in the years 1916-1920. Although the United States maintained a favorable balance of trade, in the 1920s imports from Europe increased more than U.S. exports, also compared with the years during the war. For this, see U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States. Colonial Times to 1970. Part 2 (Washington, 1975), 903, 906.
24. Luce, "The American Century."
25. Quoted from Costigliola, Awkward Dominion, 20. See also Richard Pells, Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II (New York, 1997), 7-22; and Iriye, The Globalizing of America, 1913-1945, 112-15. For the growing American impact on Norway see Sigmund Skard, The United States in Norwegian History (Westport, 1976), 145-72.
26. Quoted from Costigliola, Awkward Dominion, 20. See also Richard Pells, Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II (New York, 1997), 7-22; and Iriye, The Globalizing of America, 1913-1945, 112-15. For the growing American impact on Norway see Sigmund Skard, The United States in Norwegian History (Westport, 1976), 145-72.
27. Quoted from Costigliola, Awkward Dominion, 20. See also Richard Pells, Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II (New York, 1997), 7-22; and Iriye, The Globalizing of America, 1913-1945, 112-15. For the growing American impact on Norway see Sigmund Skard, The United States in Norwegian History (Westport, 1976), 145-72.
28. Quoted from Costigliola, Awkward Dominion, 20. See also Richard Pells, Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II (New York, 1997), 7-22; and Iriye, The Globalizing of America, 1913-1945, 112-15. For the growing American impact on Norway see Sigmund Skard, The United States in Norwegian History (Westport, 1976), 145-72.
29. This is the rather basic point in Pells's Not Like Us, a point not very surprising to most Europeans. Yet, the definition of what exactly it meant to be French, Norwegian, etc. kept changing over time, and American influence was one of many factors in this development.
30. These terms have been taken from B. J. C. McKercher, "The Deep and Latent Distrust: The British Official Mind and the United States, 1919-1929," in McKercher, Anglo-American Relations in the 1920s: The Struggle for Supremacy (London, 1991), 209-38. For a study of dramatic tension between the United States and Britain see Christopher M. Bell, "Thinking the Unthinkable: British and American Naval Strategies for an Anglo-American War, 1918-1931," International History Review 19, no. 4 (1997): 789-808.
31. These terms have been taken from B. J. C. McKercher, "The Deep and Latent Distrust: The British Official Mind and the United States, 1919-1929," in McKercher, Anglo-American Relations in the 1920s: The Struggle for Supremacy (London, 1991), 209-38. For a study of dramatic tension between the United States and Britain see Christopher M. Bell, "Thinking the Unthinkable: British and American Naval Strategies for an Anglo-American War, 1918-1931," International History Review 19, no. 4 (1997): 789-808.
32. Duroselle, France and the United States, 121-46.
33. Hans W. Gatzke, Germany and the United States: A "Special Relationship"? (Cambridge, MA, 1980), 75-102.
34. Lundestad, The American "Empire", particularly 54-56.
35. See, for instance, John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," Diplomatic History 7 (Summer 1983): 171-90, particularly 177, 181-83; Bruce K. Kuniholm, "Response," ibid., 201-4; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Cycles of American History (Boston, 1986), 161; Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987), 444; Thomas G. Paterson and Robert J. McMahon, The Origins of the Cold War (Lexington, MA, 1991), 110-18; Thomas Alan Schwartz, America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, MA, 1991), 299-300; Robert Keohane, "The United States and the Postwar Order: Empire or Hegemony," Journal of Peace Research 28, no. 4 (1991): 435-39; the contributions by David Reynolds and Anders Stephanson in Reynolds, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives (New Haven, 1994), 7, 36-57; Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam, and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954 (Montreal, 1995), 4-5; Douglas J. Macdonald, "Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War," International Security 20 (Winter 1995-96): 159-60; David Reynolds, "America's Europe, Europe's America: Image, Influence, and Interaction, 1933-1958," Diplomatic History 20 (Fall 1996): 653; and John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, 1997), 26-53, particularly 26-28, 51-53, 284-86, 304-5 n. 4, 312 n. 120. There are also many references to "empire by invitation," both critical and less so, in discussions on the Internet website H-DIPLO. A particularly valuable contribution was made on 12 December 1997 by Piers Ludlow under the subject heading "France, the Western Alliance, and the Origins of the Schuman Plan." See also contributions under the subject heading "The Legitimacy of the American Empire."
36. See, for instance, John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," Diplomatic History 7 (Summer 1983): 171-90, particularly 177, 181-83; Bruce K. Kuniholm, "Response," ibid., 201-4; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Cycles of American History (Boston, 1986), 161; Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987), 444; Thomas G. Paterson and Robert J. McMahon, The Origins of the Cold War (Lexington, MA, 1991), 110-18; Thomas Alan Schwartz, America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, MA, 1991), 299-300; Robert Keohane, "The United States and the Postwar Order: Empire or Hegemony," Journal of Peace Research 28, no. 4 (1991): 435-39; the contributions by David Reynolds and Anders Stephanson in Reynolds, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives (New Haven, 1994), 7, 36-57; Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam, and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954 (Montreal, 1995), 4-5; Douglas J. Macdonald, "Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War," International Security 20 (Winter 1995-96): 159-60; David Reynolds, "America's Europe, Europe's America: Image, Influence, and Interaction, 1933-1958," Diplomatic History 20 (Fall 1996): 653; and John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, 1997), 26-53, particularly 26-28, 51-53, 284-86, 304-5 n. 4, 312 n. 120. There are also many references to "empire by invitation," both critical and less so, in discussions on the Internet website H-DIPLO. A particularly valuable contribution was made on 12 December 1997 by Piers Ludlow under the subject heading "France, the Western Alliance, and the Origins of the Schuman Plan." See also contributions under the subject heading "The Legitimacy of the American Empire."
37. See, for instance, John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," Diplomatic History 7 (Summer 1983): 171-90, particularly 177, 181-83; Bruce K. Kuniholm, "Response," ibid., 201-4; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Cycles of American History (Boston, 1986), 161; Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987), 444; Thomas G. Paterson and Robert J. McMahon, The Origins of the Cold War (Lexington, MA, 1991), 110-18; Thomas Alan Schwartz, America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, MA, 1991), 299-300; Robert Keohane, "The United States and the Postwar Order: Empire or Hegemony," Journal of Peace Research 28, no. 4 (1991): 435-39; the contributions by David Reynolds and Anders Stephanson in Reynolds, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives (New Haven, 1994), 7, 36-57; Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam, and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954 (Montreal, 1995), 4-5; Douglas J. Macdonald, "Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War," International Security 20 (Winter 1995-96): 159-60; David Reynolds, "America's Europe, Europe's America: Image, Influence, and Interaction, 1933-1958," Diplomatic History 20 (Fall 1996): 653; and John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, 1997), 26-53, particularly 26-28, 51-53, 284-86, 304-5 n. 4, 312 n. 120. There are also many references to "empire by invitation," both critical and less so, in discussions on the Internet website H-DIPLO. A particularly valuable contribution was made on 12 December 1997 by Piers Ludlow under the subject heading "France, the Western Alliance, and the Origins of the Schuman Plan." See also contributions under the subject heading "The Legitimacy of the American Empire."
38. See, for instance, John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," Diplomatic History 7 (Summer 1983): 171-90, particularly 177, 181-83; Bruce K. Kuniholm, "Response," ibid., 201-4; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Cycles of American History (Boston, 1986), 161; Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987), 444; Thomas G. Paterson and Robert J. McMahon, The Origins of the Cold War (Lexington, MA, 1991), 110-18; Thomas Alan Schwartz, America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, MA, 1991), 299-300; Robert Keohane, "The United States and the Postwar Order: Empire or Hegemony," Journal of Peace Research 28, no. 4 (1991): 435-39; the contributions by David Reynolds and Anders Stephanson in Reynolds, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives (New Haven, 1994), 7, 36-57; Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam, and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954 (Montreal, 1995), 4-5; Douglas J. Macdonald, "Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War," International Security 20 (Winter 1995-96): 159-60; David Reynolds, "America's Europe, Europe's America: Image, Influence, and Interaction, 1933-1958," Diplomatic History 20 (Fall 1996): 653; and John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, 1997), 26-53, particularly 26-28, 51-53, 284-86, 304-5 n. 4, 312 n. 120. There are also many references to "empire by invitation," both critical and less so, in discussions on the Internet website H-DIPLO. A particularly valuable contribution was made on 12 December 1997 by Piers Ludlow under the subject heading "France, the Western Alliance, and the Origins of the Schuman Plan." See also contributions under the subject heading "The Legitimacy of the American Empire."
39. See, for instance, John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," Diplomatic History 7 (Summer 1983): 171-90, particularly 177, 181-83; Bruce K. Kuniholm, "Response," ibid., 201-4; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Cycles of American History (Boston, 1986), 161; Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987), 444; Thomas G. Paterson and Robert J. McMahon, The Origins of the Cold War (Lexington, MA, 1991), 110-18; Thomas Alan Schwartz, America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, MA, 1991), 299-300; Robert Keohane, "The United States and the Postwar Order: Empire or Hegemony," Journal of Peace Research 28, no. 4 (1991): 435-39; the contributions by David Reynolds and Anders Stephanson in Reynolds, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives (New Haven, 1994), 7, 36-57; Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam, and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954 (Montreal, 1995), 4-5; Douglas J. Macdonald, "Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War," International Security 20 (Winter 1995-96): 159-60; David Reynolds, "America's Europe, Europe's America: Image, Influence, and Interaction, 1933-1958," Diplomatic History 20 (Fall 1996): 653; and John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, 1997), 26-53, particularly 26-28, 51-53, 284-86, 304-5 n. 4, 312 n. 120. There are also many references to "empire by invitation," both critical and less so, in discussions on the Internet website H-DIPLO. A particularly valuable contribution was made on 12 December 1997 by Piers Ludlow under the subject heading "France, the Western Alliance, and the Origins of the Schuman Plan." See also contributions under the subject heading "The Legitimacy of the American Empire."
40. See, for instance, John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," Diplomatic History 7 (Summer 1983): 171-90, particularly 177, 181-83; Bruce K. Kuniholm, "Response," ibid., 201-4; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Cycles of American History (Boston, 1986), 161; Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987), 444; Thomas G. Paterson and Robert J. McMahon, The Origins of the Cold War (Lexington, MA, 1991), 110-18; Thomas Alan Schwartz, America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, MA, 1991), 299-300; Robert Keohane, "The United States and the Postwar Order: Empire or Hegemony," Journal of Peace Research 28, no. 4 (1991): 435-39; the contributions by David Reynolds and Anders Stephanson in Reynolds, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives (New Haven, 1994), 7, 36-57; Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam, and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954 (Montreal, 1995), 4-5; Douglas J. Macdonald, "Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War," International Security 20 (Winter 1995-96): 159-60; David Reynolds, "America's Europe, Europe's America: Image, Influence, and Interaction, 1933-1958," Diplomatic History 20 (Fall 1996): 653; and John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, 1997), 26-53, particularly 26-28, 51-53, 284-86, 304-5 n. 4, 312 n. 120. There are also many references to "empire by invitation," both critical and less so, in discussions on the Internet website H-DIPLO. A particularly valuable contribution was made on 12 December 1997 by Piers Ludlow under the subject heading "France, the Western Alliance, and the Origins of the Schuman Plan." See also contributions under the subject heading "The Legitimacy of the American Empire."
41. See, for instance, John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," Diplomatic History 7 (Summer 1983): 171-90, particularly 177, 181-83; Bruce K. Kuniholm, "Response," ibid., 201-4; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Cycles of American History (Boston, 1986), 161; Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987), 444; Thomas G. Paterson and Robert J. McMahon, The Origins of the Cold War (Lexington, MA, 1991), 110-18; Thomas Alan Schwartz, America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, MA, 1991), 299-300; Robert Keohane, "The United States and the Postwar Order: Empire or Hegemony," Journal of Peace Research 28, no. 4 (1991): 435-39; the contributions by David Reynolds and Anders Stephanson in Reynolds, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives (New Haven, 1994), 7, 36-57; Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam, and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954 (Montreal, 1995), 4-5; Douglas J. Macdonald, "Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War," International Security 20 (Winter 1995-96): 159-60; David Reynolds, "America's Europe, Europe's America: Image, Influence, and Interaction, 1933-1958," Diplomatic History 20 (Fall 1996): 653; and John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, 1997), 26-53, particularly 26-28, 51-53, 284-86, 304-5 n. 4, 312 n. 120. There are also many references to "empire by invitation," both critical and less so, in discussions on the Internet website H-DIPLO. A particularly valuable contribution was made on 12 December 1997 by Piers Ludlow under the subject heading "France, the Western Alliance, and the Origins of the Schuman Plan." See also contributions under the subject heading "The Legitimacy of the American Empire."
42. See, for instance, John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," Diplomatic History 7 (Summer 1983): 171-90, particularly 177, 181-83; Bruce K. Kuniholm, "Response," ibid., 201-4; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Cycles of American History (Boston, 1986), 161; Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987), 444; Thomas G. Paterson and Robert J. McMahon, The Origins of the Cold War (Lexington, MA, 1991), 110-18; Thomas Alan Schwartz, America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, MA, 1991), 299-300; Robert Keohane, "The United States and the Postwar Order: Empire or Hegemony," Journal of Peace Research 28, no. 4 (1991): 435-39; the contributions by David Reynolds and Anders Stephanson in Reynolds, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives (New Haven, 1994), 7, 36-57; Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam, and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954 (Montreal, 1995), 4-5; Douglas J. Macdonald, "Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War," International Security 20 (Winter 1995-96): 159-60; David Reynolds, "America's Europe, Europe's America: Image, Influence, and Interaction, 1933-1958," Diplomatic History 20 (Fall 1996): 653; and John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, 1997), 26-53, particularly 26-28, 51-53, 284-86, 304-5 n. 4, 312 n. 120. There are also many references to "empire by invitation," both critical and less so, in discussions on the Internet website H-DIPLO. A particularly valuable contribution was made on 12 December 1997 by Piers Ludlow under the subject heading "France, the Western Alliance, and the Origins of the Schuman Plan." See also contributions under the subject heading "The Legitimacy of the American Empire."
43. See, for instance, John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," Diplomatic History 7 (Summer 1983): 171-90, particularly 177, 181-83; Bruce K. Kuniholm, "Response," ibid., 201-4; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Cycles of American History (Boston, 1986), 161; Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987), 444; Thomas G. Paterson and Robert J. McMahon, The Origins of the Cold War (Lexington, MA, 1991), 110-18; Thomas Alan Schwartz, America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, MA, 1991), 299-300; Robert Keohane, "The United States and the Postwar Order: Empire or Hegemony," Journal of Peace Research 28, no. 4 (1991): 435-39; the contributions by David Reynolds and Anders Stephanson in Reynolds, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives (New Haven, 1994), 7, 36-57; Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam, and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954 (Montreal, 1995), 4-5; Douglas J. Macdonald, "Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War," International Security 20 (Winter 1995-96): 159-60; David Reynolds, "America's Europe, Europe's America: Image, Influence, and Interaction, 1933-1958," Diplomatic History 20 (Fall 1996): 653; and John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, 1997), 26-53, particularly 26-28, 51-53, 284-86, 304-5 n. 4, 312 n. 120. There are also many references to "empire by invitation," both critical and less so, in discussions on the Internet website H-DIPLO. A particularly valuable contribution was made on 12 December 1997 by Piers Ludlow under the subject heading "France, the Western Alliance, and the Origins of the Schuman Plan." See also contributions under the subject heading "The Legitimacy of the American Empire."
44. See, for instance, John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," Diplomatic History 7 (Summer 1983): 171-90, particularly 177, 181-83; Bruce K. Kuniholm, "Response," ibid., 201-4; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Cycles of American History (Boston, 1986), 161; Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987), 444; Thomas G. Paterson and Robert J. McMahon, The Origins of the Cold War (Lexington, MA, 1991), 110-18; Thomas Alan Schwartz, America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, MA, 1991), 299-300; Robert Keohane, "The United States and the Postwar Order: Empire or Hegemony," Journal of Peace Research 28, no. 4 (1991): 435-39; the contributions by David Reynolds and Anders Stephanson in Reynolds, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives (New Haven, 1994), 7, 36-57; Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam, and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954 (Montreal, 1995), 4-5; Douglas J. Macdonald, "Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War," International Security 20 (Winter 1995-96): 159-60; David Reynolds, "America's Europe, Europe's America: Image, Influence, and Interaction, 1933-1958," Diplomatic History 20 (Fall 1996): 653; and John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, 1997), 26-53, particularly 26-28, 51-53, 284-86, 304-5 n. 4, 312 n. 120. There are also many references to "empire by invitation," both critical and less so, in discussions on the Internet website H-DIPLO. A particularly valuable contribution was made on 12 December 1997 by Piers Ludlow under the subject heading "France, the Western Alliance, and the Origins of the Schuman Plan." See also contributions under the subject heading "The Legitimacy of the American Empire."
45. See, for instance, John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," Diplomatic History 7 (Summer 1983): 171-90, particularly 177, 181-83; Bruce K. Kuniholm, "Response," ibid., 201-4; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Cycles of American History (Boston, 1986), 161; Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987), 444; Thomas G. Paterson and Robert J. McMahon, The Origins of the Cold War (Lexington, MA, 1991), 110-18; Thomas Alan Schwartz, America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, MA, 1991), 299-300; Robert Keohane, "The United States and the Postwar Order: Empire or Hegemony," Journal of Peace Research 28, no. 4 (1991): 435-39; the contributions by David Reynolds and Anders Stephanson in Reynolds, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives (New Haven, 1994), 7, 36-57; Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam, and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954 (Montreal, 1995), 4-5; Douglas J. Macdonald, "Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War," International Security 20 (Winter 1995-96): 159-60; David Reynolds, "America's Europe, Europe's America: Image, Influence, and Interaction, 1933-1958," Diplomatic History 20 (Fall 1996): 653; and John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, 1997), 26-53, particularly 26-28, 51-53, 284-86, 304-5 n. 4, 312 n. 120. There are also many references to "empire by invitation," both critical and less so, in discussions on the Internet website H-DIPLO. A particularly valuable contribution was made on 12 December 1997 by Piers Ludlow under the subject heading "France, the Western Alliance, and the Origins of the Schuman Plan." See also contributions under the subject heading "The Legitimacy of the American Empire."
46. See, for instance, John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," Diplomatic History 7 (Summer 1983): 171-90, particularly 177, 181-83; Bruce K. Kuniholm, "Response," ibid., 201-4; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Cycles of American History (Boston, 1986), 161; Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987), 444; Thomas G. Paterson and Robert J. McMahon, The Origins of the Cold War (Lexington, MA, 1991), 110-18; Thomas Alan Schwartz, America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, MA, 1991), 299-300; Robert Keohane, "The United States and the Postwar Order: Empire or Hegemony," Journal of Peace Research 28, no. 4 (1991): 435-39; the contributions by David Reynolds and Anders Stephanson in Reynolds, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives (New Haven, 1994), 7, 36-57; Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam, and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954 (Montreal, 1995), 4-5; Douglas J. Macdonald, "Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War," International Security 20 (Winter 1995-96): 159-60; David Reynolds, "America's Europe, Europe's America: Image, Influence, and Interaction, 1933-1958," Diplomatic History 20 (Fall 1996): 653; and John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, 1997), 26-53, particularly 26-28, 51-53, 284-86, 304-5 n. 4, 312 n. 120. There are also many references to "empire by invitation," both critical and less so, in discussions on the Internet website H-DIPLO. A particularly valuable contribution was made on 12 December 1997 by Piers Ludlow under the subject heading "France, the Western Alliance, and the Origins of the Schuman Plan." See also contributions under the subject heading "The Legitimacy of the American Empire."
47. Keohane, "The United States and the Postwar Order: Empire or Hegemony," 435-39; Jasmine Aimaq, For Europe or Empire? French Colonial Ambitions and the European Army Plan (Lund, 1996), particularly 32-46; Thomas D. Lairson, "Revising Postrevisionism: Credibility and Hegemony in the Early Cold War," in Re-Thinking the Cold War, ed. Allen Hunter (Philadelphia, 1998), 63-90.
48. Keohane, "The United States and the Postwar Order: Empire or Hegemony," 435-39; Jasmine Aimaq, For Europe or Empire? French Colonial Ambitions and the European Army Plan (Lund, 1996), particularly 32-46; Thomas D. Lairson, "Revising Postrevisionism: Credibility and Hegemony in the Early Cold War," in Re-Thinking the Cold War, ed. Allen Hunter (Philadelphia, 1998), 63-90.
49. Keohane, "The United States and the Postwar Order: Empire or Hegemony," 435-39; Jasmine Aimaq, For Europe or Empire? French Colonial Ambitions and the European Army Plan (Lund, 1996), particularly 32-46; Thomas D. Lairson, "Revising Postrevisionism: Credibility and Hegemony in the Early Cold War," in Re-Thinking the Cold War, ed. Allen Hunter (Philadelphia, 1998), 63-90.
50. Geir Lundestad, "Empire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997 (Oxford, 1998), 2-4. For a suitable definition of "empire" in this wider sense see Gaddis, We Now Know, 27. ("I mean, by this term, a situation in which a single state shapes the behavior of others, whether directly or indirectly, partially or completely, by means that can range from the outright use of force through intimidation, dependency, inducements, and even inspiration.")
51. Geir Lundestad, "Empire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997 (Oxford, 1998), 2-4. For a suitable definition of "empire" in this wider sense see Gaddis, We Now Know, 27. ("I mean, by this term, a situation in which a single state shapes the behavior of others, whether directly or indirectly, partially or completely, by means that can range from the outright use of force through intimidation, dependency, inducements, and even inspiration.")
52. I have discussed this point with many historians and political scientists, particularly with John Gaddis and Melvyn Leffler.
53. Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation?" 268. In The American "Empire" I strengthened this formulation further and wrote that "Neither the Europeans nor any other foreigners could determine US foreign policy. This was done in Washington largely on the basis of America's own interests" (p. 56).
54. Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation?" 272-75.
55. Derek H. Aldcroft, From Versailles to Wall street, 1919-1929 (Harmondsworth, 1987), 239-67.
56. U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States, pt. 2:874. The best analysis of the conditions set by Washington is still found in Hadley Arkes, Bureaucracy, the Marshall Plan, and the National Interest (Princeton, 1972), particularly 153-72.
57. U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States, pt. 2:874. The best analysis of the conditions set by Washington is still found in Hadley Arkes, Bureaucracy, the Marshall Plan, and the National Interest (Princeton, 1972), particularly 153-72.
58. Geir Lundestad, The American Non-Policy towards Eastern Europe, 1943-1947: Universalism in an Area Not of Essential Interest to the United States (Oslo, 1975), particularly 384-408.
59. Robert M. Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America, 1944-1947 (New York, 1981) is still the best book on this important topic.
60. Cees Wiebes & Bert Zeeman, "Benelux," in Reynolds, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe, 172-86.
61. Quoted from Georges-Henri Soutou, "France," in Reynolds, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe, 100.
62. The quotation is from Georgette Elgey, La republique des illusions 1945-1951 [The republic of illusions, 1945-1951] (Paris, 1965), 382. See also Charles G. Cogan, Forced to Choose: France, the Atlantic Alliance, and NATO - Then and Now (Westport, 1997), 26-45; Soutou, "France," in Reynolds, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe, 100-106; and Wiebes & Zeeman, "Benelux," in Reynolds, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe, 178-86. The French efforts at military contacts in 1946-1948 are associated with the name of deputy chief of the army, Pierre Billotte. For this see particularly Cogan, Forced to Choose, 26-31.
63. The quotation is from Georgette Elgey, La republique des illusions 1945-1951 [The republic of illusions, 1945-1951] (Paris, 1965), 382. See also Charles G. Cogan, Forced to Choose: France, the Atlantic Alliance, and NATO - Then and Now (Westport, 1997), 26-45; Soutou, "France," in Reynolds, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe, 100-106; and Wiebes & Zeeman, "Benelux," in Reynolds, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe, 178-86. The French efforts at military contacts in 1946-1948 are associated with the name of deputy chief of the army, Pierre Billotte. For this see particularly Cogan, Forced to Choose, 26-31.
64. The quotation is from Georgette Elgey, La republique des illusions 1945-1951 [The republic of illusions, 1945-1951] (Paris, 1965), 382. See also Charles G. Cogan, Forced to Choose: France, the Atlantic Alliance, and NATO - Then and Now (Westport, 1997), 26-45; Soutou, "France," in Reynolds, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe, 100-106; and Wiebes & Zeeman, "Benelux," in Reynolds, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe, 178-86. The French efforts at military contacts in 1946-1948 are associated with the name of deputy chief of the army, Pierre Billotte. For this see particularly Cogan, Forced to Choose, 26-31.
65. The quotation is from Georgette Elgey, La republique des illusions 1945-1951 [The republic of illusions, 1945-1951] (Paris, 1965), 382. See also Charles G. Cogan, Forced to Choose: France, the Atlantic Alliance, and NATO - Then and Now (Westport, 1997), 26-45; Soutou, "France," in Reynolds, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe, 100-106; and Wiebes & Zeeman, "Benelux," in Reynolds, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe, 178-86. The French efforts at military contacts in 1946-1948 are associated with the name of deputy chief of the army, Pierre Billotte. For this see particularly Cogan, Forced to Choose, 26-31.
66. The quotation is from Georgette Elgey, La republique des illusions 1945-1951 [The republic of illusions, 1945-1951] (Paris, 1965), 382. See also Charles G. Cogan, Forced to Choose: France, the Atlantic Alliance, and NATO - Then and Now (Westport, 1997), 26-45; Soutou, "France," in Reynolds, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe, 100-106; and Wiebes & Zeeman, "Benelux," in Reynolds, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Europe, 178-86. The French efforts at military contacts in 1946-1948 are associated with the name of deputy chief of the army, Pierre Billotte. For this see particularly Cogan, Forced to Choose, 26-31.
67. For Norway see Rolf Tamnes, "Norway's Struggle for the Northern Flank, 1950-1952," in Western Security: The Formative Years. European and Atlantic Defence, 1947-1953 ed. Olav Riste (Oslo, 1985), 225-34. For a more general account see S. F. Wells Jr., "the First Cold War Buildup: Europe in United States Strategy and Policy, 1950-1955," in ibid., 181-97.
68. For Norway see Rolf Tamnes, "Norway's Struggle for the Northern Flank, 1950-1952," in Western Security: The Formative Years. European and Atlantic Defence, 1947-1953 ed. Olav Riste (Oslo, 1985), 225-34. For a more general account see S. F. Wells Jr., "the First Cold War Buildup: Europe in United States Strategy and Policy, 1950-1955," in ibid., 181-97.
69. Paterson and McMahon, The Origins of the Cold War, 110.
70. See my "Introduction," in Geir Lundestad, ed., No End to Alliance: The United States and Western Europe: Past, Present, and Future (London, 1998), 3-7.
71. Pierre Melandri, "The Troubled Partnership: France and the United States, 1945-1989," in Lundestad, ed., No End to Alliance.
72. See Simon W. Duke and Wolfgang Krieger, eds., U.S. Military Forces in Europe: The Early Years, 1945-1970 (Boulder, 1993). For Italy in particular see Leopoldo Nuti, "U.S. Forces in Italy, 1945-1963," ibid., 269-72.
73. See Simon W. Duke and Wolfgang Krieger, eds., U.S. Military Forces in Europe: The Early Years, 1945-1970 (Boulder, 1993). For Italy in particular see Leopoldo Nuti, "U.S. Forces in Italy, 1945-1963," ibid., 269-72.
74. Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, 1979), 938-49.
75. U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States, pt.2:872-74.
76. The numbers are from ibid., 870; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1995 (Washington, 1995), 809. See also Pells, Not Like Us, 190. For French policies on American investment see Richard F. Kuisel, Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization (Berkeley, 1993), 176-84.
77. The numbers are from ibid., 870; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1995 (Washington, 1995), 809. See also Pells, Not Like Us, 190. For French policies on American investment see Richard F. Kuisel, Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization (Berkeley, 1993), 176-84.
78. The numbers are from ibid., 870; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1995 (Washington, 1995), 809. See also Pells, Not Like Us, 190. For French policies on American investment see Richard F. Kuisel, Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization (Berkeley, 1993), 176-84.
79. The numbers are from ibid., 870; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1995 (Washington, 1995), 809. See also Pells, Not Like Us, 190. For French policies on American investment see Richard F. Kuisel, Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization (Berkeley, 1993), 176-84.
80. Pells, Not Like Us, 204-62. The quotation is from 205.
81. The best known of these historians are Michael J. Hogan and Charles S. Maier. In his celebrated article "The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe," American Historical Review 86, no. 2 (1981): 333-34, Maier referred to "the elites superintending Western society" over half a century. I have discussed their corporatist views in "The United States, the Marshall Plan, and Corporatism," in Maktpolitik och Husfrid. Studier i internationell och svensk historia tilägnade Gøran Rystad [Power politics and domestic peace: Studies in international and Swedish history dedicated to Gøran Rystad] (Lund, Sweden, 1991).
82. The best known of these historians are Michael J. Hogan and Charles S. Maier. In his celebrated article "The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe," American Historical Review 86, no. 2 (1981): 333-34, Maier referred to "the elites superintending Western society" over half a century. I have discussed their corporatist views in "The United States, the Marshall Plan, and Corporatism," in Maktpolitik och Husfrid. Studier i internationell och svensk historia tilägnade Gøran Rystad [Power politics and domestic peace: Studies in international and Swedish history dedicated to Gøran Rystad] (Lund, Sweden, 1991).
83. Richard L. Merrit and Donald J. Puchala, eds., Western European Perspectives on International Affairs (New York, 1968), 254-55.
84. Ivor Crewe, "Britain: Two and a Half Cheers for the Atlantic Alliance," in The Public and Atlantic Defense, ed. Gregory Flynn and Hans Rattinger (Totowa, NJ, 1985), particularly 39-47. The quotation is from 45. See also Ivor Crewe, "Why the British Don't Like US Anymore," Public Opinion, March-April 1987, 51-56; "West European Views about the United States and Various International Relations," World Opinion Update (1982): 3:70-72; Peter Fotheringham, "Great Britain: Generational Continuity," in The Successor Generation: International Perspectives of Postwar Europeans, ed. Stephen F. Szabo (London, 1983), particularly 97-98. For the negative attitude to Reagan see particularly Ivor Crewe, "Britain Evaluates Ronald Reagan," Public Opinion, October-November 1984, 46-49. For the rapid decline in British confidence in the United States see Bruce Russett and Donald R. Deluca, "Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe," Political Science Quarterly 98 (Summer 1983): 179-96, particularly 183-84; Philip Sabin, "British Perceptions of the USA and the USSR: The Limits of Comparative Opinion Polls," in Debating National Security: The Public Dimension, ed. Hans Rattinger and Don Munton (Frankfurt, 1991), 73-100.
85. Ivor Crewe, "Britain: Two and a Half Cheers for the Atlantic Alliance," in The Public and Atlantic Defense, ed. Gregory Flynn and Hans Rattinger (Totowa, NJ, 1985), particularly 39-47. The quotation is from 45. See also Ivor Crewe, "Why the British Don't Like US Anymore," Public Opinion, March-April 1987, 51-56; "West European Views about the United States and Various International Relations," World Opinion Update (1982): 3:70-72; Peter Fotheringham, "Great Britain: Generational Continuity," in The Successor Generation: International Perspectives of Postwar Europeans, ed. Stephen F. Szabo (London, 1983), particularly 97-98. For the negative attitude to Reagan see particularly Ivor Crewe, "Britain Evaluates Ronald Reagan," Public Opinion, October-November 1984, 46-49. For the rapid decline in British confidence in the United States see Bruce Russett and Donald R. Deluca, "Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe," Political Science Quarterly 98 (Summer 1983): 179-96, particularly 183-84; Philip Sabin, "British Perceptions of the USA and the USSR: The Limits of Comparative Opinion Polls," in Debating National Security: The Public Dimension, ed. Hans Rattinger and Don Munton (Frankfurt, 1991), 73-100.
86. Ivor Crewe, "Britain: Two and a Half Cheers for the Atlantic Alliance," in The Public and Atlantic Defense, ed. Gregory Flynn and Hans Rattinger (Totowa, NJ, 1985), particularly 39-47. The quotation is from 45. See also Ivor Crewe, "Why the British Don't Like US Anymore," Public Opinion, March-April 1987, 51-56; "West European Views about the United States and Various International Relations," World Opinion Update (1982): 3:70-72; Peter Fotheringham, "Great Britain: Generational Continuity," in The Successor Generation: International Perspectives of Postwar Europeans, ed. Stephen F. Szabo (London, 1983), particularly 97-98. For the negative attitude to Reagan see particularly Ivor Crewe, "Britain Evaluates Ronald Reagan," Public Opinion, October-November 1984, 46-49. For the rapid decline in British confidence in the United States see Bruce Russett and Donald R. Deluca, "Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe," Political Science Quarterly 98 (Summer 1983): 179-96, particularly 183-84; Philip Sabin, "British Perceptions of the USA and the USSR: The Limits of Comparative Opinion Polls," in Debating National Security: The Public Dimension, ed. Hans Rattinger and Don Munton (Frankfurt, 1991), 73-100.
87. Ivor Crewe, "Britain: Two and a Half Cheers for the Atlantic Alliance," in The Public and Atlantic Defense, ed. Gregory Flynn and Hans Rattinger (Totowa, NJ, 1985), particularly 39-47. The quotation is from 45. See also Ivor Crewe, "Why the British Don't Like US Anymore," Public Opinion, March-April 1987, 51-56; "West European Views about the United States and Various International Relations," World Opinion Update (1982): 3:70-72; Peter Fotheringham, "Great Britain: Generational Continuity," in The Successor Generation: International Perspectives of Postwar Europeans, ed. Stephen F. Szabo (London, 1983), particularly 97-98. For the negative attitude to Reagan see particularly Ivor Crewe, "Britain Evaluates Ronald Reagan," Public Opinion, October-November 1984, 46-49. For the rapid decline in British confidence in the United States see Bruce Russett and Donald R. Deluca, "Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe," Political Science Quarterly 98 (Summer 1983): 179-96, particularly 183-84;
88. Ivor Crewe, "Britain: Two and a Half Cheers for the Atlantic Alliance," in The Public and Atlantic Defense, ed. Gregory Flynn and Hans Rattinger (Totowa, NJ, 1985), particularly 39-47. The quotation is from 45. See also Ivor Crewe, "Why the British Don't Like US Anymore," Public Opinion, March-April 1987, 51-56; "West European Views about the United States and Various International Relations," World Opinion Update (1982): 3:70-72; Peter Fotheringham, "Great Britain: Generational Continuity," in The Successor Generation: International Perspectives of Postwar Europeans, ed. Stephen F. Szabo (London, 1983), particularly 97-98. For the negative attitude to Reagan see particularly Ivor Crewe, "Britain Evaluates Ronald Reagan," Public Opinion, October-November 1984, 46-49. For the rapid decline in British confidence in the United States see Bruce Russett and Donald R. Deluca, "Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe," Political Science Quarterly 98 (Summer 1983): 179-96, particularly 183-84; Philip Sabin, "British Perceptions of the USA and the USSR: The Limits of Comparative Opinion Polls," in Debating National Security: The Public Dimension, ed. Hans Rattinger and Don Munton (Frankfurt, 1991), 73-100.
89. Ivor Crewe, "Britain: Two and a Half Cheers for the Atlantic Alliance," in The Public and Atlantic Defense, ed. Gregory Flynn and Hans Rattinger (Totowa, NJ, 1985), particularly 39-47. The quotation is from 45. See also Ivor Crewe, "Why the British Don't Like US Anymore," Public Opinion, March-April 1987, 51-56; "West European Views about the United States and Various International Relations," World Opinion Update (1982): 3:70-72; Peter Fotheringham, "Great Britain: Generational Continuity," in The Successor Generation: International Perspectives of Postwar Europeans, ed. Stephen F. Szabo (London, 1983), particularly 97-98. For the negative attitude to Reagan see particularly Ivor Crewe, "Britain Evaluates Ronald Reagan," Public Opinion, October-November 1984, 46-49. For the rapid decline in British confidence in the United States see Bruce Russett and Donald R. Deluca, "Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe," Political Science Quarterly 98 (Summer 1983): 179-96, particularly 183-84; Philip Sabin, "British Perceptions of the USA and the USSR: The Limits of Comparative Opinion Polls," in Debating National Security: The Public Dimension, ed. Hans Rattinger and Don Munton (Frankfurt, 1991), 73-100.
90. Ivor Crewe, "Britain: Two and a Half Cheers for the Atlantic Alliance," in The Public and Atlantic Defense, ed. Gregory Flynn and Hans Rattinger (Totowa, NJ, 1985), particularly 39-47. The quotation is from 45. See also Ivor Crewe, "Why the British Don't Like US Anymore," Public Opinion, March-April 1987, 51-56; "West European Views about the United States and Various International Relations," World Opinion Update (1982): 3:70-72; Peter Fotheringham, "Great Britain: Generational Continuity," in The Successor Generation: International Perspectives of Postwar Europeans, ed. Stephen F. Szabo (London, 1983), particularly 97-98. For the negative attitude to Reagan see particularly Ivor Crewe, "Britain Evaluates Ronald Reagan," Public Opinion, October-November 1984, 46-49. For the rapid decline in British confidence in the United States see Bruce Russett and Donald R. Deluca, "Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe," Political Science Quarterly 98 (Summer 1983): 179-96, particularly 183-84; Philip Sabin, "British Perceptions of the USA and the USSR: The Limits of Comparative Opinion Polls," in Debating National Security: The Public Dimension, ed. Hans Rattinger and Don Munton (Frankfurt, 1991), 73-100.
91. Hans Rattinger, "The Federal Republic of Germany: Much Ado About (Almost) Nothing," in Flynn and Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense, particularly 138-47; Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, ed., The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1967-1980 (Westport, 1981), 408-9, 415-27, 434-37; Russett and Deluca, "Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe," 185-86. See also Stephen F. Szabo, "West Germany: Generations and Changing Security Perspectives," in Szabo, The Sucessor Generation, particularly 59-66; Peter Schmidt, "Public Opinion and Security Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany," ORBIS 28 (Winter 1985): 719-42; Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "The Missile Gap: The German Press and Public Opinion," Public Opinion, October-November 1983, 45-49; Wolfgang Donsbach, Hans Mathias Kepplinger, and Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "West Germans' Perceptions of NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Long-Term Content Analysis of Der Spiegel and Trends in Public Opinion," in Rattinger and Munton, eds., Debating National Security, 250-66; World Opinion Update (1980): 4:33.
92. Hans Rattinger, "The Federal Republic of Germany: Much Ado About (Almost) Nothing," in Flynn and Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense, particularly 138-47; Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, ed., The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1967-1980 (Westport, 1981), 408-9, 415-27, 434-37; Russett and Deluca, "Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe," 185-86. See also Stephen F. Szabo, "West Germany: Generations and Changing Security Perspectives," in Szabo, The Sucessor Generation, particularly 59-66; Peter Schmidt, "Public Opinion and Security Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany," ORBIS 28 (Winter 1985): 719-42; Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "The Missile Gap: The German Press and Public Opinion," Public Opinion, October-November 1983, 45-49; Wolfgang Donsbach, Hans Mathias Kepplinger, and Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "West Germans' Perceptions of NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Long-Term Content Analysis of Der Spiegel and Trends in Public Opinion," in Rattinger and Munton, eds., Debating National Security, 250-66; World Opinion Update (1980): 4:33.
93. Hans Rattinger, "The Federal Republic of Germany: Much Ado About (Almost) Nothing," in Flynn and Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense, particularly 138-47; Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, ed., The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1967-1980 (Westport, 1981), 408-9, 415-27, 434-37; Russett and Deluca, "Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe," 185-86. See also Stephen F. Szabo, "West Germany: Generations and Changing Security Perspectives," in Szabo, The Sucessor Generation, particularly 59-66; Peter Schmidt, "Public Opinion and Security Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany," ORBIS 28 (Winter 1985): 719-42; Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "The Missile Gap: The German Press and Public Opinion," Public Opinion, October-November 1983, 45-49; Wolfgang Donsbach, Hans Mathias Kepplinger, and Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "West Germans' Perceptions of NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Long-Term Content Analysis of Der Spiegel and Trends in Public Opinion," in Rattinger and Munton, eds., Debating National Security, 250-66; World Opinion Update (1980): 4:33.
94. Hans Rattinger, "The Federal Republic of Germany: Much Ado About (Almost) Nothing," in Flynn and Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense, particularly 138-47; Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, ed., The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1967-1980 (Westport, 1981), 408-9, 415-27, 434-37; Russett and Deluca, "Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe," 185-86. See also Stephen F. Szabo, "West Germany: Generations and Changing Security Perspectives," in Szabo, The Sucessor Generation, particularly 59-66; Peter Schmidt, "Public Opinion and Security Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany," ORBIS 28 (Winter 1985): 719-42; Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "The Missile Gap: The German Press and Public Opinion," Public Opinion, October-November 1983, 45-49; Wolfgang Donsbach, Hans Mathias Kepplinger, and Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "West Germans' Perceptions of NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Long-Term Content Analysis of Der Spiegel and Trends in Public Opinion," in Rattinger and Munton, eds., Debating National Security, 250-66; World Opinion Update (1980): 4:33.
95. Hans Rattinger, "The Federal Republic of Germany: Much Ado About (Almost) Nothing," in Flynn and Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense, particularly 138-47; Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, ed., The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1967-1980 (Westport, 1981), 408-9, 415-27, 434-37; Russett and Deluca, "Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe," 185-86. See also Stephen F. Szabo, "West Germany: Generations and Changing Security Perspectives," in Szabo, The Sucessor Generation, particularly 59-66; Peter Schmidt, "Public Opinion and Security Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany," ORBIS 28 (Winter 1985): 719-42; Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "The Missile Gap: The German Press and Public Opinion," Public Opinion, October-November 1983, 45-49; Wolfgang Donsbach, Hans Mathias Kepplinger, and Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "West Germans' Perceptions of NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Long-Term Content Analysis of Der Spiegel and Trends in Public Opinion," in Rattinger and Munton, eds., Debating National Security, 250-66; World Opinion Update (1980): 4:33.
96. Hans Rattinger, "The Federal Republic of Germany: Much Ado About (Almost) Nothing," in Flynn and Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense, particularly 138-47; Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, ed., The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1967-1980 (Westport, 1981), 408-9, 415-27, 434-37; Russett and Deluca, "Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe," 185-86. See also Stephen F. Szabo, "West Germany: Generations and Changing Security Perspectives," in Szabo, The Sucessor Generation, particularly 59-66; Peter Schmidt, "Public Opinion and Security Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany," ORBIS 28 (Winter 1985): 719-42; Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "The Missile Gap: The German Press and Public Opinion," Public Opinion, October-November 1983, 45-49; Wolfgang Donsbach, Hans Mathias Kepplinger, and Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "West Germans' Perceptions of NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Long-Term Content Analysis of Der Spiegel and Trends in Public Opinion," in Rattinger and Munton, eds., Debating National Security, 250-66; World Opinion Update (1980): 4:33.
97. Hans Rattinger, "The Federal Republic of Germany: Much Ado About (Almost) Nothing," in Flynn and Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense, particularly 138-47; Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, ed., The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1967-1980 (Westport, 1981), 408-9, 415-27, 434-37; Russett and Deluca, "Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe," 185-86. See also Stephen F. Szabo, "West Germany: Generations and Changing Security Perspectives," in Szabo, The Sucessor Generation, particularly 59-66; Peter Schmidt, "Public Opinion and Security Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany," ORBIS 28 (Winter 1985): 719-42; Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "The Missile Gap: The German Press and Public Opinion," Public Opinion, October-November 1983, 45-49; Wolfgang Donsbach, Hans Mathias Kepplinger, and Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "West Germans' Perceptions of NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Long-Term Content Analysis of Der Spiegel and Trends in Public Opinion," in Rattinger and Munton, eds., Debating National Security, 250-66; World Opinion Update (1980): 4:33.
98. Hans Rattinger, "The Federal Republic of Germany: Much Ado About (Almost) Nothing," in Flynn and Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense, particularly 138-47; Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, ed., The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1967-1980 (Westport, 1981), 408-9, 415-27, 434-37; Russett and Deluca, "Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe," 185-86. See also Stephen F. Szabo, "West Germany: Generations and Changing Security Perspectives," in Szabo, The Sucessor Generation, particularly 59-66; Peter Schmidt, "Public Opinion and Security Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany," ORBIS 28 (Winter 1985): 719-42; Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "The Missile Gap: The German Press and Public Opinion," Public Opinion, October-November 1983, 45-49; Wolfgang Donsbach, Hans Mathias Kepplinger, and Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "West Germans' Perceptions of NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Long-Term Content Analysis of Der Spiegel and Trends in Public Opinion," in Rattinger and Munton, eds., Debating National Security, 250-66; World Opinion Update (1980): 4:33.
99. Sergio A. Rossi, "Public Opinion and Atlantic Defense in Italy," in Flynn and Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense, 196-218. The quotation is from 216.
100. For a collection of essays on anti-Americanism in Europe see Rob Kroes and Maarten Van Rossem, eds., Anti-Americanism in Europe (Amsterdam, 1986). For studies of polls in various Western European countries in these years see Philip Everts, "NATO, the European Community, and the United Nations," in Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance, ed. Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott (Oxford, 1995), 402-19; Philip P. Everts, "Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, Defense, and Security: The Case of the Netherlands," in Flynn and Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense, 262-67; Koen Koch, "Anti-Americanism and the Dutch Peace Movement," in Kroes and Van Rossem, eds., Anti-Americanism in Europe, 108-9; Ragnar Waldahl, "Norwegian Attitudes toward Defense and Foreign Policy Issues," in Flynn and Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense, 308-10; Bjørn Alstad, ed., Norske Meninger, 1946-93: 1: Norge og verden [Norwegian opinions, 1946-93. 1: Norway and the world] (Oslo, 1993), particularly 82-84; "West European Views about the United States and Various International Issues," World Opinion Update (1982): 3:70-72.
101. For a collection of essays on anti-Americanism in Europe see Rob Kroes and Maarten Van Rossem, eds., Anti-Americanism in Europe (Amsterdam, 1986). For studies of polls in various Western European countries in these years see Philip Everts, "NATO, the European Community, and the United Nations," in Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance, ed. Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott (Oxford, 1995), 402-19; Philip P. Everts, "Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, Defense, and Security: The Case of the Netherlands," in Flynn and Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense, 262-67; Koen Koch, "Anti-Americanism and the Dutch Peace Movement," in Kroes and Van Rossem, eds., Anti-Americanism in Europe, 108-9; Ragnar Waldahl, "Norwegian Attitudes toward Defense and Foreign Policy Issues," in Flynn and Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense, 308-10; Bjørn Alstad, ed., Norske Meninger, 1946-93: 1: Norge og verden [Norwegian opinions, 1946-93. 1: Norway and the world] (Oslo, 1993), particularly 82-84; "West European Views about the United States and Various International Issues," World Opinion Update (1982): 3:70-72.
102. For a collection of essays on anti-Americanism in Europe see Rob Kroes and Maarten Van Rossem, eds., Anti-Americanism in Europe (Amsterdam, 1986). For studies of polls in various Western European countries in these years see Philip Everts, "NATO, the European Community, and the United Nations," in Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance, ed. Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott (Oxford, 1995), 402-19; Philip P. Everts, "Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, Defense, and Security: The Case of the Netherlands," in Flynn and Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense, 262-67; Koen Koch, "Anti-Americanism and the Dutch Peace Movement," in Kroes and Van Rossem, eds., Anti-Americanism in Europe, 108-9; Ragnar Waldahl, "Norwegian Attitudes toward Defense and Foreign Policy Issues," in Flynn and Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense, 308-10; Bjørn Alstad, ed., Norske Meninger, 1946-93: 1: Norge og verden [Norwegian opinions, 1946-93. 1: Norway and the world] (Oslo, 1993), particularly 82-84; "West European Views about the United States and Various International Issues," World Opinion Update (1982): 3:70-72.
103. For a collection of essays on anti-Americanism in Europe see Rob Kroes and Maarten Van Rossem, eds., Anti-Americanism in Europe (Amsterdam, 1986). For studies of polls in various Western European countries in these years see Philip Everts, "NATO, the European Community, and the United Nations," in Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance, ed. Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott (Oxford, 1995), 402-19; Philip P. Everts, "Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, Defense, and Security: The Case of the Netherlands," in Flynn and Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense, 262-67; Koen Koch, "Anti-Americanism and the Dutch Peace Movement," in Kroes and Van Rossem, eds., Anti-Americanism in Europe, 108-9; Ragnar Waldahl, "Norwegian Attitudes toward Defense and Foreign Policy Issues," in Flynn and Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense, 308-10; Bjørn Alstad, ed., Norske Meninger, 1946-93: 1: Norge og verden [Norwegian opinions, 1946-93. 1: Norway and the world] (Oslo, 1993), particularly 82-84; "West European Views about the United States and Various International Issues," World Opinion Update (1982): 3:70-72.
104. For a collection of essays on anti-Americanism in Europe see Rob Kroes and Maarten Van Rossem, eds., Anti-Americanism in Europe (Amsterdam, 1986). For studies of polls in various Western European countries in these years see Philip Everts, "NATO, the European Community, and the United Nations," in Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance, ed. Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott (Oxford, 1995), 402-19; Philip P. Everts, "Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, Defense, and Security: The Case of the Netherlands," in Flynn and Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense, 262-67; Koen Koch, "Anti-Americanism and the Dutch Peace Movement," in Kroes and Van Rossem, eds., Anti-Americanism in Europe, 108-9; Ragnar Waldahl, "Norwegian Attitudes toward Defense and Foreign Policy Issues," in Flynn and Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense, 308-10; Bjørn Alstad, ed., Norske Meninger, 1946-93: 1: Norge og verden [Norwegian opinions, 1946-93. 1: Norway and the world] (Oslo, 1993), particularly 82-84; "West European Views about the United States and Various International Issues," World Opinion Update (1982): 3:70-72.
105. For a collection of essays on anti-Americanism in Europe see Rob Kroes and Maarten Van Rossem, eds., Anti-Americanism in Europe (Amsterdam, 1986). For studies of polls in various Western European countries in these years see Philip Everts, "NATO, the European Community, and the United Nations," in Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance, ed. Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott (Oxford, 1995), 402-19; Philip P. Everts, "Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, Defense, and Security: The Case of the Netherlands," in Flynn and Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense, 262-67; Koen Koch, "Anti-Americanism and the Dutch Peace Movement," in Kroes and Van Rossem, eds., Anti-Americanism in Europe, 108-9; Ragnar Waldahl, "Norwegian Attitudes toward Defense and Foreign Policy Issues," in Flynn and Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense, 308-10; Bjørn Alstad, ed., Norske Meninger, 1946-93: 1: Norge og verden [Norwegian opinions, 1946-93. 1: Norway and the world] (Oslo, 1993), particularly 82-84; "West European Views about the United States and Various International Issues," World Opinion Update (1982): 3:70-72.
106. For a collection of essays on anti-Americanism in Europe see Rob Kroes and Maarten Van Rossem, eds., Anti-Americanism in Europe (Amsterdam, 1986). For studies of polls in various Western European countries in these years see Philip Everts, "NATO, the European Community, and the United Nations," in Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance, ed. Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott (Oxford, 1995), 402-19; Philip P. Everts, "Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, Defense, and Security: The Case of the Netherlands," in Flynn and Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense, 262-67; Koen Koch, "Anti-Americanism and the Dutch Peace Movement," in Kroes and Van Rossem, eds., Anti-Americanism in Europe, 108-9; Ragnar Waldahl, "Norwegian Attitudes toward Defense and Foreign Policy Issues," in Flynn and Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense, 308-10; Bjørn Alstad, ed., Norske Meninger, 1946-93: 1: Norge og verden [Norwegian opinions, 1946-93. 1: Norway and the world] (Oslo, 1993), particularly 82-84; "West European Views about the United States and Various International Issues," World Opinion Update (1982): 3:70-72.
107. Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, "France: Attachment to a Nonbinding Relationship," in Flynn and Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense, particularly 88-99. For the poll mentioned see World Opinion Update (1985): 9:2. For a study of anti-Americanism in France in general see Denis Lacorne, Jacques Rupnik, and Marie-France Toinet, eds., The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism: A Century of French Perception (London, 1990).
108. Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, "France: Attachment to a Nonbinding Relationship," in Flynn and Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense, particularly 88-99. For the poll mentioned see World Opinion Update (1985): 9:2. For a study of anti-Americanism in France in general see Denis Lacorne, Jacques Rupnik, and Marie-France Toinet, eds., The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism: A Century of French Perception (London, 1990).
109. Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, "France: Attachment to a Nonbinding Relationship," in Flynn and Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense, particularly 88-99. For the poll mentioned see World Opinion Update (1985): 9:2. For a study of anti-Americanism in France in general see Denis Lacorne, Jacques Rupnik, and Marie-France Toinet, eds., The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism: A Century of French Perception (London, 1990).
110. Richard C. Eichenberg, Public Opinion and National Security in Western Europe (Ithaca, 1989), 123-27. Net support was defined as the percentage who thought NATO essential minus those who responded that NATO was not essential.
111. Thus, at the "national security elite level" in the early 1980s "The desire for a close alliance with the United States is shared in France by 81 percent, in Great Britain by 69 percent, and in the Netherlands by 81 percent." The 81 percent in France and Holland was in fact the highest percentage in the five countries studied: France, Holland, Britain, West Germany, and Norway. For this see Asmus, "Public Opinion and Security Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany," 737-38. See also Russett and Deluca, "Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe," 187.
112. Thus, at the "national security elite level" in the early 1980s "The desire for a close alliance with the United States is shared in France by 81 percent, in Great Britain by 69 percent, and in the Netherlands by 81 percent." The 81 percent in France and Holland was in fact the highest percentage in the five countries studied: France, Holland, Britain, West Germany, and Norway. For this see Asmus, "Public Opinion and Security Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany," 737-38. See also Russett and Deluca, "Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe," 187.
113. Stephen F. Szabo, "European Opinion after the Missiles," Survival 27 (November-December 1985): 265-73, particularly 270; "West European Views about the United States and Various International Issues," 70-71.
114. Stephen F. Szabo, "European Opinion after the Missiles," Survival 27 (November-December 1985): 265-73, particularly 270; "West European Views about the United States and Various International Issues," 70-71.
115. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Game Plan: How to Conduct the U.S.-Soviet Contest (New York, 1986), 207.
116. In fact, the United States apparently exported more to Singapore than to France or Italy. For this, see Kishore Mahbubani, "An Asia-Pacific Consensus," Foreign Affairs 76 (September-October 1997): 151.
117. David Oddsson, "Icelandic Foreign Policy and Atlantic Issues" (Oslo, 1997), 6-7; Dr. Valur Ingimundarson to Geir Lundestad, 24 March 1998; Jørgen Kosmo, "Norwegian Security and Defence Policy - Future Challenges" (Oslo, 1997), 4-5; Rolf Tamnes, Oljealder, 1965-1995 [Oil Age, 1965-1995] (Volume 6 in History of Norwegian Foreign Policy)(Oslo, 1997), 142-44.
118. David Oddsson, "Icelandic Foreign Policy and Atlantic Issues" (Oslo, 1997), 6-7; Dr. Valur Ingimundarson to Geir Lundestad, 24 March 1998; Jørgen Kosmo, "Norwegian Security and Defence Policy - Future Challenges" (Oslo, 1997), 4-5; Rolf Tamnes, Oljealder, 1965-1995 [Oil Age, 1965-1995] (Volume 6 in History of Norwegian Foreign Policy)(Oslo, 1997), 142-44.
119. David Oddsson, "Icelandic Foreign Policy and Atlantic Issues" (Oslo, 1997), 6-7; Dr. Valur Ingimundarson to Geir Lundestad, 24 March 1998; Jørgen Kosmo, "Norwegian Security and Defence Policy - Future Challenges" (Oslo, 1997), 4-5; Rolf Tamnes, Oljealder, 1965-1995 [Oil Age, 1965-1995] (Volume 6 in History of Norwegian Foreign Policy)(Oslo, 1997), 142-44.
120. David Oddsson, "Icelandic Foreign Policy and Atlantic Issues" (Oslo, 1997), 6-7; Dr. Valur Ingimundarson to Geir Lundestad, 24 March 1998; Jørgen Kosmo, "Norwegian Security and Defence Policy - Future Challenges" (Oslo, 1997), 4-5; Rolf Tamnes, Oljealder, 1965-1995 [Oil Age, 1965-1995] (Volume 6 in History of Norwegian Foreign Policy)(Oslo, 1997), 142-44.
121. For my discussion of America's role as the ultimate arbiter in Europe see "Empire" by Integration, 132-33, 137-46. For recent developments in France see Frédéric Bozo, "France," in NATO and Collective Security, ed. Michael Brenner (London, 1998), 39-80.
122. For my discussion of America's role as the ultimate arbiter in Europe see "Empire" by Integration, 132-33, 137-46. For recent developments in France see Frédéric Bozo, "France," in NATO and Collective Security, ed. Michael Brenner (London, 1998), 39-80.
123. The last paragraphs are in great part based on my "Empire" by Integration, particularly 114-25, 143-46.
124. Everts, "NATO, the European Community, and the United Nations, 406-10.
125. Richard Sinnott, European Public Opinion and Security Policy (Paris, Chaillot Paper 28,1997), 19-24, 43, 53; Everts, "NATO, the European Community, and the United Nations," 410-19; Philippe Manigart and Eric Marlier, "Public Opinion and Security Matters in Europe," in European Security ed. Wilfried von Bredow, Thomas Jäger, and Gerhard Kümmel (London, 1997), 3-21.
126. Richard Sinnott, European Public Opinion and Security Policy (Paris, Chaillot Paper 28,1997), 19-24, 43, 53; Everts, "NATO, the European Community, and the United Nations," 410-19; Philippe Manigart and Eric Marlier, "Public Opinion and Security Matters in Europe," in European Security ed. Wilfried von Bredow, Thomas Jäger, and Gerhard Kümmel (London, 1997), 3-21.
127. Richard Sinnott, European Public Opinion and Security Policy (Paris, Chaillot Paper 28,1997), 19-24, 43, 53; Everts, "NATO, the European Community, and the United Nations," 410-19; Philippe Manigart and Eric Marlier, "Public Opinion and Security Matters in Europe," in European Security ed. Wilfried von Bredow, Thomas Jäger, and Gerhard Kümmel (London, 1997), 3-21.
128. Pells, Not Like Us, 201, 211, 219, 221, 231-32.
129. The story of Germany's unification is superbly told in Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA, 1993).
130. David Calleo "Western Transformation after the Cold War," in Lundestad, ed., No End to Alliance, 184-203. For a good, short account of the NATO enlargement issue see Jonathan Eyal, "NATO's Enlargement Anatomy of a Decision," International Affairs 73, no. 4 (1997): 695-719.
131. David Calleo "Western Transformation after the Cold War," in Lundestad, ed., No End to Alliance, 184-203. For a good, short account of the NATO enlargement issue see Jonathan Eyal, "NATO's Enlargement Anatomy of a Decision," International Affairs 73, no. 4 (1997): 695-719.
132. Tarja Halonen and Lena Hjelm-Wallen, "Working for European Security Outside the NATO Structure " International Herald Tribune, 15 March 1997.
133. George Cunningham, "EU and NATO Enlargement: How Public Opinion is Shaping up in Some Candidate Countries," NATO Review, May-June 1997, 16-18. See also Sinnott, European Public Opinion and Security Policy, 21-25. In the referendum in Hungary on NATO membership in November 1997, 85 percent voted in favor a far higher percentage than earlier polls had indicated. (The turnout was only 49 percent, however.) The sharp increase is primarily explained by the Hungarian governments vigorous campaign in favor of Hungary's NATO membership.
134. George Cunningham, "EU and NATO Enlargement: How Public Opinion is Shaping up in Some Candidate Countries," NATO Review, May-June 1997, 16-18. See also Sinnott, European Public Opinion and Security Policy, 21-25. In the referendum in Hungary on NATO membership in November 1997, 85 percent voted in favor a far higher percentage than earlier polls had indicated. (The turnout was only 49 percent, however.) The sharp increase is primarily explained by the Hungarian governments vigorous campaign in favor of Hungary's NATO membership.
135. Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, 170-71, 205-7, 236-38, 276-78, 300.
136. For a short account of the origins of ANZUS see R. J. O'Neill, "The Korean War and the Origins of ANZUS," in Munich to Vietnam: Australia's Relations with Britain and the United States since the 1930s, ed. Carl Bridge (Melbourne, 1991), 99-113. For longer accounts see J. G. Starke, The ANZUS Treaty Alliance (Melbourne, 1965); and W. David McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact: Policy-Making, Strategy, and Diplomacy, 1945-55 (Basingstoke, 1995). For Spender's own version see Sir Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy: The ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan (Sydney, 1969). Melvyn Leffler writes about the situation in the Asia-Pacific region at this time that "In Asia (as in Europe) a successful strategy aimed at co-opting Japanese (or German) power compelled the United States to incur commitments that would otherwise have been eschewed." See Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 394. See also ibid., 346-47, 428-29, 482.
137. For a short account of the origins of ANZUS see R. J. O'Neill, "The Korean War and the Origins of ANZUS," in Munich to Vietnam: Australia's Relations with Britain and the United States since the 1930s, ed. Carl Bridge (Melbourne, 1991), 99-113. For longer accounts see J. G. Starke, The ANZUS Treaty Alliance (Melbourne, 1965); and W. David McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact: Policy-Making, Strategy, and Diplomacy, 1945-55 (Basingstoke, 1995). For Spender's own version see Sir Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy: The ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan (Sydney, 1969). Melvyn Leffler writes about the situation in the Asia-Pacific region at this time that "In Asia (as in Europe) a successful strategy aimed at co-opting Japanese (or German) power compelled the United States to incur commitments that would otherwise have been eschewed." See Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 394. See also ibid., 346-47, 428-29, 482.
138. For a short account of the origins of ANZUS see R. J. O'Neill, "The Korean War and the Origins of ANZUS," in Munich to Vietnam: Australia's Relations with Britain and the United States since the 1930s, ed. Carl Bridge (Melbourne, 1991), 99-113. For longer accounts see J. G. Starke, The ANZUS Treaty Alliance (Melbourne, 1965); and W. David McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact: Policy-Making, Strategy, and Diplomacy, 1945-55 (Basingstoke, 1995). For Spender's own version see Sir Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy: The ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan (Sydney, 1969). Melvyn Leffler writes about the situation in the Asia-Pacific region at this time that "In Asia (as in Europe) a successful strategy aimed at co-opting Japanese (or German) power compelled the United States to incur commitments that would otherwise have been eschewed." See Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 394. See also ibid., 346-47, 428-29, 482.
139. For a short account of the origins of ANZUS see R. J. O'Neill, "The Korean War and the Origins of ANZUS," in Munich to Vietnam: Australia's Relations with Britain and the United States since the 1930s, ed. Carl Bridge (Melbourne, 1991), 99-113. For longer accounts see J. G. Starke, The ANZUS Treaty Alliance (Melbourne, 1965); and W. David McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact: Policy-Making, Strategy, and Diplomacy, 1945-55 (Basingstoke, 1995). For Spender's own version see Sir Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy: The ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan (Sydney, 1969). Melvyn Leffler writes about the situation in the Asia-Pacific region at this time that "In Asia (as in Europe) a successful strategy aimed at co-opting Japanese (or German) power compelled the United States to incur commitments that would otherwise have been eschewed." See Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 394. See also ibid., 346-47, 428-29, 482.
140. For a short account of the origins of ANZUS see R. J. O'Neill, "The Korean War and the Origins of ANZUS," in Munich to Vietnam: Australia's Relations with Britain and the United States since the 1930s, ed. Carl Bridge (Melbourne, 1991), 99-113. For longer accounts see J. G. Starke, The ANZUS Treaty Alliance (Melbourne, 1965); and W. David McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact: Policy-Making, Strategy, and Diplomacy, 1945-55 (Basingstoke, 1995). For Spender's own version see Sir Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy: The ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan (Sydney, 1969). Melvyn Leffler writes about the situation in the Asia-Pacific region at this time that "In Asia (as in Europe) a successful strategy aimed at co-opting Japanese (or German) power compelled the United States to incur commitments that would otherwise have been eschewed." See Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 394. See also ibid., 346-47, 428-29, 482.
141. For a short account of the origins of ANZUS see R. J. O'Neill, "The Korean War and the Origins of ANZUS," in Munich to Vietnam: Australia's Relations with Britain and the United States since the 1930s, ed. Carl Bridge (Melbourne, 1991), 99-113. For longer accounts see J. G. Starke, The ANZUS Treaty Alliance (Melbourne, 1965); and W. David McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact: Policy-Making, Strategy, and Diplomacy, 1945-55 (Basingstoke, 1995). For Spender's own version see Sir Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy: The ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan (Sydney, 1969). Melvyn Leffler writes about the situation in the Asia-Pacific region at this time that "In Asia (as in Europe) a successful strategy aimed at co-opting Japanese (or German) power compelled the United States to incur commitments that would otherwise have been eschewed." See Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 394. See also ibid., 346-47, 428-29, 482.
142. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992 (New York, 1994), 35. For an account stressing the U.S. imperial side more than the invitations see Lee, Outposts of Empire. ("'Invitation' was an important aspect of this empire but not its predominant element. On the perimeter of the communist empire, Korea and Vietnam were to act as local Western proxies") (p. 254). As I have tried to show, "empire" does not necessarily exclude invitation.
143. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992 (New York, 1994), 35. For an account stressing the U.S. imperial side more than the invitations see Lee, Outposts of Empire. ("'Invitation' was an important aspect of this empire but not its predominant element. On the perimeter of the communist empire, Korea and Vietnam were to act as local Western proxies") (p. 254). As I have tried to show, "empire" does not necessarily exclude invitation.
144. This impression was strongly reinforced in conversations I had with South Korean high officials and intellectuals during my visit there 5-13 September 1997.
145. Akira Iriye, Japan and the Wider World: From the Mid-nineteenth Century to the Present (London, 1997), 88-119, particularly 118-19, 128-31, 151-52, 179-80; Glenn D. Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan (London, 1996), particularly 119-22; Michael Richardson, "U.S. Calms Asians on Troop Levels," International Herald Tribune, 17 March 1997. See also Lundestad, The American "Empire", 60-62. The conclusion is also based on my conversations with Japanese high officials and intellectuals during a visit to Japan 20-27 September 1997. On small Okinawa, where most of the American troops in Japan are actually based, the American presence is quite controversial. See Robert D. Eldridge, "The 1996 Okinawa Referendum on U.S. Base Reductions," Asian Survey 37 (October 1997): 879-904.
146. Akira Iriye, Japan and the Wider World: From the Mid-nineteenth Century to the Present (London, 1997), 88-119, particularly 118-19, 128-31, 151-52, 179-80; Glenn D. Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan (London, 1996), particularly 119-22; Michael Richardson, "U.S. Calms Asians on Troop Levels," International Herald Tribune, 17 March 1997. See also Lundestad, The American "Empire", 60-62. The conclusion is also based on my conversations with Japanese high officials and intellectuals during a visit to Japan 20-27 September 1997. On small Okinawa, where most of the American troops in Japan are actually based, the American presence is quite controversial. See Robert D. Eldridge, "The 1996 Okinawa Referendum on U.S. Base Reductions," Asian Survey 37 (October 1997): 879-904.
147. Akira Iriye, Japan and the Wider World: From the Mid-nineteenth Century to the Present (London, 1997), 88-119, particularly 118-19, 128-31, 151-52, 179-80; Glenn D. Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan (London, 1996), particularly 119-22; Michael Richardson, "U.S. Calms Asians on Troop Levels," International Herald Tribune, 17 March 1997. See also Lundestad, The American "Empire", 60-62. The conclusion is also based on my conversations with Japanese high officials and intellectuals during a visit to Japan 20-27 September 1997. On small Okinawa, where most of the American troops in Japan are actually based, the American presence is quite controversial. See Robert D. Eldridge, "The 1996 Okinawa Referendum on U.S. Base Reductions," Asian Survey 37 (October 1997): 879-904.
148. Akira Iriye, Japan and the Wider World: From the Mid-nineteenth Century to the Present (London, 1997), 88-119, particularly 118-19, 128-31, 151-52, 179-80; Glenn D. Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan (London, 1996), particularly 119-22; Michael Richardson, "U.S. Calms Asians on Troop Levels," International Herald Tribune, 17 March 1997. See also Lundestad, The American "Empire", 60-62. The conclusion is also based on my conversations with Japanese high officials and intellectuals during a visit to Japan 20-27 September 1997. On small Okinawa, where most of the American troops in Japan are actually based, the American presence is quite controversial. See Robert D. Eldridge, "The 1996 Okinawa Referendum on U.S. Base Reductions," Asian Survey 37 (October 1997): 879-904.
149. Akira Iriye, Japan and the Wider World: From the Mid-nineteenth Century to the Present (London, 1997), 88-119, particularly 118-19, 128-31, 151-52, 179-80; Glenn D. Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan (London, 1996), particularly 119-22; Michael Richardson, "U.S. Calms Asians on Troop Levels," International Herald Tribune, 17 March 1997. See also Lundestad, The American "Empire", 60-62. The conclusion is also based on my conversations with Japanese high officials and intellectuals during a visit to Japan 20-27 September 1997. On small Okinawa, where most of the American troops in Japan are actually based, the American presence is quite controversial. See Robert D. Eldridge, "The 1996 Okinawa Referendum on U.S. Base Reductions," Asian Survey 37 (October 1997): 879-904.
150. SEATO consisted of the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines. For accounts of its formation see Gary R. Hess, "The American Search for Stability in Southeast Asia: The SEATO Structure of Containment," in The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953-1960, ed. Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye (New York, 1990), 272-95; Nick Cullather, Illusions of Influence: The Political Economy of United States-Philippines Relations, 1942-1960 (Stanford, 1994), 141-52; and Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan (New York, 1994), 154-88.
151. SEATO consisted of the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines. For accounts of its formation see Gary R. Hess, "The American Search for Stability in Southeast Asia: The SEATO Structure of Containment," in The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953-1960, ed. Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye (New York, 1990), 272-95; Nick Cullather, Illusions of Influence: The Political Economy of United States-Philippines Relations, 1942-1960 (Stanford, 1994), 141-52; and Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan (New York, 1994), 154-88.
152. SEATO consisted of the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines. For accounts of its formation see Gary R. Hess, "The American Search for Stability in Southeast Asia: The SEATO Structure of Containment," in The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953-1960, ed. Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye (New York, 1990), 272-95; Nick Cullather, Illusions of Influence: The Political Economy of United States-Philippines Relations, 1942-1960 (Stanford, 1994), 141-52; and Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan (New York, 1994), 154-88.
153. Peter Teed, Dictionary of Twentieth-Century History, 1914-1990 (Oxford, 1992), 435.
154. M. L. Smith and D. M. Jones, "ASEAN, Asian Values and Southeast Asian Security in the New World Order," Contemporary Security Policy 18 (December 1997): 126-56; Gerald Segal, "How Insecure is Pacific Asia?" International Affairs 73, no. 2 (1997): 235-49, particularly 245-48; Allen S. Whiting, "ASEAN Eyes China: The Security Dimension," Asian Survey 37 (April 1997): 299-322; Jose T. Almonte, "Ensuring Security the 'ASEAN Way'," Survival 39 (Winter 1997-98): 80-92; Mahbubani, "An Asia-Pacific Consensus," 149-58; Richardson, "U.S. Calms Asians on Troop Levels," 4; "Asia-Pacific Opinions Mixed on New Defense Guide," The Japan Times, 25 September 1997.
155. M. L. Smith and D. M. Jones, "ASEAN, Asian Values and Southeast Asian Security in the New World Order," Contemporary Security Policy 18 (December 1997): 126-56; Gerald Segal, "How Insecure is Pacific Asia?" International Affairs 73, no. 2 (1997): 235-49, particularly 245-48; Allen S. Whiting, "ASEAN Eyes China: The Security Dimension," Asian Survey 37 (April 1997): 299-322; Jose T. Almonte, "Ensuring Security the 'ASEAN Way'," Survival 39 (Winter 1997-98): 80-92; Mahbubani, "An Asia-Pacific Consensus," 149-58; Richardson, "U.S. Calms Asians on Troop Levels," 4; "Asia-Pacific Opinions Mixed on New Defense Guide," The Japan Times, 25 September 1997.
156. M. L. Smith and D. M. Jones, "ASEAN, Asian Values and Southeast Asian Security in the New World Order," Contemporary Security Policy 18 (December 1997): 126-56; Gerald Segal, "How Insecure is Pacific Asia?" International Affairs 73, no. 2 (1997): 235-49, particularly 245-48; Allen S. Whiting, "ASEAN Eyes China: The Security Dimension," Asian Survey 37 (April 1997): 299-322; Jose T. Almonte, "Ensuring Security the 'ASEAN Way'," Survival 39 (Winter 1997-98): 80-92; Mahbubani, "An Asia-Pacific Consensus," 149-58; Richardson, "U.S. Calms Asians on Troop Levels," 4; "Asia-Pacific Opinions Mixed on New Defense Guide," The Japan Times, 25 September 1997.
157. M. L. Smith and D. M. Jones, "ASEAN, Asian Values and Southeast Asian Security in the New World Order," Contemporary Security Policy 18 (December 1997): 126-56; Gerald Segal, "How Insecure is Pacific Asia?" International Affairs 73, no. 2 (1997): 235-49, particularly 245-48; Allen S. Whiting, "ASEAN Eyes China: The Security Dimension," Asian Survey 37 (April 1997): 299-322; Jose T. Almonte, "Ensuring Security the 'ASEAN Way'," Survival 39 (Winter 1997-98): 80-92; Mahbubani, "An Asia-Pacific Consensus," 149-58; Richardson, "U.S. Calms Asians on Troop Levels," 4; "Asia-Pacific Opinions Mixed on New Defense Guide," The Japan Times, 25 September 1997.
158. M. L. Smith and D. M. Jones, "ASEAN, Asian Values and Southeast Asian Security in the New World Order," Contemporary Security Policy 18 (December 1997): 126-56; Gerald Segal, "How Insecure is Pacific Asia?" International Affairs 73, no. 2 (1997): 235-49, particularly 245-48; Allen S. Whiting, "ASEAN Eyes China: The Security Dimension," Asian Survey 37 (April 1997): 299-322; Jose T. Almonte, "Ensuring Security the 'ASEAN Way'," Survival 39 (Winter 1997-98): 80-92; Mahbubani, "An Asia-Pacific Consensus," 149-58; Richardson, "U.S. Calms Asians on Troop Levels," 4; "Asia-Pacific Opinions Mixed on New Defense Guide," The Japan Times, 25 September 1997.
159. M. L. Smith and D. M. Jones, "ASEAN, Asian Values and Southeast Asian Security in the New World Order," Contemporary Security Policy 18 (December 1997): 126-56; Gerald Segal, "How Insecure is Pacific Asia?" International Affairs 73, no. 2 (1997): 235-49, particularly 245-48; Allen S. Whiting, "ASEAN Eyes China: The Security Dimension," Asian Survey 37 (April 1997): 299-322; Jose T. Almonte, "Ensuring Security the 'ASEAN Way'," Survival 39 (Winter 1997-98): 80-92; Mahbubani, "An Asia-Pacific Consensus," 149-58; Richardson, "U.S. Calms Asians on Troop Levels," 4; "Asia-Pacific Opinions Mixed on New Defense Guide," The Japan Times, 25 September 1997.
160. M. L. Smith and D. M. Jones, "ASEAN, Asian Values and Southeast Asian Security in the New World Order," Contemporary Security Policy 18 (December 1997): 126-56; Gerald Segal, "How Insecure is Pacific Asia?" International Affairs 73, no. 2 (1997): 235-49, particularly 245-48; Allen S. Whiting, "ASEAN Eyes China: The Security Dimension," Asian Survey 37 (April 1997): 299-322; Jose T. Almonte, "Ensuring Security the 'ASEAN Way'," Survival 39 (Winter 1997-98): 80-92; Mahbubani, "An Asia-Pacific Consensus," 149-58; Richardson, "U.S. Calms Asians on Troop Levels," 4; "Asia-Pacific Opinions Mixed on New Defense Guide," The Japan Times, 25 September 1997.
161. Author's conversations in Beijing with Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yingfan, 16 September 1997.
162. The preceding is based primarily on Elie Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact (Leiden, 1995), particularly 1-5, 243-52. The quotation is from 247. See also Nigel John Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan, and the Problem of Nasser: Anglo-American Relations and Arab Nationalism, 1955-59 (London, 1996), 41-60; Mark J. Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran (Ithaca, 1991), 121-26; James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations(New Haven, 1988), 113-20; George McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets (London, 1990), 156-65.
163. The preceding is based primarily on Elie Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact (Leiden, 1995), particularly 1-5, 243-52. The quotation is from 247. See also Nigel John Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan, and the Problem of Nasser: Anglo-American Relations and Arab Nationalism, 1955-59 (London, 1996), 41-60; Mark J. Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran (Ithaca, 1991), 121-26; James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations(New Haven, 1988), 113-20; George McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets (London, 1990), 156-65.
164. The preceding is based primarily on Elie Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact (Leiden, 1995), particularly 1-5, 243-52. The quotation is from 247. See also Nigel John Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan, and the Problem of Nasser: Anglo-American Relations and Arab Nationalism, 1955-59 (London, 1996), 41-60; Mark J. Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran (Ithaca, 1991), 121-26; James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations(New Haven, 1988), 113-20; George McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets (London, 1990), 156-65.
165. The preceding is based primarily on Elie Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact (Leiden, 1995), particularly 1-5, 243-52. The quotation is from 247. See also Nigel John Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan, and the Problem of Nasser: Anglo-American Relations and Arab Nationalism, 1955-59 (London, 1996), 41-60; Mark J. Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran (Ithaca, 1991), 121-26; James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations(New Haven, 1988), 113-20; George McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets (London, 1990), 156-65.
166. The preceding is based primarily on Elie Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact (Leiden, 1995), particularly 1-5, 243-52. The quotation is from 247. See also Nigel John Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan, and the Problem of Nasser: Anglo-American Relations and Arab Nationalism, 1955-59 (London, 1996), 41-60; Mark J. Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran (Ithaca, 1991), 121-26; James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations(New Haven, 1988), 113-20; George McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets (London, 1990), 156-65.
167. For recent studies of the American-Israeli relationship see Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, "The United States and Israel since 1948: 'A Special Relationship'?" Diplomatic History 22 (Spring 1998): 231-62 and the commentaries to that article by Peter L. Hahn (263-72) and David Schoenbaum (273-83) in the same issue; George Wildman Ball, The Passionate Attachment: America's Involvement with Israel, 1947 to the Present (New York, 1992); David Schoenbaum, The United States and the State of Israel (Oxford, 1993); and Abraham Ben-Zvi, The United States and Israel: The Limits of the Special Relationship (New York, 1993).
168. For recent studies of the American-Israeli relationship see Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, "The United States and Israel since 1948: 'A Special Relationship'?" Diplomatic History 22 (Spring 1998): 231-62 and the commentaries to that article by Peter L. Hahn (263-72) and David Schoenbaum (273-83) in the same issue; George Wildman Ball, The Passionate Attachment: America's Involvement with Israel, 1947 to the Present (New York, 1992); David Schoenbaum, The United States and the State of Israel (Oxford, 1993); and Abraham Ben-Zvi, The United States and Israel: The Limits of the Special Relationship (New York, 1993).
169. For recent studies of the American-Israeli relationship see Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, "The United States and Israel since 1948: 'A Special Relationship'?" Diplomatic History 22 (Spring 1998): 231-62 and the commentaries to that article by Peter L. Hahn (263-72) and David Schoenbaum (273-83) in the same issue; George Wildman Ball, The Passionate Attachment: America's Involvement with Israel, 1947 to the Present (New York, 1992); David Schoenbaum, The United States and the State of Israel (Oxford, 1993); and Abraham Ben-Zvi, The United States and Israel: The Limits of the Special Relationship (New York, 1993).
170. For recent studies of the American-Israeli relationship see Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, "The United States and Israel since 1948: 'A Special Relationship'?" Diplomatic History 22 (Spring 1998): 231-62 and the commentaries to that article by Peter L. Hahn (263-72) and David Schoenbaum (273-83) in the same issue; George Wildman Ball, The Passionate Attachment: America's Involvement with Israel, 1947 to the Present (New York, 1992); David Schoenbaum, The United States and the State of Israel (Oxford, 1993); and Abraham Ben-Zvi, The United States and Israel: The Limits of the Special Relationship (New York, 1993).
171. The quotation is from Thomas M. Campbell, Masquerade Peace: America's UN Policy, 1944-45 (Tallahasee, 1973), 168. See also O Carlos Stoetzer, The
172. The quotation is from Thomas M. Campbell, Masquerade Peace: America's UN Policy, 1944-45 (Tallahasee, 1973), 168. See also O Carlos Stoetzer, The Organization of American States (Westport, 1993), 13-30; Lester D. Langley, America and the Americas: The United States in the Western Hemisphere (Athens, GA, 1989), 162-68; Lundestad, The American "Empire", 59-60; and Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, 172-73.
173. The quotation is from Thomas M. Campbell, Masquerade Peace: America's UN Policy, 1944-45 (Tallahasee, 1973), 168. See also O Carlos Stoetzer, The Organization of American States (Westport, 1993), 13-30; Lester D. Langley, America and the Americas: The United States in the Western Hemisphere (Athens, GA, 1989), 162-68; Lundestad, The American "Empire", 59-60; and Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, 172-73.
174. The quotation is from Thomas M. Campbell, Masquerade Peace: America's UN Policy, 1944-45 (Tallahasee, 1973), 168. See also O Carlos Stoetzer, The Organization of American States (Westport, 1993), 13-30; Lester D. Langley, America and the Americas: The United States in the Western Hemisphere (Athens, GA, 1989), 162-68; Lundestad, The American "Empire", 59-60; and Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, 172-73.
175. The quotation is from Thomas M. Campbell, Masquerade Peace: America's UN Policy, 1944-45 (Tallahasee, 1973), 168. See also O Carlos Stoetzer, The Organization of American States (Westport, 1993), 13-30; Lester D. Langley, America and the Americas: The United States in the Western Hemisphere (Athens, GA, 1989), 162-68; Lundestad, The American "Empire", 59-60; and Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, 172-73.
176. Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, 1978), 14, 25-28, 547-53; Stephen S. Kaplan, Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, 1981), 42, 689-93. For other lists of interventions see William Blum, The CIA: A Forgotten History. US Global Interventions (London, 1986), particularly 412-21 ("Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-1945") and James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1991: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force (London, 1994), 158-213 ("Seventy Years of Gunboat Diplomacy").
177. Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, 1978), 14, 25-28, 547-53; Stephen S. Kaplan, Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, 1981), 42, 689-93. For other lists of interventions see William Blum, The CIA: A Forgotten History. US Global Interventions (London, 1986), particularly 412-21 ("Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-1945") and James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1991: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force (London, 1994), 158-213 ("Seventy Years of Gunboat Diplomacy").
178. Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, 1978), 14, 25-28, 547-53; Stephen S. Kaplan, Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, 1981), 42, 689-93. For other lists of interventions see William Blum, The CIA: A Forgotten History. US Global Interventions (London, 1986), particularly 412-21 ("Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-1945") and James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1991: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force (London, 1994), 158-213 ("Seventy Years of Gunboat Diplomacy").
179. Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, 1978), 14, 25-28, 547-53; Stephen S. Kaplan, Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, 1981), 42, 689-93. For other lists of interventions see William Blum, The CIA: A Forgotten History. US Global Interventions (London, 1986), particularly 412-21 ("Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-1945") and James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1991: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force (London, 1994), 158-213 ("Seventy Years of Gunboat Diplomacy").
180. The definition used was the following: "A political use of armed forces occurs when physical actions are taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence." (Blechman and Kaplan, eds., Force without War, 12.)
181. For a further discussion of this point see my The American "Empire", 65-67.
182. See, for instance, the differing accounts in Blum, The CIA: A Forgotten History, 243-50 and Stephen G. Xydis, "Coups and Countercoups in Greece, 1967-73 (with postscript)," Political Science Quarterly 89 (Fall 1974): 507-38.
183. See, for instance, the differing accounts in Blum, The CIA: A Forgotten History, 243-50 and Stephen G. Xydis, "Coups and Countercoups in Greece, 1967-73 (with postscript)," Political Science Quarterly 89 (Fall 1974): 507-38.
184. This event is analyzed in detail in my The American Non-Policy towards Eastern Europe, 1943-1947, 167-75.
185. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston, 1965), 769.
186. For accounts of these interventions see William B. Quandt, "Lebanon, 1958, and Jordan, 1970" in Blechman and Kaplan, eds., Force without War, 225-57; Ritchie Ovendale, "Great Britain and the Anglo-American Invasion of Jordan and Lebanon in 1958," International History Review 16 (May 1994): 284-303; and Douglas Little, "His Finest Hour? Eisenhower, Lebanon, and the 1958 Middle East Crisis," Diplomatic History 20 (Winter 1996): 27-54.
187. For accounts of these interventions see William B. Quandt, "Lebanon, 1958, and Jordan, 1970" in Blechman and Kaplan, eds., Force without War, 225-57; Ritchie Ovendale, "Great Britain and the Anglo-American Invasion of Jordan and Lebanon in 1958," International History Review 16 (May 1994): 284-303; and Douglas Little, "His Finest Hour? Eisenhower, Lebanon, and the 1958 Middle East Crisis," Diplomatic History 20 (Winter 1996): 27-54.
188. For accounts of these interventions see William B. Quandt, "Lebanon, 1958, and Jordan, 1970" in Blechman and Kaplan, eds., Force without War, 225-57; Ritchie Ovendale, "Great Britain and the Anglo-American Invasion of Jordan and Lebanon in 1958," International History Review 16 (May 1994): 284-303; and Douglas Little, "His Finest Hour? Eisenhower, Lebanon, and the 1958 Middle East Crisis," Diplomatic History 20 (Winter 1996): 27-54.
189. For a good review article of the already vast literature on the Gulf War see L. Carl Brown, "Review Article: Shield and Storm in the Desert," International History Review 16 (February 1994): 92-113. The best account of the Gulf War is probably Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991. Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, 1993). For a short account see George Joffe, "Middle Eastern Views of the Gulf Conflict and its Aftermath," Review of International Studies 19, no. 2 (1993): 177-99. For an interesting Arab view see Mohamed Heikal, Illusions of Triumph: An Arab View of the Gulf War (London, 1992).
190. For a good review article of the already vast literature on the Gulf War see L. Carl Brown, "Review Article: Shield and Storm in the Desert," International History Review 16 (February 1994): 92-113. The best account of the Gulf War is probably Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991. Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, 1993). For a short account see George Joffe, "Middle Eastern Views of the Gulf Conflict and its Aftermath," Review of International Studies 19, no. 2 (1993): 177-99. For an interesting Arab view see Mohamed Heikal, Illusions of Triumph: An Arab View of the Gulf War (London, 1992).
191. For a good review article of the already vast literature on the Gulf War see L. Carl Brown, "Review Article: Shield and Storm in the Desert," International History Review 16 (February 1994): 92-113. The best account of the Gulf War is probably Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991. Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, 1993). For a short account see George Joffe, "Middle Eastern Views of the Gulf Conflict and its Aftermath," Review of International Studies 19, no. 2 (1993): 177-99. For an interesting Arab view see Mohamed Heikal, Illusions of Triumph: An Arab View of the Gulf War (London, 1992).
192. For a good review article of the already vast literature on the Gulf War see L. Carl Brown, "Review Article: Shield and Storm in the Desert," International History Review 16 (February 1994): 92-113. The best account of the Gulf War is probably Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991. Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, 1993). For a short account see George Joffe, "Middle Eastern Views of the Gulf Conflict and its Aftermath," Review of International Studies 19, no. 2 (1993): 177-99. For an interesting Arab view see Mohamed Heikal, Illusions of Triumph: An Arab View of the Gulf War (London, 1992).
193. For a short account of the events in the Philippines see Walter LaFeber, The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913, Vol. 2, Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations (Cambridge, England, 1993), 156-68. For a longer account see Glenn Anthony May, A Past Recovered (Quezon City, Philippines, 1987).
194. For a short account of the events in the Philippines see Walter LaFeber, The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913, Vol. 2, Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations (Cambridge, England, 1993), 156-68. For a longer account see Glenn Anthony May, A Past Recovered (Quezon City, Philippines, 1987).
195. The best account of the situation in Iran is probably Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 51-97. The quotation is from 94. See also Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah, 57-84.
196. The best account of the situation in Iran is probably Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 51-97. The quotation is from 94. See also Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah, 57-84.
197. The best account of Eisenhower's policy toward Indonesia is Audrey R. & George McT. Kahin, Subversion as foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (New York, 1995).
198. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (New York, 1965), 449.
199. See, for instance, Henry Cabot Lodge's comment: "I don't think we ought to take this government seriously. There is no one who can do anything. We have to do what we think we ought to do regardless of what the Saigon government does." U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968 (Washington, 1998), 3:193. Among the many accounts of the American role in Vietnam in general and the fall of Diem in particular I prefer George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York, 1979), 73-107; George McT. Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New York, 1986), 146-81; and Robert D. Schulzinger, A Time of War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975 (Oxford, 1997), 97-123. Joseph G. Morgan, The Vietnam Lobby: The American Friends of Vietnam, 1955-1975 (Chapel Hill, 1997) shows that the ties between Diem and the Vietnam Lobby in the United States may well have been weaker than we had earlier thought. For an official study of the American role in the planned assassination not only of Diem but also of Fidel Castro, Patrice Lumumba, Chilean General Rene Schneider, and Rafael Trujillo see United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, An Interim Report, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders (New York, 1976). The report concluded that although various U.S. agencies had indeed drawn up plans of one sort or another for the assassination of these leaders, with the possible exception of General Schneider the United States was probably not involved in any of the actual killings.
200. See, for instance, Henry Cabot Lodge's comment: "I don't think we ought to take this government seriously. There is no one who can do anything. We have to do what we think we ought to do regardless of what the Saigon government does." U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968 (Washington, 1998), 3:193. Among the many accounts of the American role in Vietnam in general and the fall of Diem in particular I prefer George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York, 1979), 73-107; George McT. Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New York, 1986), 146-81; and Robert D. Schulzinger, A Time of War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975 (Oxford, 1997), 97-123. Joseph G. Morgan, The Vietnam Lobby: The American Friends of Vietnam, 1955-1975 (Chapel Hill, 1997) shows that the ties between Diem and the Vietnam Lobby in the United States may well have been weaker than we had earlier thought. For an official study of the American role in the planned assassination not only of Diem but also of Fidel Castro, Patrice Lumumba, Chilean General Rene Schneider, and Rafael Trujillo see United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, An Interim Report, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders (New York, 1976). The report concluded that although various U.S. agencies had indeed drawn up plans of one sort or another for the assassination of these leaders, with the possible exception of General Schneider the United States was probably not involved in any of the actual killings.
201. See, for instance, Henry Cabot Lodge's comment: "I don't think we ought to take this government seriously. There is no one who can do anything. We have to do what we think we ought to do regardless of what the Saigon government does." U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968 (Washington, 1998), 3:193. Among the many accounts of the American role in Vietnam in general and the fall of Diem in particular I prefer George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York, 1979), 73-107; George McT. Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New York, 1986), 146-81; and Robert D. Schulzinger, A Time of War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975 (Oxford, 1997), 97-123. Joseph G. Morgan, The Vietnam Lobby: The American Friends of Vietnam, 1955-1975 (Chapel Hill, 1997) shows that the ties between Diem and the Vietnam Lobby in the United States may well have been weaker than we had earlier thought. For an official study of the American role in the planned assassination not only of Diem but also of Fidel Castro, Patrice Lumumba, Chilean General Rene Schneider, and Rafael Trujillo see United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, An Interim Report, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders (New York, 1976). The report concluded that although various U.S. agencies had indeed drawn up plans of one sort or another for the assassination of these leaders, with the possible exception of General Schneider the United States was probably not involved in any of the actual killings.
202. See, for instance, Henry Cabot Lodge's comment: "I don't think we ought to take this government seriously. There is no one who can do anything. We have to do what we think we ought to do regardless of what the Saigon government does." U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968 (Washington, 1998), 3:193. Among the many accounts of the American role in Vietnam in general and the fall of Diem in particular I prefer George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York, 1979), 73-107; George McT. Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New York, 1986), 146-81; and Robert D. Schulzinger, A Time of War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975 (Oxford, 1997), 97-123. Joseph G. Morgan, The Vietnam Lobby: The American Friends of Vietnam, 1955-1975 (Chapel Hill, 1997) shows that the ties between Diem and the Vietnam Lobby in the United States may well have been weaker than we had earlier thought. For an official study of the American role in the planned assassination not only of Diem but also of Fidel Castro, Patrice Lumumba, Chilean General Rene Schneider, and Rafael Trujillo see United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, An Interim Report, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders (New York, 1976). The report concluded that although various U.S. agencies had indeed drawn up plans of one sort or another for the assassination of these leaders, with the possible exception of General Schneider the United States was probably not involved in any of the actual killings.
203. See, for instance, Henry Cabot Lodge's comment: "I don't think we ought to take this government seriously. There is no one who can do anything. We have to do what we think we ought to do regardless of what the Saigon government does." U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968 (Washington, 1998), 3:193. Among the many accounts of the American role in Vietnam in general and the fall of Diem in particular I prefer George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York, 1979), 73-107; George McT. Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New York, 1986), 146-81; and Robert D. Schulzinger, A Time of War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975 (Oxford, 1997), 97-123. Joseph G. Morgan, The Vietnam Lobby: The American Friends of Vietnam, 1955-1975 (Chapel Hill, 1997) shows that the ties between Diem and the Vietnam Lobby in the United States may well have been weaker than we had earlier thought. For an official study of the American role in the planned assassination not only of Diem but also of Fidel Castro, Patrice Lumumba, Chilean General Rene Schneider, and Rafael Trujillo see United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, An Interim Report, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders (New York, 1976). The report concluded that although various U.S. agencies had indeed drawn up plans of one sort or another for the assassination of these leaders, with the possible exception of General Schneider the United States was probably not involved in any of the actual killings.
204. See, for instance, Henry Cabot Lodge's comment: "I don't think we ought to take this government seriously. There is no one who can do anything. We have to do what we think we ought to do regardless of what the Saigon government does." U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968 (Washington, 1998), 3:193. Among the many accounts of the American role in Vietnam in general and the fall of Diem in particular I prefer George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York, 1979), 73-107; George McT. Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New York, 1986), 146-81; and Robert D. Schulzinger, A Time of War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975 (Oxford, 1997), 97-123. Joseph G. Morgan, The Vietnam Lobby: The American Friends of Vietnam, 1955-1975 (Chapel Hill, 1997) shows that the ties between Diem and the Vietnam Lobby in the United States may well have been weaker than we had earlier thought. For an official study of the American role in the planned assassination not only of Diem but also of Fidel Castro, Patrice Lumumba, Chilean General Rene Schneider, and Rafael Trujillo see United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, An Interim Report, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders (New York, 1976). The report concluded that although various U.S. agencies had indeed drawn up plans of one sort or another for the assassination of these leaders, with the possible exception of General Schneider the United States was probably not involved in any of the actual killings.
205. For analyses of these events in Cuba and Panama see LaFeber, The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913, 139-55, 193-96; David Healy, Drive to Hegemony: The United States in the Caribbean, 1898-1917 (Madison, 1988), 77-94, 126-33; Allan Reed Millett, The Politics of Intervention: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906-09 (Columbus, 1968), 59-112; and John Major, Prize Possession: The United States and the Panama Canal, 1903-1979 (Cambridge, England, 1993), 34-77.
206. For analyses of these events in Cuba and Panama see LaFeber, The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913, 139-55, 193-96; David Healy, Drive to Hegemony: The United States in the Caribbean, 1898-1917 (Madison, 1988), 77-94, 126-33; Allan Reed Millett, The Politics of Intervention: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906-09 (Columbus, 1968), 59-112; and John Major, Prize Possession: The United States and the Panama Canal, 1903-1979 (Cambridge, England, 1993), 34-77.
207. For analyses of these events in Cuba and Panama see LaFeber, The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913, 139-55, 193-96; David Healy, Drive to Hegemony: The United States in the Caribbean, 1898-1917 (Madison, 1988), 77-94, 126-33; Allan Reed Millett, The Politics of Intervention: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906-09 (Columbus, 1968), 59-112; and John Major, Prize Possession: The United States and the Panama Canal, 1903-1979 (Cambridge, England, 1993), 34-77.
208. For analyses of these events in Cuba and Panama see LaFeber, The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913, 139-55, 193-96; David Healy, Drive to Hegemony: The United States in the Caribbean, 1898-1917 (Madison, 1988), 77-94, 126-33; Allan Reed Millett, The Politics of Intervention: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906-09 (Columbus, 1968), 59-112; and John Major, Prize Possession: The United States and the Panama Canal, 1903-1979 (Cambridge, England, 1993), 34-77.
209. See for instance, LaFeber, The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913, 198-201.
210. This point is taken from Iriye, The Globalizing of America, 1913-1945, 35.
211. Ibid., 82-83, 147-48.
212. For an overview of U.S. interventions from a legal point of view see Max Hilaire, International Law and United States Military Intervention in the Western Hemisphere (The Hague, 1997). For some comparative comments on U.S. interventions see H. W. Brands, Jr., "Decisions on American Armed Intervention: Lebanon, Dominican Republic, and Grenada," Political Science Quarterly 102, no 4 (1987): 607-24. For the most recent interventions see Richard N. Haass, Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World (Washington, 1994), particularly 19-48. For an account of American interventions in Central America see Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York, 1993). For the interventions in Guatemala and Chile I prefer Piero Gleijeses, Shatterd Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-54 (Princeton, 1991) and Paul E. Sigmund, The United States and Democracy in Chile (Baltimore, 1993).
213. For an overview of U.S. interventions from a legal point of view see Max Hilaire, International Law and United States Military Intervention in the Western Hemisphere (The Hague, 1997). For some comparative comments on U.S. interventions see H. W. Brands, Jr., "Decisions on American Armed Intervention: Lebanon, Dominican Republic, and Grenada," Political Science Quarterly 102, no 4 (1987): 607-24. For the most recent interventions see Richard N. Haass, Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World (Washington, 1994), particularly 19-48. For an account of American interventions in Central America see Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York, 1993). For the interventions in Guatemala and Chile I prefer Piero Gleijeses, Shatterd Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-54 (Princeton, 1991) and Paul E. Sigmund, The United States and Democracy in Chile (Baltimore, 1993).
214. For an overview of U.S. interventions from a legal point of view see Max Hilaire, International Law and United States Military Intervention in the Western Hemisphere (The Hague, 1997). For some comparative comments on U.S. interventions see H. W. Brands, Jr., "Decisions on American Armed Intervention: Lebanon, Dominican Republic, and Grenada," Political Science Quarterly 102, no 4 (1987): 607-24. For the most recent interventions see Richard N. Haass, Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World (Washington, 1994), particularly 19-48. For an account of American interventions in Central America see Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York, 1993). For the interventions in Guatemala and Chile I prefer Piero Gleijeses, Shatterd Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-54 (Princeton, 1991) and Paul E. Sigmund, The United States and Democracy in Chile (Baltimore, 1993).
215. For an overview of U.S. interventions from a legal point of view see Max Hilaire, International Law and United States Military Intervention in the Western Hemisphere (The Hague, 1997). For some comparative comments on U.S. interventions see H. W. Brands, Jr., "Decisions on American Armed Intervention: Lebanon, Dominican Republic, and Grenada," Political Science Quarterly 102, no 4 (1987): 607-24. For the most recent interventions see Richard N. Haass, Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World (Washington, 1994), particularly 19-48. For an account of American interventions in Central America see Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York, 1993). For the interventions in Guatemala and Chile I prefer Piero Gleijeses, Shatterd Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-54 (Princeton, 1991) and Paul E. Sigmund, The United States and Democracy in Chile (Baltimore, 1993).
216. For an overview of U.S. interventions from a legal point of view see Max Hilaire, International Law and United States Military Intervention in the Western Hemisphere (The Hague, 1997). For some comparative comments on U.S. interventions see H. W. Brands, Jr., "Decisions on American Armed Intervention: Lebanon, Dominican Republic, and Grenada," Political Science Quarterly 102, no 4 (1987): 607-24. For the most recent interventions see Richard N. Haass, Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World (Washington, 1994), particularly 19-48. For an account of American interventions in Central America see Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York, 1993). For the interventions in Guatemala and Chile I prefer Piero Gleijeses, Shatterd Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-54 (Princeton, 1991) and Paul E. Sigmund, The United States and Democracy in Chile (Baltimore, 1993).
217. For an overview of U.S. interventions from a legal point of view see Max Hilaire, International Law and United States Military Intervention in the Western Hemisphere (The Hague, 1997). For some comparative comments on U.S. interventions see H. W. Brands, Jr., "Decisions on American Armed Intervention: Lebanon, Dominican Republic, and Grenada," Political Science Quarterly 102, no 4 (1987): 607-24. For the most recent interventions see Richard N. Haass, Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World (Washington, 1994), particularly 19-48. For an account of American interventions in Central America see Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York, 1993). For the interventions in Guatemala and Chile I prefer Piero Gleijeses, Shatterd Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-54 (Princeton, 1991) and Paul E. Sigmund, The United States and Democracy in Chile (Baltimore, 1993).
218. Anthony Faiola, "'Yankee' Is Cool in Latin America," International Herald Tribune, 22 January 1998.
219. Joseph S. Nye Jr., and William A. Owens, "America's Information Edge," Foreign Affairs 75 (March-April 1996): 20-36.
220. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York, 1987); idem, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century (London, 1993). Today my own The American "Empire", which criticized Kennedy for his declinist views, seems rather mild in its criticism.
221. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York, 1987); idem, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century (London, 1993). Today my own The American "Empire", which criticized Kennedy for his declinist views, seems rather mild in its criticism.
222. For a short account of the intervention in Somalia see Haass, Intervention, 43-46. For development assistance see The OECD Observer, OECD in Figures: Statistics on the Member Countries (Paris, 1997), 68-69.
223. For a short account of the intervention in Somalia see Haass, Intervention, 43-46. For development assistance see The OECD Observer, OECD in Figures: Statistics on the Member Countries (Paris, 1997), 68-69.
224. See, for instance, David E. Sanger, "Ugly American Returns," International Herald Tribune, 6 October 1997; and William Drozdiak, "U.S. Dominance Breeds Irritation," ibid., 5 November 1997.
225. See, for instance, David E. Sanger, "Ugly American Returns," International Herald Tribune, 6 October 1997; and William Drozdiak, "U.S. Dominance Breeds Irritation," ibid., 5 November 1997.
226. For a good realist analysis see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Relations (Reading, MA, 1979). For NATO predictions see, for instance, John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15 (Summer 1990): 5-56. See also Mearsheimer, "The Future of America's Continental Commitment," in Lundestad, ed., No End to Alliance, 221-42.
227. For a good realist analysis see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Relations (Reading, MA, 1979). For NATO predictions see, for instance, John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15 (Summer 1990): 5-56. See also Mearsheimer, "The Future of America's Continental Commitment," in Lundestad, ed., No End to Alliance, 221-42.
228. For a good realist analysis see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Relations (Reading, MA, 1979). For NATO predictions see, for instance, John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15 (Summer 1990): 5-56. See also Mearsheimer, "The Future of America's Continental Commitment," in Lundestad, ed., No End to Alliance, 221-42.
229. No End to Alliance is the title of a book on American-Western European relations I have edited, published by Macmillan in 1998.
230. This paragraph is based in part on Josef Joffe, "How America Does It," Foreign Affairs 76 (September-October 1997): 13-27.