Intimate enemies: The politics of peacetime alliances

Security Studies

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 156-193

  Weitsman, Patricia A ^a  

^a OHIO UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0009887539     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636419708429337     Document Type: Article

References (216)

1. Paul W. Schroeder's exceptional piece, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, ed. Klaus Knorr (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1976), 227-62, provides the cornerstone of this argument.
2. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 160; see also Alan Ned Sabrosky, "Interstate Alliances: Their Reliability and the Expansion of War," in The Correlates of War II, ed. J. David Singer (New York: Free Press, 1980), 247-86; John A. C. Conybeare, "A Portfolio Diversification Model of Alliances: The Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 1879-1914," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 1 (March 1992): 53-85. See also Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations," International Organization 50, no. 1 (winter 1996): 109-39, who argues that state type has an important effect on the duration of alliance commitments. See also D. Scott Bennett's extension of this argument in "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984," American Journal of Political Science 41, no. 3 (July 1997): 846-78.
3. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 160; see also Alan Ned Sabrosky, "Interstate Alliances: Their Reliability and the Expansion of War," in The Correlates of War II, ed. J. David Singer (New York: Free Press, 1980), 247-86; John A. C. Conybeare, "A Portfolio Diversification Model of Alliances: The Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 1879-1914," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 1 (March 1992): 53-85. See also Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations," International Organization 50, no. 1 (winter 1996): 109-39, who argues that state type has an important effect on the duration of alliance commitments. See also D. Scott Bennett's extension of this argument in "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984," American Journal of Political Science 41, no. 3 (July 1997): 846-78.
4. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 160; see also Alan Ned Sabrosky, "Interstate Alliances: Their Reliability and the Expansion of War," in The Correlates of War II, ed. J. David Singer (New York: Free Press, 1980), 247-86; John A. C. Conybeare, "A Portfolio Diversification Model of Alliances: The Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 1879-1914," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 1 (March 1992): 53-85. See also Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations," International Organization 50, no. 1 (winter 1996): 109-39, who argues that state type has an important effect on the duration of alliance commitments. See also D. Scott Bennett's extension of this argument in "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984," American Journal of Political Science 41, no. 3 (July 1997): 846-78.
5. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 160; see also Alan Ned Sabrosky, "Interstate Alliances: Their Reliability and the Expansion of War," in The Correlates of War II, ed. J. David Singer (New York: Free Press, 1980), 247-86; John A. C. Conybeare, "A Portfolio Diversification Model of Alliances: The Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 1879-1914," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 1 (March 1992): 53-85. See also Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations," International Organization 50, no. 1 (winter 1996): 109-39, who argues that state type has an important effect on the duration of alliance commitments. See also D. Scott Bennett's extension of this argument in "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984," American Journal of Political Science 41, no. 3 (July 1997): 846-78.
6. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 160; see also Alan Ned Sabrosky, "Interstate Alliances: Their Reliability and the Expansion of War," in The Correlates of War II, ed. J. David Singer (New York: Free Press, 1980), 247-86; John A. C. Conybeare, "A Portfolio Diversification Model of Alliances: The Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 1879-1914," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 1 (March 1992): 53-85. See also Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations," International Organization 50, no. 1 (winter 1996): 109-39, who argues that state type has an important effect on the duration of alliance commitments. See also D. Scott Bennett's extension of this argument in "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984," American Journal of Political Science 41, no. 3 (July 1997): 846-78.
7. See Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Case Studies (New York: Wiley, 1973), for a comprehensive review of hypotheses concerning alliance behavior. See also Philip M. Burgess and David W. Moore, "Inter-nation Alliances: An Inventory and Appraisal of Propositions," in Political Science Annual, ed. J. A. Robinson (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972): 339-83; and Don Ward, Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics, Monograph Series in World Affairs 19, no. 1 (Denver Colorado Seminary, University of Denver, 1982). See also Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); David Priess, "Balance of Threat Theory and the Genesis of the Gulf Cooperation Council: An Interpretative Case Study," Security Studies 5, no. 4 (summer 1996): 143-71; and Fred Chernoff, After Bipolarity (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995). An alliance will refer to any formal or informal agreement between two or more states intended to further (militarily) the national security of the participating states. It is a continuing security association among member states with an element of forward planning and understanding to aid member states militarily or through benevolent neutrality.
8. See Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Case Studies (New York: Wiley, 1973), for a comprehensive review of hypotheses concerning alliance behavior. See also Philip M. Burgess and David W. Moore, "Inter-nation Alliances: An Inventory and Appraisal of Propositions," in Political Science Annual, ed. J. A. Robinson (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972): 339-83; and Don Ward, Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics, Monograph Series in World Affairs 19, no. 1 (Denver Colorado Seminary, University of Denver, 1982). See also Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); David Priess, "Balance of Threat Theory and the Genesis of the Gulf Cooperation Council: An Interpretative Case Study," Security Studies 5, no. 4 (summer 1996): 143-71; and Fred Chernoff, After Bipolarity (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995). An alliance will refer to any formal or informal agreement between two or more states intended to further (militarily) the national security of the participating states. It is a continuing security association among member states with an element of forward planning and understanding to aid member states militarily or through benevolent neutrality.
9. See Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Case Studies (New York: Wiley, 1973), for a comprehensive review of hypotheses concerning alliance behavior. See also Philip M. Burgess and David W. Moore, "Inter-nation Alliances: An Inventory and Appraisal of Propositions," in Political Science Annual, ed. J. A. Robinson (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972): 339-83; and Don Ward, Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics, Monograph Series in World Affairs 19, no. 1 (Denver Colorado Seminary, University of Denver, 1982). See also Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); David Priess, "Balance of Threat Theory and the Genesis of the Gulf Cooperation Council: An Interpretative Case Study," Security Studies 5, no. 4 (summer 1996): 143-71; and Fred Chernoff, After Bipolarity (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995). An alliance will refer to any formal or informal agreement between two or more states intended to further (militarily) the national security of the participating states. It is a continuing security association among member states with an element of forward planning and understanding to aid member states militarily or through benevolent neutrality.
10. See Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Case Studies (New York: Wiley, 1973), for a comprehensive review of hypotheses concerning alliance behavior. See also Philip M. Burgess and David W. Moore, "Inter-nation Alliances: An Inventory and Appraisal of Propositions," in Political Science Annual, ed. J. A. Robinson (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972): 339-83; and Don Ward, Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics, Monograph Series in World Affairs 19, no. 1 (Denver Colorado Seminary, University of Denver, 1982). See also Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); David Priess, "Balance of Threat Theory and the Genesis of the Gulf Cooperation Council: An Interpretative Case Study," Security Studies 5, no. 4 (summer 1996): 143-71; and Fred Chernoff, After Bipolarity (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995). An alliance will refer to any formal or informal agreement between two or more states intended to further (militarily) the national security of the participating states. It is a continuing security association among member states with an element of forward planning and understanding to aid member states militarily or through benevolent neutrality.
11. See Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Case Studies (New York: Wiley, 1973), for a comprehensive review of hypotheses concerning alliance behavior. See also Philip M. Burgess and David W. Moore, "Inter-nation Alliances: An Inventory and Appraisal of Propositions," in Political Science Annual, ed. J. A. Robinson (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972): 339-83; and Don Ward, Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics, Monograph Series in World Affairs 19, no. 1 (Denver Colorado Seminary, University of Denver, 1982). See also Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); David Priess, "Balance of Threat Theory and the Genesis of the Gulf Cooperation Council: An Interpretative Case Study," Security Studies 5, no. 4 (summer 1996): 143-71; and Fred Chernoff, After Bipolarity (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995). An alliance will refer to any formal or informal agreement between two or more states intended to further (militarily) the national security of the participating states. It is a continuing security association among member states with an element of forward planning and understanding to aid member states militarily or through benevolent neutrality.
12. See Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Case Studies (New York: Wiley, 1973), for a comprehensive review of hypotheses concerning alliance behavior. See also Philip M. Burgess and David W. Moore, "Inter-nation Alliances: An Inventory and Appraisal of Propositions," in Political Science Annual, ed. J. A. Robinson (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972): 339-83; and Don Ward, Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics, Monograph Series in World Affairs 19, no. 1 (Denver Colorado Seminary, University of Denver, 1982). See also Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); David Priess, "Balance of Threat Theory and the Genesis of the Gulf Cooperation Council: An Interpretative Case Study," Security Studies 5, no. 4 (summer 1996): 143-71; and Fred Chernoff, After Bipolarity (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995). An alliance will refer to any formal or informal agreement between two or more states intended to further (militarily) the national security of the participating states. It is a continuing security association among member states with an element of forward planning and understanding to aid member states militarily or through benevolent neutrality.
13. See Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Case Studies (New York: Wiley, 1973), for a comprehensive review of hypotheses concerning alliance behavior. See also Philip M. Burgess and David W. Moore, "Inter-nation Alliances: An Inventory and Appraisal of Propositions," in Political Science Annual, ed. J. A. Robinson (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972): 339-83; and Don Ward, Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics, Monograph Series in World Affairs 19, no. 1 (Denver Colorado Seminary, University of Denver, 1982). See also Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); David Priess, "Balance of Threat Theory and the Genesis of the Gulf Cooperation Council: An Interpretative Case Study," Security Studies 5, no. 4 (summer 1996): 143-71; and Fred Chernoff, After Bipolarity (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995). An alliance will refer to any formal or informal agreement between two or more states intended to further (militarily) the national security of the participating states. It is a continuing security association among member states with an element of forward planning and understanding to aid member states militarily or through benevolent neutrality.
14. Walt, The Origins of Alliances; and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), arc classic examples of this perspective.
15. Walt, The Origins of Alliances; and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), arc classic examples of this perspective.
16. For example, James D. Morrow, in "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 4 (November 1991): 904-33, argues that alliances should be examined in the context of the strategic tradeoff between security and autonomy inherent in a decision to become a part of an alliance. Ultimately, however, "a nation's autonomy and security rises and falls with its capabilities and the support it receives from its allies" (909). Underlying John Conybeare's work ("The Portfolio Benefits of Free Riding in Military Alliances," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 [September 1994]: 405-19), is the assumption that "states may benefit from pooling their military effort" (408).
17. For example, James D. Morrow, in "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 4 (November 1991): 904-33, argues that alliances should be examined in the context of the strategic tradeoff between security and autonomy inherent in a decision to become a part of an alliance. Ultimately, however, "a nation's autonomy and security rises and falls with its capabilities and the support it receives from its allies" (909). Underlying John Conybeare's work ("The Portfolio Benefits of Free Riding in Military Alliances," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 [September 1994]: 405-19), is the assumption that "states may benefit from pooling their military effort" (408).
18. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 27-31, 173-75. See also James D. Morrow, "Arms Versus Allies," International Organization 47, no. 2 (spring 1993): 207-33, who examines the autonomy offered a great power by deciding to ally with a weaker state; and Dan Reiter ("Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past," World Politics 46, no. 4 [July 1994]: 490-526; and Crucible of Beliefs), who pits learning theory against balance of power theory to explain small states' decisions to ally or maintain neutrality.
19. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 27-31, 173-75. See also James D. Morrow, "Arms Versus Allies," International Organization 47, no. 2 (spring 1993): 207-33, who examines the autonomy offered a great power by deciding to ally with a weaker state; and Dan Reiter ("Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past," World Politics 46, no. 4 [July 1994]: 490-526; and Crucible of Beliefs), who pits learning theory against balance of power theory to explain small states' decisions to ally or maintain neutrality.
20. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 27-31, 173-75. See also James D. Morrow, "Arms Versus Allies," International Organization 47, no. 2 (spring 1993): 207-33, who examines the autonomy offered a great power by deciding to ally with a weaker state; and Dan Reiter ("Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past," World Politics 46, no. 4 [July 1994]: 490-526; and Crucible of Beliefs), who pits learning theory against balance of power theory to explain small states' decisions to ally or maintain neutrality.
21. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 27-31, 173-75. See also James D. Morrow, "Arms Versus Allies," International Organization 47, no. 2 (spring 1993): 207-33, who examines the autonomy offered a great power by deciding to ally with a weaker state; and Dan Reiter ("Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past," World Politics 46, no. 4 [July 1994]: 490-526; and Crucible of Beliefs), who pits learning theory against balance of power theory to explain small states' decisions to ally or maintain neutrality.
22. See, for example, Emerson M. S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Gregory F. Rose, The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Emerson M. S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Alliances in Anarchic International Systems," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 167-91; Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization 44, no. 2 (spring 1990): 137-68; Karl Mueller, "Patterns of Alliance: Alignment Balancing and Stability," Security Studies 5, no. 1 (autumn 1995): 38-76; Robert Axelrod and D. Scott Bennett, "A Landscape Theory of Aggregation," British Journal of Political Science 23, pt. 2 (April 1993): 211-33. See also, "structural balance theory," discussed and described by Brian Healy and Arthur Stein, "The Balance of Power in International History," Journal of Conflict Resolution 17, no. 1 (March 1973): 33-61; and H. Brooke McDonald and Richard Rosecrance, "Alliance and Structural Balance in the International System," Journal of Conflict Resolution 29, no. 1 (March 1985): 57-82.
23. See, for example, Emerson M. S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Gregory F. Rose, The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Emerson M. S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Alliances in Anarchic International Systems," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 167-91; Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization 44, no. 2 (spring 1990): 137-68; Karl Mueller, "Patterns of Alliance: Alignment Balancing and Stability," Security Studies 5, no. 1 (autumn 1995): 38-76; Robert Axelrod and D. Scott Bennett, "A Landscape Theory of Aggregation," British Journal of Political Science 23, pt. 2 (April 1993): 211-33. See also, "structural balance theory," discussed and described by Brian Healy and Arthur Stein, "The Balance of Power in International History," Journal of Conflict Resolution 17, no. 1 (March 1973): 33-61; and H. Brooke McDonald and Richard Rosecrance, "Alliance and Structural Balance in the International System," Journal of Conflict Resolution 29, no. 1 (March 1985): 57-82.
24. See, for example, Emerson M. S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Gregory F. Rose, The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Emerson M. S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Alliances in Anarchic International Systems," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 167-91; Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization 44, no. 2 (spring 1990): 137-68; Karl Mueller, "Patterns of Alliance: Alignment Balancing and Stability," Security Studies 5, no. 1 (autumn 1995): 38-76; Robert Axelrod and D. Scott Bennett, "A Landscape Theory of Aggregation," British Journal of Political Science 23, pt. 2 (April 1993): 211-33. See also, "structural balance theory," discussed and described by Brian Healy and Arthur Stein, "The Balance of Power in International History," Journal of Conflict Resolution 17, no. 1 (March 1973): 33-61; and H. Brooke McDonald and Richard Rosecrance, "Alliance and Structural Balance in the International System," Journal of Conflict Resolution 29, no. 1 (March 1985): 57-82.
25. See, for example, Emerson M. S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Gregory F. Rose, The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Emerson M. S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Alliances in Anarchic International Systems," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 167-91; Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization 44, no. 2 (spring 1990): 137-68; Karl Mueller, "Patterns of Alliance: Alignment Balancing and Stability," Security Studies 5, no. 1 (autumn 1995): 38-76; Robert Axelrod and D. Scott Bennett, "A Landscape Theory of Aggregation," British Journal of Political Science 23, pt. 2 (April 1993): 211-33. See also, "structural balance theory," discussed and described by Brian Healy and Arthur Stein, "The Balance of Power in International History," Journal of Conflict Resolution 17, no. 1 (March 1973): 33-61; and H. Brooke McDonald and Richard Rosecrance, "Alliance and Structural Balance in the International System," Journal of Conflict Resolution 29, no. 1 (March 1985): 57-82.
26. See, for example, Emerson M. S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Gregory F. Rose, The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Emerson M. S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Alliances in Anarchic International Systems," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 167-91; Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization 44, no. 2 (spring 1990): 137-68; Karl Mueller, "Patterns of Alliance: Alignment Balancing and Stability," Security Studies 5, no. 1 (autumn 1995): 38-76; Robert Axelrod and D. Scott Bennett, "A Landscape Theory of Aggregation," British Journal of Political Science 23, pt. 2 (April 1993): 211-33. See also, "structural balance theory," discussed and described by Brian Healy and Arthur Stein, "The Balance of Power in International History," Journal of Conflict Resolution 17, no. 1 (March 1973): 33-61; and H. Brooke McDonald and Richard Rosecrance, "Alliance and Structural Balance in the International System," Journal of Conflict Resolution 29, no. 1 (March 1985): 57-82.
27. See, for example, Emerson M. S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Gregory F. Rose, The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Emerson M. S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Alliances in Anarchic International Systems," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 167-91; Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization 44, no. 2 (spring 1990): 137-68; Karl Mueller, "Patterns of Alliance: Alignment Balancing and Stability," Security Studies 5, no. 1 (autumn 1995): 38-76; Robert Axelrod and D. Scott Bennett, "A Landscape Theory of Aggregation," British Journal of Political Science 23, pt. 2 (April 1993): 211-33. See also, "structural balance theory," discussed and described by Brian Healy and Arthur Stein, "The Balance of Power in International History," Journal of Conflict Resolution 17, no. 1 (March 1973): 33-61; and H. Brooke McDonald and Richard Rosecrance, "Alliance and Structural Balance in the International System," Journal of Conflict Resolution 29, no. 1 (March 1985): 57-82.
28. See, for example, Emerson M. S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Gregory F. Rose, The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Emerson M. S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Alliances in Anarchic International Systems," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 167-91; Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization 44, no. 2 (spring 1990): 137-68; Karl Mueller, "Patterns of Alliance: Alignment Balancing and Stability," Security Studies 5, no. 1 (autumn 1995): 38-76; Robert Axelrod and D. Scott Bennett, "A Landscape Theory of Aggregation," British Journal of Political Science 23, pt. 2 (April 1993): 211-33. See also, "structural balance theory," discussed and described by Brian Healy and Arthur Stein, "The Balance of Power in International History," Journal of Conflict Resolution 17, no. 1 (March 1973): 33-61; and H. Brooke McDonald and Richard Rosecrance, "Alliance and Structural Balance in the International System," Journal of Conflict Resolution 29, no. 1 (March 1985): 57-82.
29. Waltz, Theory of International Politics. See also George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1968), 93.
30. Waltz, Theory of International Politics. See also George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1968), 93.
31. See, for example, Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks"; and Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Alliances in Europe," International Organization 51, no. 1 (winter 1997): 65-97.
32. See, for example, Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks"; and Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Alliances in Europe," International Organization 51, no. 1 (winter 1997): 65-97.
33. Walt, Origins of Alliances. See also John A. C. Conybeare, "Arms versus Alliance: The Capital Structure of Military Enterprise," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 233, who suggests that states "in high-risk international military environments" will more often seek allies than try to raise the necessary resources internally, as the latter strategy is far more costly than the former. According to Conybeare, state choices regarding their partners are akin to finance theory's propositions concerning the diversification of investment portfolios to achieve an optimal combination of risk and return. The expected return of an alliance is derived from the level of military manpower of the potential allies over a specific period of time. The anticipated risks involved are calculated by the variation in military manpower in the potential allies over the same time period.
34. Walt, Origins of Alliances. See also John A. C. Conybeare, "Arms versus Alliance: The Capital Structure of Military Enterprise," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 233, who suggests that states "in high-risk international military environments" will more often seek allies than try to raise the necessary resources internally, as the latter strategy is far more costly than the former. According to Conybeare, state choices regarding their partners are akin to finance theory's propositions concerning the diversification of investment portfolios to achieve an optimal combination of risk and return. The expected return of an alliance is derived from the level of military manpower of the potential allies over a specific period of time. The anticipated risks involved are calculated by the variation in military manpower in the potential allies over the same time period.
35. Liska, Nations in Alliance, 12.
36. Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks."
37. Morrow, "Arms Versus Allies."
38. James D. Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 270-97. See Christensen's response to Morrow in his article, "Perceptions and Alliances," esp. 70-81.
39. James D. Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 270-97. See Christensen's response to Morrow in his article, "Perceptions and Alliances," esp. 70-81.
40. Gerald L. Sorokin, "Alliance Formation and General Deterrence: A Game-Theoretic Model and the Case of Israel," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 298-325.
41. Walt, Origins of Alliances, 173-78.
42. See Waltz, Theory of International Polities, 125-26.
43. Deborah Larson, "Bandwagon Images in American Foreign Policy," in Dominoes and Bandwagons, eds. Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 102-3. Stephen David, Choosing Sides (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), similarly argues that leaders of Third World states make alliance choices based on how they can best assure their political survival (see esp. chap. 1). See also Richard J. Harknett and Jeffrey A. VanDenBerg's extension to this argument in "Alignment Theory and Interrelated Threats: Jordan and the Gulf Crisis," Security Studies 6, no. 3 (spring 1997): 112-53.
44. Deborah Larson, "Bandwagon Images in American Foreign Policy," in Dominoes and Bandwagons, eds. Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 102-3. Stephen David, Choosing Sides (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), similarly argues that leaders of Third World states make alliance choices based on how they can best assure their political survival (see esp. chap. 1). See also Richard J. Harknett and Jeffrey A. VanDenBerg's extension to this argument in "Alignment Theory and Interrelated Threats: Jordan and the Gulf Crisis," Security Studies 6, no. 3 (spring 1997): 112-53.
45. Deborah Larson, "Bandwagon Images in American Foreign Policy," in Dominoes and Bandwagons, eds. Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 102-3. Stephen David, Choosing Sides (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), similarly argues that leaders of Third World states make alliance choices based on how they can best assure their political survival (see esp. chap. 1). See also Richard J. Harknett and Jeffrey A. VanDenBerg's extension to this argument in "Alignment Theory and Interrelated Threats: Jordan and the Gulf Crisis," Security Studies 6, no. 3 (spring 1997): 112-53.
46. See Larson, "Bandwagon Images in American Foreign Policy," 102-3.
47. For a related argument, see McDonald and Rosecrance, "Alliance and Structural Balance in the International System." They concur with Healy's and Stein's assessment of the "ingratiating effect," but contest the finding that alliances among states enhance cooperation between the alliance and external powers. Instead, in extending the period of assessment by an additional decade, McDonald and Rosecrance found that as the alliances became increasingly formal, there was a decrease in cooperation between the alliances and external states. As will be returned to below, this finding may also have been the result of increasing external threat to the central alliances during this latter decade. See also a related extension of these arguments in Ido Oren, "The Indo-Pakistani Arms Competition: A Deductive and Statistical Analysis," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 185-214.
48. For a related argument, see McDonald and Rosecrance, "Alliance and Structural Balance in the International System." They concur with Healy's and Stein's assessment of the "ingratiating effect," but contest the finding that alliances among states enhance cooperation between the alliance and external powers. Instead, in extending the period of assessment by an additional decade, McDonald and Rosecrance found that as the alliances became increasingly formal, there was a decrease in cooperation between the alliances and external states. As will be returned to below, this finding may also have been the result of increasing external threat to the central alliances during this latter decade. See also a related extension of these arguments in Ido Oren, "The Indo-Pakistani Arms Competition: A Deductive and Statistical Analysis," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 185-214.
49. Randall Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19, no. 1 (summer 1994): 72-107.
50. Ibid., 101.
51. There is a growing literature on state choices to arm themselves rather than ally, and on state choices to remain neutral. See, for example, Conybeare, "Arms versus Alliance"; Morrow "Arms Versus Allies"; Gerald Sorokin, "Arms, Alliances, and Security Tradeoffs in Enduring Rivalries," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (September 1994): 421-46; and Reiter, "Learning, Realism, and Alliances." See also Glenn Snyder's work on abandonment-entrapment trade-offs and costs and benefits of allying (Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma and Alliance Politics," World Politics 36, no. 4 [July 1984]: 461-95; "Alliance Theory. A Neorealist First Cut," Journal of International Affairs 44, no. 1 [spring/summer 1990]: 103-23; and "Alliances, Balances, and Stability," International Organization 45, no. 1 [winter 1991]: 121-42). The focus of this essay, however, remains confined to the motives of states choosing to ally.
52. There is a growing literature on state choices to arm themselves rather than ally, and on state choices to remain neutral. See, for example, Conybeare, "Arms versus Alliance"; Morrow "Arms Versus Allies"; Gerald Sorokin, "Arms, Alliances, and Security Tradeoffs in Enduring Rivalries," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (September 1994): 421-46; and Reiter, "Learning, Realism, and Alliances." See also Glenn Snyder's work on abandonment-entrapment trade-offs and costs and benefits of allying (Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma and Alliance Politics," World Politics 36, no. 4 [July 1984]: 461-95; "Alliance Theory. A Neorealist First Cut," Journal of International Affairs 44, no. 1 [spring/summer 1990]: 103-23; and "Alliances, Balances, and Stability," International Organization 45, no. 1 [winter 1991]: 121-42). The focus of this essay, however, remains confined to the motives of states choosing to ally.
53. There is a growing literature on state choices to arm themselves rather than ally, and on state choices to remain neutral. See, for example, Conybeare, "Arms versus Alliance"; Morrow "Arms Versus Allies"; Gerald Sorokin, "Arms, Alliances, and Security Tradeoffs in Enduring Rivalries," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (September 1994): 421-46; and Reiter, "Learning, Realism, and Alliances." See also Glenn Snyder's work on abandonment-entrapment trade-offs and costs and benefits of allying (Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma and Alliance Politics," World Politics 36, no. 4 [July 1984]: 461-95; "Alliance Theory. A Neorealist First Cut," Journal of International Affairs 44, no. 1 [spring/summer 1990]: 103-23; and "Alliances, Balances, and Stability," International Organization 45, no. 1 [winter 1991]: 121-42). The focus of this essay, however, remains confined to the motives of states choosing to ally.
54. There is a growing literature on state choices to arm themselves rather than ally, and on state choices to remain neutral. See, for example, Conybeare, "Arms versus Alliance"; Morrow "Arms Versus Allies"; Gerald Sorokin, "Arms, Alliances, and Security Tradeoffs in Enduring Rivalries," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (September 1994): 421-46; and Reiter, "Learning, Realism, and Alliances." See also Glenn Snyder's work on abandonment-entrapment trade-offs and costs and benefits of allying (Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma and Alliance Politics," World Politics 36, no. 4 [July 1984]: 461-95; "Alliance Theory. A Neorealist First Cut," Journal of International Affairs 44, no. 1 [spring/summer 1990]: 103-23; and "Alliances, Balances, and Stability," International Organization 45, no. 1 [winter 1991]: 121-42). The focus of this essay, however, remains confined to the motives of states choosing to ally.
55. There is a growing literature on state choices to arm themselves rather than ally, and on state choices to remain neutral. See, for example, Conybeare, "Arms versus Alliance"; Morrow "Arms Versus Allies"; Gerald Sorokin, "Arms, Alliances, and Security Tradeoffs in Enduring Rivalries," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (September 1994): 421-46; and Reiter, "Learning, Realism, and Alliances." See also Glenn Snyder's work on abandonment-entrapment trade-offs and costs and benefits of allying (Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma and Alliance Politics," World Politics 36, no. 4 [July 1984]: 461-95; "Alliance Theory. A Neorealist First Cut," Journal of International Affairs 44, no. 1 [spring/summer 1990]: 103-23; and "Alliances, Balances, and Stability," International Organization 45, no. 1 [winter 1991]: 121-42). The focus of this essay, however, remains confined to the motives of states choosing to ally.
56. There is a growing literature on state choices to arm themselves rather than ally, and on state choices to remain neutral. See, for example, Conybeare, "Arms versus Alliance"; Morrow "Arms Versus Allies"; Gerald Sorokin, "Arms, Alliances, and Security Tradeoffs in Enduring Rivalries," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (September 1994): 421-46; and Reiter, "Learning, Realism, and Alliances." See also Glenn Snyder's work on abandonment-entrapment trade-offs and costs and benefits of allying (Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma and Alliance Politics," World Politics 36, no. 4 [July 1984]: 461-95; "Alliance Theory. A Neorealist First Cut," Journal of International Affairs 44, no. 1 [spring/summer 1990]: 103-23; and "Alliances, Balances, and Stability," International Organization 45, no. 1 [winter 1991]: 121-42). The focus of this essay, however, remains confined to the motives of states choosing to ally.
57. There is a growing literature on state choices to arm themselves rather than ally, and on state choices to remain neutral. See, for example, Conybeare, "Arms versus Alliance"; Morrow "Arms Versus Allies"; Gerald Sorokin, "Arms, Alliances, and Security Tradeoffs in Enduring Rivalries," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (September 1994): 421-46; and Reiter, "Learning, Realism, and Alliances." See also Glenn Snyder's work on abandonment-entrapment trade-offs and costs and benefits of allying (Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma and Alliance Politics," World Politics 36, no. 4 [July 1984]: 461-95; "Alliance Theory. A Neorealist First Cut," Journal of International Affairs 44, no. 1 [spring/summer 1990]: 103-23; and "Alliances, Balances, and Stability," International Organization 45, no. 1 [winter 1991]: 121-42). The focus of this essay, however, remains confined to the motives of states choosing to ally.
58. Paul W. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, ed. Klaus Knorr (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1976), 227-62.
59. Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia," in Jervis and Snyder, Dominoes and Bandwagons, 55 (emphasis in original).
60. Paul Schroeder argued twenty years ago that this dynamic was a central feature of alliances and should be explored in more detail (see his "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," 255-56). The argument here builds on Schroeder, but differs in that I argue that these pacts are among states posing a grave threat to them in the international system, rather than pacts forming among relatively friendly states. Schroeder, for example, describes the Dual Alliance as an alliance of this kind. I do not, precisely because there was a low level of reciprocal threat. I also reconceptualize the argument in terms of internal versus external threats, and draw out the implications for alliance cohesion.
61. John A. C. Conybeare, "Financial Models of the 'Risky' State," in Enforcing Cooperation: "Risky" States and the Intergovernmental Management of Conflict, eds. Gerald Schneider and Patricia Weitsman (London: MacMillan, 1997): 60-77.
62. See Joseph M. Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 331-34; Joseph M. Grieco, "The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the Neo-Realist Research Programme," Review of International Studies 21 (1995): 21-40; and Grieco, "State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories," in Realism: Restatements and Renewal, ed. Benjamin Frankel (special issue of Security Studies 5, no. 3 [spring 1996]): 261-306; Daniel H. Deudney, "The Philadelphian System," International Organization 49, no. 2 (spring 1995): 191-228; and Deudney, "Binding Sovereigns," in State Sovereignty as Social Construct, eds. Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), esp. 213-16.
63. See Joseph M. Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 331-34; Joseph M. Grieco, "The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the Neo-Realist Research Programme," Review of International Studies 21 (1995): 21-40; and Grieco, "State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories," in Realism: Restatements and Renewal, ed. Benjamin Frankel (special issue of Security Studies 5, no. 3 [spring 1996]): 261-306; Daniel H. Deudney, "The Philadelphian System," International Organization 49, no. 2 (spring 1995): 191-228; and Deudney, "Binding Sovereigns," in State Sovereignty as Social Construct, eds. Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), esp. 213-16.
64. See Joseph M. Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 331-34; Joseph M. Grieco, "The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the Neo-Realist Research Programme," Review of International Studies 21 (1995): 21-40; and Grieco, "State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories," in Realism: Restatements and Renewal, ed. Benjamin Frankel (special issue of Security Studies 5, no. 3 [spring 1996]): 261-306; Daniel H. Deudney, "The Philadelphian System," International Organization 49, no. 2 (spring 1995): 191-228; and Deudney, "Binding Sovereigns," in State Sovereignty as Social Construct, eds. Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), esp. 213-16.
65. See Joseph M. Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 331-34; Joseph M. Grieco, "The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the Neo-Realist Research Programme," Review of International Studies 21 (1995): 21-40; and Grieco, "State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories," in Realism: Restatements and Renewal, ed. Benjamin Frankel (special issue of Security Studies 5, no. 3 [spring 1996]): 261-306; Daniel H. Deudney, "The Philadelphian System," International Organization 49, no. 2 (spring 1995): 191-228; and Deudney, "Binding Sovereigns," in State Sovereignty as Social Construct, eds. Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), esp. 213-16.
66. See Joseph M. Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 331-34; Joseph M. Grieco, "The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the Neo-Realist Research Programme," Review of International Studies 21 (1995): 21-40; and Grieco, "State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories," in Realism: Restatements and Renewal, ed. Benjamin Frankel (special issue of Security Studies 5, no. 3 [spring 1996]): 261-306; Daniel H. Deudney, "The Philadelphian System," International Organization 49, no. 2 (spring 1995): 191-228; and Deudney, "Binding Sovereigns," in State Sovereignty as Social Construct, eds. Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), esp. 213-16.
67. Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation," 331.
68. Deudney, "Binding Sovereigns," 214.
69. Walt, Origins of Alliances, 22-26.
70. For an analysis of alliances as institutions which promote cooperation among member states, see Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, "An Institutional Approach to Alliance Theory" (Paper prepared for the meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, 21-25 February 1995); Thomas Risse-Kappen, "A Liberal Interpretation of the Transatlantic Security Community," in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 357-99; and Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," Security Studies 3, no. 1 (autumn 1993): 3-43; John S. Duffield, "International Regimes and Alliance Behavior Explaining NATO Conventional Force Levels," International Organization 46, no. 4 (autumn 1992): 818-55; and Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War," International Organization 50, no. 3 (summer 1996): 445-75.
71. For an analysis of alliances as institutions which promote cooperation among member states, see Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, "An Institutional Approach to Alliance Theory" (Paper prepared for the meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, 21-25 February 1995); Thomas Risse-Kappen, "A Liberal Interpretation of the Transatlantic Security Community," in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 357-99; and Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," Security Studies 3, no. 1 (autumn 1993): 3-43; John S. Duffield, "International Regimes and Alliance Behavior Explaining NATO Conventional Force Levels," International Organization 46, no. 4 (autumn 1992): 818-55; and Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War," International Organization 50, no. 3 (summer 1996): 445-75.
72. For an analysis of alliances as institutions which promote cooperation among member states, see Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, "An Institutional Approach to Alliance Theory" (Paper prepared for the meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, 21-25 February 1995); Thomas Risse-Kappen, "A Liberal Interpretation of the Transatlantic Security Community," in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 357-99; and Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," Security Studies 3, no. 1 (autumn 1993): 3-43; John S. Duffield, "International Regimes and Alliance Behavior Explaining NATO Conventional Force Levels," International Organization 46, no. 4 (autumn 1992): 818-55; and Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War," International Organization 50, no. 3 (summer 1996): 445-75.
73. For an analysis of alliances as institutions which promote cooperation among member states, see Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, "An Institutional Approach to Alliance Theory" (Paper prepared for the meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, 21-25 February 1995); Thomas Risse-Kappen, "A Liberal Interpretation of the Transatlantic Security Community," in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 357-99; and Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," Security Studies 3, no. 1 (autumn 1993): 3-43; John S. Duffield, "International Regimes and Alliance Behavior Explaining NATO Conventional Force Levels," International Organization 46, no. 4 (autumn 1992): 818-55; and Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War," International Organization 50, no. 3 (summer 1996): 445-75.
74. For an analysis of alliances as institutions which promote cooperation among member states, see Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, "An Institutional Approach to Alliance Theory" (Paper prepared for the meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, 21-25 February 1995); Thomas Risse-Kappen, "A Liberal Interpretation of the Transatlantic Security Community," in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 357-99; and Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," Security Studies 3, no. 1 (autumn 1993): 3-43; John S. Duffield, "International Regimes and Alliance Behavior Explaining NATO Conventional Force Levels," International Organization 46, no. 4 (autumn 1992): 818-55; and Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War," International Organization 50, no. 3 (summer 1996): 445-75.
75. For an analysis of alliances as institutions which promote cooperation among member states, see Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, "An Institutional Approach to Alliance Theory" (Paper prepared for the meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, 21-25 February 1995); Thomas Risse-Kappen, "A Liberal Interpretation of the Transatlantic Security Community," in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 357-99; and Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," Security Studies 3, no. 1 (autumn 1993): 3-43; John S. Duffield, "International Regimes and Alliance Behavior Explaining NATO Conventional Force Levels," International Organization 46, no. 4 (autumn 1992): 818-55; and Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War," International Organization 50, no. 3 (summer 1996): 445-75.
76. See Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security and the Future of Europe," International Security 16, no. 1 (summer 1991): 114-61; Richard K. Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe," International Security 17, no. 1 (summer 1992): 5-43; George Downs, ed., Collective Security Beyond the Cold War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); and Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995): 52-61.
77. See Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security and the Future of Europe," International Security 16, no. 1 (summer 1991): 114-61; Richard K. Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe," International Security 17, no. 1 (summer 1992): 5-43; George Downs, ed., Collective Security Beyond the Cold War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); and Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995): 52-61.
78. See Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security and the Future of Europe," International Security 16, no. 1 (summer 1991): 114-61; Richard K. Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe," International Security 17, no. 1 (summer 1992): 5-43; George Downs, ed., Collective Security Beyond the Cold War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); and Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995): 52-61.
79. See Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security and the Future of Europe," International Security 16, no. 1 (summer 1991): 114-61; Richard K. Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe," International Security 17, no. 1 (summer 1992): 5-43; George Downs, ed., Collective Security Beyond the Cold War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); and Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995): 52-61.
80. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit," 99.
81. Ally and adversary arc generally conceived of as opposites of one another. I would argue, however, that this dichotomy is not altogether straightforward. It is not at all intuitive that any state that is not militarily allied with another is therefore an adversary; nor is it clear, as argued here, that simply because states militarily ally with one another they are no longer adversaries. An adversary, in my view, refers to states that have hostile and threatening relationships with one another.
82. I would like to point out that the dynamic I describe here is confined to peacetime alliances; wartime conditions are different, and the difference in context of interaction will alter the resulting alliance behavior.
83. I employ a behavioral conceptualization of cohesion: the ability of member states "to agree on goals, strategy, and tactics, and coordinate activity directed toward those ends" (Holsti et al., Unity and Disintegration, 16). This is in contrast to Liska who distinguishes between cohesion and efficacy (Liska, Nations in Alliance, chaps. 2-3). In my view, cohesion is not analytically the same as duration. It might be preferable to discuss cohesion as a "we feeling," but assessing it as such would be inherently impressionistic. Adopting a behavioral conception, I think, is a suitable alternative. Alliance cohesion has not received the same amount of attention as alliance formation has, although most arguments concerning alliance formation speak to the issue of effectiveness by default. Numerous authors make reference to alliance cohesion, but never define it Further, there are significant differences in what authors mean when they do refer to cohesion. Fred Chernoff, for example, implies that alliance cohesion refers to the distance between or among allies' goals ("Stability and Alliance Cohesion," Journal of Conflict Resolution 34, no. 1 [March 1990]: 92-101); similarly, Louise Richardson's analysis of the relationship between the United States and Britain during the Suez crisis and the Falklands War implies that cohesion has to do with differences between or among allied states' objectives (When Allies Differ [New York: St. Martin's, 1996]). Stephen Walt ("Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," Survival 39, no. 1 [spring 1997]: 156-79), on the other hand, implies that cohesion is connected to alliance duration; James O'Leary ("Economic Relationships Among the Allies: Sources of Cohesion and Tension," in Alliances in V.S. Foreign Policy: Issues in the Quest for Collective Defense, ed. Alan Ned Sabrosky [Boulder: Westview, 1988], 41-56), implies that cohesion is about agreement and shared goals, although in the same volume, Earl C. Ravenal ("Extended Deterrence and Alliance Cohesion," 19-40) implies that cohesion is about commitment.
84. I employ a behavioral conceptualization of cohesion: the ability of member states "to agree on goals, strategy, and tactics, and coordinate activity directed toward those ends" (Holsti et al., Unity and Disintegration, 16). This is in contrast to Liska who distinguishes between cohesion and efficacy (Liska, Nations in Alliance, chaps. 2-3). In my view, cohesion is not analytically the same as duration. It might be preferable to discuss cohesion as a "we feeling," but assessing it as such would be inherently impressionistic. Adopting a behavioral conception, I think, is a suitable alternative. Alliance cohesion has not received the same amount of attention as alliance formation has, although most arguments concerning alliance formation speak to the issue of effectiveness by default. Numerous authors make reference to alliance cohesion, but never define it Further, there are significant differences in what authors mean when they do refer to cohesion. Fred Chernoff, for example, implies that alliance cohesion refers to the distance between or among allies' goals ("Stability and Alliance Cohesion," Journal of Conflict Resolution 34, no. 1 [March 1990]: 92-101); similarly, Louise Richardson's analysis of the relationship between the United States and Britain during the Suez crisis and the Falklands War implies that cohesion has to do with differences between or among allied states' objectives (When Allies Differ [New York: St. Martin's, 1996]). Stephen Walt ("Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," Survival 39, no. 1 [spring 1997]: 156-79), on the other hand, implies that cohesion is connected to alliance duration; James O'Leary ("Economic Relationships Among the Allies: Sources of Cohesion and Tension," in Alliances in V.S. Foreign Policy: Issues in the Quest for Collective Defense, ed. Alan Ned Sabrosky [Boulder: Westview, 1988], 41-56), implies that cohesion is about agreement and shared goals, although in the same volume, Earl C. Ravenal ("Extended Deterrence and Alliance Cohesion," 19-40) implies that cohesion is about commitment.
85. I employ a behavioral conceptualization of cohesion: the ability of member states "to agree on goals, strategy, and tactics, and coordinate activity directed toward those ends" (Holsti et al., Unity and Disintegration, 16). This is in contrast to Liska who distinguishes between cohesion and efficacy (Liska, Nations in Alliance, chaps. 2-3). In my view, cohesion is not analytically the same as duration. It might be preferable to discuss cohesion as a "we feeling," but assessing it as such would be inherently impressionistic. Adopting a behavioral conception, I think, is a suitable alternative. Alliance cohesion has not received the same amount of attention as alliance formation has, although most arguments concerning alliance formation speak to the issue of effectiveness by default. Numerous authors make reference to alliance cohesion, but never define it Further, there are significant differences in what authors mean when they do refer to cohesion. Fred Chernoff, for example, implies that alliance cohesion refers to the distance between or among allies' goals ("Stability and Alliance Cohesion," Journal of Conflict Resolution 34, no. 1 [March 1990]: 92-101); similarly, Louise Richardson's analysis of the relationship between the United States and Britain during the Suez crisis and the Falklands War implies that cohesion has to do with differences between or among allied states' objectives (When Allies Differ [New York: St. Martin's, 1996]). Stephen Walt ("Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," Survival 39, no. 1 [spring 1997]: 156-79), on the other hand, implies that cohesion is connected to alliance duration; James O'Leary ("Economic Relationships Among the Allies: Sources of Cohesion and Tension," in Alliances in V.S. Foreign Policy: Issues in the Quest for Collective Defense, ed. Alan Ned Sabrosky [Boulder: Westview, 1988], 41-56), implies that cohesion is about agreement and shared goals, although in the same volume, Earl C. Ravenal ("Extended Deterrence and Alliance Cohesion," 19-40) implies that cohesion is about commitment.
86. I employ a behavioral conceptualization of cohesion: the ability of member states "to agree on goals, strategy, and tactics, and coordinate activity directed toward those ends" (Holsti et al., Unity and Disintegration, 16). This is in contrast to Liska who distinguishes between cohesion and efficacy (Liska, Nations in Alliance, chaps. 2-3). In my view, cohesion is not analytically the same as duration. It might be preferable to discuss cohesion as a "we feeling," but assessing it as such would be inherently impressionistic. Adopting a behavioral conception, I think, is a suitable alternative. Alliance cohesion has not received the same amount of attention as alliance formation has, although most arguments concerning alliance formation speak to the issue of effectiveness by default. Numerous authors make reference to alliance cohesion, but never define it Further, there are significant differences in what authors mean when they do refer to cohesion. Fred Chernoff, for example, implies that alliance cohesion refers to the distance between or among allies' goals ("Stability and Alliance Cohesion," Journal of Conflict Resolution 34, no. 1 [March 1990]: 92-101); similarly, Louise Richardson's analysis of the relationship between the United States and Britain during the Suez crisis and the Falklands War implies that cohesion has to do with differences between or among allied states' objectives (When Allies Differ [New York: St. Martin's, 1996]). Stephen Walt ("Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," Survival 39, no. 1 [spring 1997]: 156-79), on the other hand, implies that cohesion is connected to alliance duration; James O'Leary ("Economic Relationships Among the Allies: Sources of Cohesion and Tension," in Alliances in V.S. Foreign Policy: Issues in the Quest for Collective Defense, ed. Alan Ned Sabrosky [Boulder: Westview, 1988], 41-56), implies that cohesion is about agreement and shared goals, although in the same volume, Earl C. Ravenal ("Extended Deterrence and Alliance Cohesion," 19-40) implies that cohesion is about commitment.
87. I employ a behavioral conceptualization of cohesion: the ability of member states "to agree on goals, strategy, and tactics, and coordinate activity directed toward those ends" (Holsti et al., Unity and Disintegration, 16). This is in contrast to Liska who distinguishes between cohesion and efficacy (Liska, Nations in Alliance, chaps. 2-3). In my view, cohesion is not analytically the same as duration. It might be preferable to discuss cohesion as a "we feeling," but assessing it as such would be inherently impressionistic. Adopting a behavioral conception, I think, is a suitable alternative. Alliance cohesion has not received the same amount of attention as alliance formation has, although most arguments concerning alliance formation speak to the issue of effectiveness by default. Numerous authors make reference to alliance cohesion, but never define it Further, there are significant differences in what authors mean when they do refer to cohesion. Fred Chernoff, for example, implies that alliance cohesion refers to the distance between or among allies' goals ("Stability and Alliance Cohesion," Journal of Conflict Resolution 34, no. 1 [March 1990]: 92-101); similarly, Louise Richardson's analysis of the relationship between the United States and Britain during the Suez crisis and the Falklands War implies that cohesion has to do with differences between or among allied states' objectives (When Allies Differ [New York: St. Martin's, 1996]). Stephen Walt ("Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," Survival 39, no. 1 [spring 1997]: 156-79), on the other hand, implies that cohesion is connected to alliance duration; James O'Leary ("Economic Relationships Among the Allies: Sources of Cohesion and Tension," in Alliances in V.S. Foreign Policy: Issues in the Quest for Collective Defense, ed. Alan Ned Sabrosky [Boulder: Westview, 1988], 41-56), implies that cohesion is about agreement and shared goals, although in the same volume, Earl C. Ravenal ("Extended Deterrence and Alliance Cohesion," 19-40) implies that cohesion is about commitment.
88. I employ a behavioral conceptualization of cohesion: the ability of member states "to agree on goals, strategy, and tactics, and coordinate activity directed toward those ends" (Holsti et al., Unity and Disintegration, 16). This is in contrast to Liska who distinguishes between cohesion and efficacy (Liska, Nations in Alliance, chaps. 2-3). In my view, cohesion is not analytically the same as duration. It might be preferable to discuss cohesion as a "we feeling," but assessing it as such would be inherently impressionistic. Adopting a behavioral conception, I think, is a suitable alternative. Alliance cohesion has not received the same amount of attention as alliance formation has, although most arguments concerning alliance formation speak to the issue of effectiveness by default. Numerous authors make reference to alliance cohesion, but never define it Further, there are significant differences in what authors mean when they do refer to cohesion. Fred Chernoff, for example, implies that alliance cohesion refers to the distance between or among allies' goals ("Stability and Alliance Cohesion," Journal of Conflict Resolution 34, no. 1 [March 1990]: 92-101); similarly, Louise Richardson's analysis of the relationship between the United States and Britain during the Suez crisis and the Falklands War implies that cohesion has to do with differences between or among allied states' objectives (When Allies Differ [New York: St. Martin's, 1996]). Stephen Walt ("Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," Survival 39, no. 1 [spring 1997]: 156-79), on the other hand, implies that cohesion is connected to alliance duration; James O'Leary ("Economic Relationships Among the Allies: Sources of Cohesion and Tension," in Alliances in V.S. Foreign Policy: Issues in the Quest for Collective Defense, ed. Alan Ned Sabrosky [Boulder: Westview, 1988], 41-56), implies that cohesion is about agreement and shared goals, although in the same volume, Earl C. Ravenal ("Extended Deterrence and Alliance Cohesion," 19-40) implies that cohesion is about commitment.
89. This is the implication of Walt's argument, although it is not tested in his Origins of Alliances. For a comprehensive discussion of extending the arguments about alliance formation to alliance cohesion, see Patricia Weitsman, "Common Enemies and Uncommon Interests" (Ph.D. diss, Columbia University, 1994).
90. Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 29.
91. Holsti et al., Unity and Disintegration, 225.
92. See Walt, Origin of Alliances, 29-30, 173-75; Reiter, "Learning, Realism, and Alliances," 499-505, 511-24. On small states and alliance behavior see also the classic, Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).
93. See Walt, Origin of Alliances, 29-30, 173-75; Reiter, "Learning, Realism, and Alliances," 499-505, 511-24. On small states and alliance behavior see also the classic, Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).
94. See Walt, Origin of Alliances, 29-30, 173-75; Reiter, "Learning, Realism, and Alliances," 499-505, 511-24. On small states and alliance behavior see also the classic, Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).
95. Harvey Starr, "Democracy and War: Choice, Learning and Security Communities," Journal of Peace Research 29, no. 2 (1992): 211. There is a growing literature on security communities. The classic remains Karl W. Deutsch, with S. A. Burell, R. A. Kann, M. Lee, M. Lichtermann and R. W. van Wagenen, Political Community and the North Atlantic-Area. International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). See also Emanuel Adler, "Europe's New Security Order A Pluralistic Security Community," in The Future of European Security, ed. Beverly Crawford (Berkeley: Center for German and European Studies of the University of California-Berkeley, 1992), 287-326; and Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies.
96. Harvey Starr, "Democracy and War: Choice, Learning and Security Communities," Journal of Peace Research 29, no. 2 (1992): 211. There is a growing literature on security communities. The classic remains Karl W. Deutsch, with S. A. Burell, R. A. Kann, M. Lee, M. Lichtermann and R. W. van Wagenen, Political Community and the North Atlantic-Area. International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). See also Emanuel Adler, "Europe's New Security Order A Pluralistic Security Community," in The Future of European Security, ed. Beverly Crawford (Berkeley: Center for German and European Studies of the University of California-Berkeley, 1992), 287-326; and Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies.
97. Harvey Starr, "Democracy and War: Choice, Learning and Security Communities," Journal of Peace Research 29, no. 2 (1992): 211. There is a growing literature on security communities. The classic remains Karl W. Deutsch, with S. A. Burell, R. A. Kann, M. Lee, M. Lichtermann and R. W. van Wagenen, Political Community and the North Atlantic-Area. International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). See also Emanuel Adler, "Europe's New Security Order A Pluralistic Security Community," in The Future of European Security, ed. Beverly Crawford (Berkeley: Center for German and European Studies of the University of California-Berkeley, 1992), 287-326; and Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies.
98. Harvey Starr, "Democracy and War: Choice, Learning and Security Communities," Journal of Peace Research 29, no. 2 (1992): 211. There is a growing literature on security communities. The classic remains Karl W. Deutsch, with S. A. Burell, R. A. Kann, M. Lee, M. Lichtermann and R. W. van Wagenen, Political Community and the North Atlantic-Area. International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). See also Emanuel Adler, "Europe's New Security Order A Pluralistic Security Community," in The Future of European Security, ed. Beverly Crawford (Berkeley: Center for German and European Studies of the University of California-Berkeley, 1992), 287-326; and Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies.
99. It is argued, in fact, that the exaggeration and exacerbation of the Russian-German quarrel was a tactic Bismarck employed in order to convince the Emperor William (a friend of Russia and Czar Alexander's uncle) to sanction the alliance with Austria-Hungary. See A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 260-01. Gordon A. Craig (Germany, 1866-1945 [New York: Oxford University Press, 1978], 114), writes that the Emperor only capitulated to Bismarck's demand because of Bismarck's threat to resign otherwise; Bruce Waller (Bismarck at the Crossroads [London: University of London at the Athlone Press, 1974]), argues that the Dual Alliance was devised by Bismarck in order to impress on Russia the need to come to terms and return to the League of the Three Emperors.
100. It is argued, in fact, that the exaggeration and exacerbation of the Russian-German quarrel was a tactic Bismarck employed in order to convince the Emperor William (a friend of Russia and Czar Alexander's uncle) to sanction the alliance with Austria-Hungary. See A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 260-01. Gordon A. Craig (Germany, 1866-1945 [New York: Oxford University Press, 1978], 114), writes that the Emperor only capitulated to Bismarck's demand because of Bismarck's threat to resign otherwise; Bruce Waller (Bismarck at the Crossroads [London: University of London at the Athlone Press, 1974]), argues that the Dual Alliance was devised by Bismarck in order to impress on Russia the need to come to terms and return to the League of the Three Emperors.
101. It is argued, in fact, that the exaggeration and exacerbation of the Russian-German quarrel was a tactic Bismarck employed in order to convince the Emperor William (a friend of Russia and Czar Alexander's uncle) to sanction the alliance with Austria-Hungary. See A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 260-01. Gordon A. Craig (Germany, 1866-1945 [New York: Oxford University Press, 1978], 114), writes that the Emperor only capitulated to Bismarck's demand because of Bismarck's threat to resign otherwise; Bruce Waller (Bismarck at the Crossroads [London: University of London at the Athlone Press, 1974]), argues that the Dual Alliance was devised by Bismarck in order to impress on Russia the need to come to terms and return to the League of the Three Emperors.
102. The goals of the alliance were "defensive." See Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The Origins of the World War, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: MacMillan, 1967), 342-43.
103. References to external threats refer to common threats.
104. See Alfred Franzis Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920), 25-31, for the text of the treaty. Germany at first intended to keep the contents of the treaty secret. The treaty was published only a month after it was signed (William Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 2nd ed. [New York: Knopf, 1950]), 173.
105. See Alfred Franzis Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920), 25-31, for the text of the treaty. Germany at first intended to keep the contents of the treaty secret. The treaty was published only a month after it was signed (William Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 2nd ed. [New York: Knopf, 1950]), 173.
106. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery, 260-61.
107. Archibald Coolidge, Origins of the Triple Alliance (New York: Scribner's, 1919), 172-73.
108. See Fay, The Origins of the World War, 378-406. Fay writes that despite the full-fledged German support for Austria during this crisis, and despite the good understanding between the two states' heads of army staffs, "there was more friction between the two allies than has generally been supposed" (405). He goes on to note, however, that "occasionally, Bethmann felt it necessary to renew promises to support policies which Austria deemed essential for her vital interests in the Balkans, because he would otherwise have caused such dissatisfaction at the Ballplatz as to have seriously weakened the alliance which still remained the corner-stone of German foreign policy" (405-6).
109. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Amy, 289. See also Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Sceptre. The European Powers and the Wilhelmian Empire, 1890-1914, vol. 2 (London: Allen Lane, Penguin Press, 1972), 239-40.
110. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Amy, 289. See also Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Sceptre. The European Powers and the Wilhelmian Empire, 1890-1914, vol. 2 (London: Allen Lane, Penguin Press, 1972), 239-40.
111. The need to draw Italy into the fold are made abundantly clear by Bismarck and Prince Henry VII of Reuss (the German ambassador in Vienna). See documents nos. 547, 576, 589, and 593, in La Politique Extérieure Ae L.'Allemagne, 1870-1914, Documents Officiels Publiés par Le Minsitère Allemand des Affaires Étrangères, vol. 3 (Paris: Alfred Costes, 1928), trans. Paul Reclus. See also document no. 564 between German ambassador to Rome Keudell and Bismarck.
112. Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914, vol. 1.
113. See German Diplomatie Documents, 1871-1914, vol. 1, trans. E. T. S. Dugdale (London: Methuen, 1928), 110-18. See especially the memos by Bismarck, 22 December 1881 and 31 January 1882, and the minutes by the Emperor on the latter; the reports from Busch (of the German Foreign Office) to Prince Henry VII of Reuss on 14 February and 28 February 1882; and the report from Prince Henry VII of Reuss to Bismarck, 18 March 1882. See also Oswald Henry Wedel's analysis of the Austrian documents during the beginning of the Balkan Wars, Austro-German Diplomatic Relations, 1908-1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1932), 140-41.
114. See German Diplomatie Documents, 1871-1914, vol. 1, trans. E. T. S. Dugdale (London: Methuen, 1928), 110-18. See especially the memos by Bismarck, 22 December 1881 and 31 January 1882, and the minutes by the Emperor on the latter; the reports from Busch (of the German Foreign Office) to Prince Henry VII of Reuss on 14 February and 28 February 1882; and the report from Prince Henry VII of Reuss to Bismarck, 18 March 1882. See also Oswald Henry Wedel's analysis of the Austrian documents during the beginning of the Balkan Wars, Austro-German Diplomatic Relations, 1908-1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1932), 140-41.
115. Archibald Cary Coolidge, Origins of the Triple Alliance (New York: Scribner's, 1919), 215-16. For more on Italian sentiments, see Francesco Crispi, The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi: The Triple Alliance, vol. 2 (New York: Hodder and Stoughton, 1912).
116. Archibald Cary Coolidge, Origins of the Triple Alliance (New York: Scribner's, 1919), 215-16. For more on Italian sentiments, see Francesco Crispi, The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi: The Triple Alliance, vol. 2 (New York: Hodder and Stoughton, 1912).
117. Albert Franzis Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1921), 45; Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914 (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), vol. 1, 51, 84; Fay, The Origins of the World War, 86-87.
118. Albert Franzis Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1921), 45; Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914 (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), vol. 1, 51, 84; Fay, The Origins of the World War, 86-87.
119. Albert Franzis Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1921), 45; Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914 (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), vol. 1, 51, 84; Fay, The Origins of the World War, 86-87.
120. William C. Askew, "Austro-Italian Antagonism, 1896-1914," in Power, Public Opinion and Diplomacy, eds. Lillian Parker and William C. Askew (Durham: Duke University Press, 1959), 176-220. Askew sees the sources of antagonism between Italy and Austria as popular opinion; Albanian rivalry; the Balkans outside the Adriatic; irredentism; pressures from the military; and economic rivalry between the two allied adversaries.
121. Fay, in The Origins of the World War, vol. 1, writes that the Balkan Wars "increased the internal friction within the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente....This internal friction, however, was more than counter-balanced by the feeling in each group that it must do everything possible to preserve unity and solidarity among its members. Allies must stand together and support one another's policies, consenting to policies which were unpalatable, or even consenting to acts which might involve dangers to the peace of Europe" (346-47).
122. The text of this agreement can be found in Pribram, Secret Treaties, vol. 1, 283-305.
123. R. J. B. Bosworth, Italy, the Least of the Great Powers: Italian Foreign Policy before the First World War (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 247.
124. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery, 273. Richard Bosworth, in Italy and the Approach of the First World War (London: MacMillan, 1983), writes that there were eleven thousand Italians in Tunis.
125. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery, 273. Richard Bosworth, in Italy and the Approach of the First World War (London: MacMillan, 1983), writes that there were eleven thousand Italians in Tunis.
126. Coolidge, Origins of the Triple Alliance, 191-206.
127. Charles Seymour, The Diplomatic Background of the War, 1870-1914 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1916), 33.
128. Pribram, Secret Treaties, vol. 2, 40.
129. It is true, however, that the period 1875-85 marked more friendlier relations between Germany and France. This came to an end with the appointment of General Boulanger as minister of war in France. See Fay, The Origins of the World War, 96-104.
130. Craig, Germany, 116; Pribram, Secret Treaties, vol. 2, 41; Fay, The Origins of the World War, 84-85.
131. Craig, Germany, 116; Pribram, Secret Treaties, vol. 2, 41; Fay, The Origins of the World War, 84-85.
132. Craig, Germany, 116; Pribram, Secret Treaties, vol. 2, 41; Fay, The Origins of the World War, 84-85.
133. Fay, The Origins of the World War, 142-51.
134. Die Grossi Politik der Europäischen Kabinette (1871-1914). Sammlung der Diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin, vol. 18, 5780, as cited in Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 1, 135.
135. Die Grossi Politik der Europäischen Kabinette (1871-1914). Sammlung der Diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin, vol. 18, 5780, as cited in Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 1, 135.
136. Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 1, 182; Pribram, Secret Treaties, vol. 2, 138-43; Fay, The Origins of the World War, 150-51.
137. Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 1, 182; Pribram, Secret Treaties, vol. 2, 138-43; Fay, The Origins of the World War, 150-51.
138. Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 1, 182; Pribram, Secret Treaties, vol. 2, 138-43; Fay, The Origins of the World War, 150-51.
139. As cited in Pribram, Secret Treaties, vol. 2, 138. See also Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol 1, 162-84.
140. As cited in Pribram, Secret Treaties, vol. 2, 138. See also Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol 1, 162-84.
141. Pribram, Secret Treaties, vol. 2, 143, 145.
142. Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 1, 31.
143. Antonio Salandra, Italy and the Great War (London: Edward Arnold, 1932), 25-26.
144. This case is interesting, too, for it demonstrates that even when employing a definition of alliances which deems the specification of casus foederis essential, alliances may nevertheless perform the function of managing conflict.
145. William L. Langer, The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1890-1894 (New York: Octagon, 1967) 183; Langer, "The Franco-Russian Alliance (1890-1894)," Slavonic Review 3, no. 9 (March 1925): 574.
146. William L. Langer, The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1890-1894 (New York: Octagon, 1967) 183; Langer, "The Franco-Russian Alliance (1890-1894)," Slavonic Review 3, no. 9 (March 1925): 574.
147. The hostility between Germany and France did vary from 1871 to 1914, but the issue of French revanche could never wholly be overcome. Niou et al., The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems, 236, summarize the historical consensus on this point well. As they write in their discussion of the possible combination of powers in this period, "Examining the potential coalitions and alliances for Germany from 1871 to 1887, in light of French revanchist ambitions arising from the Franco-Prussian War - for example, the demand for the return of Alsace-Lorraine as a condition of negotiation - and the role of Franco-German rivalry in the emergence of the German state, we eliminate as infeasible any coalitions that include France." They go on to note that, "scholarly opinion is virtually unanimous in identifying the same impediments to such a [Franco-German] coalition" (236-37 n. 13).
148. Pribram, The Secret Treaties, vol. 2, 209.
149. Fay, The Origins of the World War, 24-25, writes that the fact that Poincaré viewed war as inevitable made a European war inevitable. Although accounts differ on the level of hostility between Germany and France, and in fact the level of hostility varied over the years 1871-1914, there is historical consensus that "the major obstacle to any lasting improvement in Franco-German relations was the treaty of Frankfurt, by which Germany annexed Alsace and Lorraine" (John F. V. Keiger, France and the Origins of the First World War [London: MacMillan, 1983], 68). See Keiger on the ups and downs of Franco-German relations prior to the Great War. See also E. Malcom Carroll, French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 1870-1914 (New York: Century, 1931).
150. Fay, The Origins of the World War, 24-25, writes that the fact that Poincaré viewed war as inevitable made a European war inevitable. Although accounts differ on the level of hostility between Germany and France, and in fact the level of hostility varied over the years 1871-1914, there is historical consensus that "the major obstacle to any lasting improvement in Franco-German relations was the treaty of Frankfurt, by which Germany annexed Alsace and Lorraine" (John F. V. Keiger, France and the Origins of the First World War [London: MacMillan, 1983], 68). See Keiger on the ups and downs of Franco-German relations prior to the Great War. See also E. Malcom Carroll, French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 1870-1914 (New York: Century, 1931).
151. Fay, The Origins of the World War, 24-25, writes that the fact that Poincaré viewed war as inevitable made a European war inevitable. Although accounts differ on the level of hostility between Germany and France, and in fact the level of hostility varied over the years 1871-1914, there is historical consensus that "the major obstacle to any lasting improvement in Franco-German relations was the treaty of Frankfurt, by which Germany annexed Alsace and Lorraine" (John F. V. Keiger, France and the Origins of the First World War [London: MacMillan, 1983], 68). See Keiger on the ups and downs of Franco-German relations prior to the Great War. See also E. Malcom Carroll, French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 1870-1914 (New York: Century, 1931).
152. Langer, The Franco-Russian Alliance, 68.
153. George F. Kennan, The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia, and the Coming of the First World War (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 155.
154. Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente (New York: Holt, 1934), 42.
155. Georges Michon, The Franco-Russian Alliance: 1891-1917 (New York: Howard Fertig, 1969), 74.
156. Langer, The Franco-Russian Alliance, 240.
157. Ibid., 261-63.
158. Ibid., 268-69.
159. Michon, TAe Franco-Russian Alliance, 80-81. French foreign minister Hanotaux wanted to refuse the German invitation to Kiel and wrote to the Tsar asking whether Russia would be sending representatives to Kiel. Nicholas II responded by writing that he did not understand French hesitation and that as allies, given that the Russians were sending warships to Kiel, he expected the French to do so as well (Michon, The Franco-Russian Alliance, 81 n. 1). Cf. Carroll, French Public Opinion, 162-63.
160. Michon, TAe Franco-Russian Alliance, 80-81. French foreign minister Hanotaux wanted to refuse the German invitation to Kiel and wrote to the Tsar asking whether Russia would be sending representatives to Kiel. Nicholas II responded by writing that he did not understand French hesitation and that as allies, given that the Russians were sending warships to Kiel, he expected the French to do so as well (Michon, The Franco-Russian Alliance, 81 n. 1). Cf. Carroll, French Public Opinion, 162-63.
161. Michon, TAe Franco-Russian Alliance, 80-81. French foreign minister Hanotaux wanted to refuse the German invitation to Kiel and wrote to the Tsar asking whether Russia would be sending representatives to Kiel. Nicholas II responded by writing that he did not understand French hesitation and that as allies, given that the Russians were sending warships to Kiel, he expected the French to do so as well (Michon, The Franco-Russian Alliance, 81 n. 1). Cf. Carroll, French Public Opinion, 162-63.
162. John Francis Parr, "Théophile Delcassé and the Practice of the Franco-Russian Alliance, 1898-1905" (Ph.D. diss., University of Fribourg, Switzerland, 1951), 56-61. See also Kennan, The Fateful Alliance, 35, about the diverse aims and goals of France and Russia.
163. John Francis Parr, "Théophile Delcassé and the Practice of the Franco-Russian Alliance, 1898-1905" (Ph.D. diss., University of Fribourg, Switzerland, 1951), 56-61. See also Kennan, The Fateful Alliance, 35, about the diverse aims and goals of France and Russia.
164. Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 74.
165. See, for example, G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperely, British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, vol. 4, The Anglo-Russian Rapprochement, 1903-1907 (London: His Majesty's Government Printing Office, 1928), 33-35, 206-7, 217-18, 231-32. The latter documents in particular reveal that balancing against Germany was certainly not the motivating force behind the British overtures toward Russia. Germany knew and supported the British attempts at improving relations with Russia. See also Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916, vol. 1 (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1925), 35, 37-38, 47, 49-50.
166. See, for example, G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperely, British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, vol. 4, The Anglo-Russian Rapprochement, 1903-1907 (London: His Majesty's Government Printing Office, 1928), 33-35, 206-7, 217-18, 231-32. The latter documents in particular reveal that balancing against Germany was certainly not the motivating force behind the British overtures toward Russia. Germany knew and supported the British attempts at improving relations with Russia. See also Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916, vol. 1 (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1925), 35, 37-38, 47, 49-50.
167. George Monger, The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900-1907 (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1963), 168. See also David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 65.
168. George Monger, The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900-1907 (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1963), 168. See also David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 65.
169. Christopher Andrew, "The Entente Cordiale from its Origins to 1914," in Troubled Neighbors: Franco-British Relations in the Twentieth Century, ed. Neville Waites (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), 17.
170. Christopher Andrew, Théophile Delcassé and the Entente Cordiale (London: Macmillan 1968), 125. See also Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 1, 187.
171. Christopher Andrew, Théophile Delcassé and the Entente Cordiale (London: Macmillan 1968), 125. See also Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 1, 187.
172. Samuel R. Williamson Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-1914 (London: Ashfield, 1990), 22.
173. Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 59.
174. Monger, The End of Isolation, 134.
175. P. J. V. Rolo, Entente Cordiale (London: Macmillan, 1969), 274; Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 1, 152. Taylor, in The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 424, writes that perhaps French efforts to defuse this crisis were of consequence, but the main reason the crisis was defused was that the British did not want a conflict, nor did the Russians. Yet this argument is not very compelling, first because one can always say a crisis was averted because the two parties wanted to avert it, and second, according to the British documents French intervention was welcomed and effective. See document nos. 5-31, especially n. 21, G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperely, British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, vol. 4, The Anglo-Russian Rapprochement, 1903-1907 (London: His Majesty's Government Printing Office, 1928).
176. P. J. V. Rolo, Entente Cordiale (London: Macmillan, 1969), 274; Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 1, 152. Taylor, in The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 424, writes that perhaps French efforts to defuse this crisis were of consequence, but the main reason the crisis was defused was that the British did not want a conflict, nor did the Russians. Yet this argument is not very compelling, first because one can always say a crisis was averted because the two parties wanted to avert it, and second, according to the British documents French intervention was welcomed and effective. See document nos. 5-31, especially n. 21, G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperely, British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, vol. 4, The Anglo-Russian Rapprochement, 1903-1907 (London: His Majesty's Government Printing Office, 1928).
177. P. J. V. Rolo, Entente Cordiale (London: Macmillan, 1969), 274; Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 1, 152. Taylor, in The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 424, writes that perhaps French efforts to defuse this crisis were of consequence, but the main reason the crisis was defused was that the British did not want a conflict, nor did the Russians. Yet this argument is not very compelling, first because one can always say a crisis was averted because the two parties wanted to avert it, and second, according to the British documents French intervention was welcomed and effective. See document nos. 5-31, especially n. 21, G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperely, British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, vol. 4, The Anglo-Russian Rapprochement, 1903-1907 (London: His Majesty's Government Printing Office, 1928).
178. P. J. V. Rolo, Entente Cordiale (London: Macmillan, 1969), 274; Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 1, 152. Taylor, in The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 424, writes that perhaps French efforts to defuse this crisis were of consequence, but the main reason the crisis was defused was that the British did not want a conflict, nor did the Russians. Yet this argument is not very compelling, first because one can always say a crisis was averted because the two parties wanted to avert it, and second, according to the British documents French intervention was welcomed and effective. See document nos. 5-31, especially n. 21, G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperely, British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, vol. 4, The Anglo-Russian Rapprochement, 1903-1907 (London: His Majesty's Government Printing Office, 1928).
179. This was a reciprocal sentiment. See Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 164-65.
180. Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 1, 550.
181. See Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, 130-47, for a discussion of British and French views of the crisis as well as Russia's and its allies' perceptions of why Russia backed down during the crisis.
182. Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 78-81.
183. Telegram, February 14-27, 1909 (document no. 251, in George Abel Schreiner, Entente Diplomacy and the World [New York: Knickerbocker, 1921], 235-36).
184. Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 94.
185. See Willkinson, The Politics of Grand Strategy, 135-37; Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 85; and document nos. 598-619, in Schreiner, Entente Diplomacy, 524-44. Especially of note are document nos. 605 and 606 in which Russia is adamant in divorcing its policy choices from its allies'; and no. 614 which discusses the blow the Triple Entente sustained from the Potsdam agreement.
186. See Willkinson, The Politics of Grand Strategy, 135-37; Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 85; and document nos. 598-619, in Schreiner, Entente Diplomacy, 524-44. Especially of note are document nos. 605 and 606 in which Russia is adamant in divorcing its policy choices from its allies'; and no. 614 which discusses the blow the Triple Entente sustained from the Potsdam agreement.
187. See Willkinson, The Politics of Grand Strategy, 135-37; Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 85; and document nos. 598-619, in Schreiner, Entente Diplomacy, 524-44. Especially of note are document nos. 605 and 606 in which Russia is adamant in divorcing its policy choices from its allies'; and no. 614 which discusses the blow the Triple Entente sustained from the Potsdam agreement.
188. Fay, The Origins of the World War, vol. 1, 293.
189. Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 1, 339. See also Fay, The Origins of the World War, 291; Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 74-75.
190. Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 1, 339. See also Fay, The Origins of the World War, 291; Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 74-75.
191. Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 1, 339. See also Fay, The Origins of the World War, 291; Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 74-75.
192. Williamson, The Politics of Grand Strategy, 299.
193. Ibid., 317, 339. See also Schreiner, Entente Diplomacy, 724-34, document nos. 850-56.
194. Ibid., 317, 339. See also Schreiner, Entente Diplomacy, 724-34, document nos. 850-56.
195. A clear alternative explanation for these cases would be an argument often made concerning the specific character of Otto von Bismarck and the policies he implemented. The fact that the dynamic held true in the Triple Entente case, however, suggests that something else is at work.
196. There are numerous other potential factors which affect the cohesion of alliances. For an analysis of the effect of ideology, duration, size, regime stability, and decision-making structure on the cohesion of the pre-First World War alliances, and the First World War wartime coalitions, see Weitsman, "Common Enemies and Uncommon Interests."
197. There is a voluminous and growing literature on the topic of the future of NATO. See, for example, Duffield, "NATO's Functions after the Cold War"; and Duffield, "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Alliance Theory," in Explaining International Relations Since 1945, ed. Ngaire Woods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War"; Hellmann and Wolf, "Neorcalism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO"; Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies; Chernoff, After Bipolarity, John Mueller, "A New Concert of Europe," Foreign Policy, no. 77 (winter 1989/90): 3-16; Richard Holbrooke, "America, A European Power," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 2 (March/April 1995): 38-51; David Gompert and Richard Kugler, "Free-Rider Redux: NATO Needs to Project Power (and Europe Can Help)," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January/February 1995): 7-12; Zbigniew Brzezinksi, "A Plan for Europe," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January/February 1995): 26-42; Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion," Foreign Policy, no. 98 (spring 1995): 116-29.
198. There is a voluminous and growing literature on the topic of the future of NATO. See, for example, Duffield, "NATO's Functions after the Cold War"; and Duffield, "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Alliance Theory," in Explaining International Relations Since 1945, ed. Ngaire Woods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War"; Hellmann and Wolf, "Neorcalism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO"; Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies; Chernoff, After Bipolarity, John Mueller, "A New Concert of Europe," Foreign Policy, no. 77 (winter 1989/90): 3-16; Richard Holbrooke, "America, A European Power," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 2 (March/April 1995): 38-51; David Gompert and Richard Kugler, "Free-Rider Redux: NATO Needs to Project Power (and Europe Can Help)," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January/February 1995): 7-12; Zbigniew Brzezinksi, "A Plan for Europe," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January/February 1995): 26-42; Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion," Foreign Policy, no. 98 (spring 1995): 116-29.
199. There is a voluminous and growing literature on the topic of the future of NATO. See, for example, Duffield, "NATO's Functions after the Cold War"; and Duffield, "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Alliance Theory," in Explaining International Relations Since 1945, ed. Ngaire Woods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War"; Hellmann and Wolf, "Neorcalism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO"; Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies; Chernoff, After Bipolarity, John Mueller, "A New Concert of Europe," Foreign Policy, no. 77 (winter 1989/90): 3-16; Richard Holbrooke, "America, A European Power," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 2 (March/April 1995): 38-51; David Gompert and Richard Kugler, "Free-Rider Redux: NATO Needs to Project Power (and Europe Can Help)," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January/February 1995): 7-12; Zbigniew Brzezinksi, "A Plan for Europe," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January/February 1995): 26-42; Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion," Foreign Policy, no. 98 (spring 1995): 116-29.
200. There is a voluminous and growing literature on the topic of the future of NATO. See, for example, Duffield, "NATO's Functions after the Cold War"; and Duffield, "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Alliance Theory," in Explaining International Relations Since 1945, ed. Ngaire Woods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War"; Hellmann and Wolf, "Neorcalism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO"; Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies; Chernoff, After Bipolarity, John Mueller, "A New Concert of Europe," Foreign Policy, no. 77 (winter 1989/90): 3-16; Richard Holbrooke, "America, A European Power," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 2 (March/April 1995): 38-51; David Gompert and Richard Kugler, "Free-Rider Redux: NATO Needs to Project Power (and Europe Can Help)," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January/February 1995): 7-12; Zbigniew Brzezinksi, "A Plan for Europe," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January/February 1995): 26-42; Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion," Foreign Policy, no. 98 (spring 1995): 116-29.
201. There is a voluminous and growing literature on the topic of the future of NATO. See, for example, Duffield, "NATO's Functions after the Cold War"; and Duffield, "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Alliance Theory," in Explaining International Relations Since 1945, ed. Ngaire Woods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War"; Hellmann and Wolf, "Neorcalism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO"; Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies; Chernoff, After Bipolarity, John Mueller, "A New Concert of Europe," Foreign Policy, no. 77 (winter 1989/90): 3-16; Richard Holbrooke, "America, A European Power," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 2 (March/April 1995): 38-51; David Gompert and Richard Kugler, "Free-Rider Redux: NATO Needs to Project Power (and Europe Can Help)," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January/February 1995): 7-12; Zbigniew Brzezinksi, "A Plan for Europe," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January/February 1995): 26-42; Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion," Foreign Policy, no. 98 (spring 1995): 116-29.
202. There is a voluminous and growing literature on the topic of the future of NATO. See, for example, Duffield, "NATO's Functions after the Cold War"; and Duffield, "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Alliance Theory," in Explaining International Relations Since 1945, ed. Ngaire Woods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War"; Hellmann and Wolf, "Neorcalism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO"; Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies; Chernoff, After Bipolarity, John Mueller, "A New Concert of Europe," Foreign Policy, no. 77 (winter 1989/90): 3-16; Richard Holbrooke, "America, A European Power," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 2 (March/April 1995): 38-51; David Gompert and Richard Kugler, "Free-Rider Redux: NATO Needs to Project Power (and Europe Can Help)," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January/February 1995): 7-12; Zbigniew Brzezinksi, "A Plan for Europe," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January/February 1995): 26-42; Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion," Foreign Policy, no. 98 (spring 1995): 116-29.
203. There is a voluminous and growing literature on the topic of the future of NATO. See, for example, Duffield, "NATO's Functions after the Cold War"; and Duffield, "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Alliance Theory," in Explaining International Relations Since 1945, ed. Ngaire Woods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War"; Hellmann and Wolf, "Neorcalism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO"; Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies; Chernoff, After Bipolarity, John Mueller, "A New Concert of Europe," Foreign Policy, no. 77 (winter 1989/90): 3-16; Richard Holbrooke, "America, A European Power," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 2 (March/April 1995): 38-51; David Gompert and Richard Kugler, "Free-Rider Redux: NATO Needs to Project Power (and Europe Can Help)," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January/February 1995): 7-12; Zbigniew Brzezinksi, "A Plan for Europe," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January/February 1995): 26-42; Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion," Foreign Policy, no. 98 (spring 1995): 116-29.
204. There is a voluminous and growing literature on the topic of the future of NATO. See, for example, Duffield, "NATO's Functions after the Cold War"; and Duffield, "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Alliance Theory," in Explaining International Relations Since 1945, ed. Ngaire Woods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War"; Hellmann and Wolf, "Neorcalism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO"; Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies; Chernoff, After Bipolarity, John Mueller, "A New Concert of Europe," Foreign Policy, no. 77 (winter 1989/90): 3-16; Richard Holbrooke, "America, A European Power," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 2 (March/April 1995): 38-51; David Gompert and Richard Kugler, "Free-Rider Redux: NATO Needs to Project Power (and Europe Can Help)," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January/February 1995): 7-12; Zbigniew Brzezinksi, "A Plan for Europe," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January/February 1995): 26-42; Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion," Foreign Policy, no. 98 (spring 1995): 116-29.
205. There is a voluminous and growing literature on the topic of the future of NATO. See, for example, Duffield, "NATO's Functions after the Cold War"; and Duffield, "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Alliance Theory," in Explaining International Relations Since 1945, ed. Ngaire Woods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War"; Hellmann and Wolf, "Neorcalism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO"; Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies; Chernoff, After Bipolarity, John Mueller, "A New Concert of Europe," Foreign Policy, no. 77 (winter 1989/90): 3-16; Richard Holbrooke, "America, A European Power," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 2 (March/April 1995): 38-51; David Gompert and Richard Kugler, "Free-Rider Redux: NATO Needs to Project Power (and Europe Can Help)," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January/February 1995): 7-12; Zbigniew Brzezinksi, "A Plan for Europe," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January/February 1995): 26-42; Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion," Foreign Policy, no. 98 (spring 1995): 116-29.
206. There is a voluminous and growing literature on the topic of the future of NATO. See, for example, Duffield, "NATO's Functions after the Cold
207. There is a voluminous and growing literature on the topic of the future of NATO. See, for example, Duffield, "NATO's Functions after the Cold War"; and Duffield, "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Alliance Theory," in Explaining International Relations Since 1945, ed. Ngaire Woods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War"; Hellmann and Wolf, "Neorcalism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO"; Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies; Chernoff, After Bipolarity, John Mueller, "A New Concert of Europe," Foreign Policy, no. 77 (winter 1989/90): 3-16; Richard Holbrooke, "America, A European Power," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 2 (March/April 1995): 38-51; David Gompert and Richard Kugler, "Free-Rider Redux: NATO Needs to Project Power (and Europe Can Help)," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January/February 1995): 7-12; Zbigniew Brzezinksi, "A Plan for Europe," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January/February 1995): 26-42; Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion," Foreign Policy, no. 98 (spring 1995): 116-29.
208. John Mueller makes this argument quite effectively (see "A New Concert of Europe").
209. Risse-Kappen discusses the transformation of relationships among NATO members and the development of collective identity at length in Cooperation Among Democracies. See especially his concluding chapter. See also Risse-Kappen, "A Liberal Interpretation of the Transatlantic Security Community." This suggests that tethering alliances are useful, even if in their inception cohesion is low.
210. See Gerald Schneider and Patricia Weitsman, "Cooperation Among Equals: A Theory of Regional Integration," University of Bern/Ohio University mimeo, for a discussion of implicit entry and exclusion thresholds.
211. See Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security and the Future of Europe"; and Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War?"
212. See Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security and the Future of Europe"; and Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War?"
213. Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War?"
214. See John Albert White, Transition to Global Rivalry: Alliance Diplomacy and the Quadruple Entente, 1895-1907 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). See also Keith M. Wilson, The Policy of the Entente (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), esp. chap. 6.
215. See John Albert White, Transition to Global Rivalry: Alliance Diplomacy and the Quadruple Entente, 1895-1907 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). See also Keith M. Wilson, The Policy of the Entente (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), esp. chap. 6.
216. John Duffield, "NATO's Functions after the Cold War," 768-74, illuminates the importance of providing reassurance to states within the alliance. This will be especially true as NATO membership expands. It will be even more important, however, as a consequence of expansion, to provide those benefits to Russia. Duffield argues, in contrast, that NATO needs to continue to counterbalance Russian capabilities.