The nature and sources of liberal international order

Review of International Studies

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 179-196

  Deudney, Daniel ^a   Ikenberry, G John ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033416765     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210599001795     Document Type: Article

References (66)

1. See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). For extensions and debates, see Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
2. See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). For extensions and debates, see Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
3. John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability of Europe after the Cold War', International Security 15 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-57; and Conor Cruise O'Brien, 'The Future of the West', The National Interest, 30 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 3-10.
4. John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability of Europe after the Cold War', International Security 15 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-57; and Conor Cruise O'Brien, 'The Future of the West', The National Interest, 30 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 3-10.
5. See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
6. See G. John Ikenberry, 'Liberal Hegemony: The Logic and Future of America's Postwar Order', in John A. Hall and T.V. Paul (eds.), International Order in the 21st Century (forthcoming); and Ikenberry, 'Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony', Political Science Quarterly 104 (Fall 1989), pp. 375-400.
7. See G. John Ikenberry, 'Liberal Hegemony: The Logic and Future of America's Postwar Order', in John A. Hall and T.V. Paul (eds.), International Order in the 21st Century (forthcoming); and Ikenberry, 'Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony', Political Science Quarterly 104 (Fall 1989), pp. 375-400.
8. For a survey of liberal theories, see Mark W. Zacher and Richard A. Matthew, 'Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands', in Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (ed.), Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995).
9. Waltz, Theory of International Politics; and Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
10. Waltz, Theory of International Politics; and Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
11. See Daniel Deudney, The Philadelphian System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-Union, 1787-1861', International Organization, 49:2 (Spring 1995);
12. and Deudney, 'Binding Sovereigns: Authority, Structure, and Geopolitics in Philadelphian Systems', in Thomas Biersteiker and Cynthia Weber (eds.), State Sovereignty as Social Construct (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
13. See Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
14. Mary Hampton, 'NATO at the Creation: US Foreign Policy, West Germany and the Wilsonian Impulse,' Security Studies, 4:3 (Spring 1995), pp. 610-56; Geir Lundstadt, The American 'Empire' (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance (New York: Basic Books, 1988), ch. 1.
15. Mary Hampton, 'NATO at the Creation: US Foreign Policy, West Germany and the Wilsonian Impulse,' Security Studies, 4:3 (Spring 1995), pp. 610-56; Geir Lundstadt, The American 'Empire' (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance (New York: Basic Books, 1988), ch. 1.
16. Mary Hampton, 'NATO at the Creation: US Foreign Policy, West Germany and the Wilsonian Impulse,' Security Studies, 4:3 (Spring 1995), pp. 610-56; Geir Lundstadt, The American 'Empire' (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance (New York: Basic Books, 1988), ch. 1.
17. John Duffield, Power Rules (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995).
18. Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
19. Alberta Sbragia. 'Thinking about European Future: The Uses of Comparison', in Sbragia (ed.), Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the 'New' European Community (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1992).
20. See Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; also Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), esp. pp. 72-80.
21. See Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; also Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), esp. pp. 72-80.
22. For a realist argument that secondary states will balance against American hegemony, see Christopher Layne, 'The Unipolar Illusion', International Security, 17: 4 (Spring 1993).
23. Some realists have faulted the United States for lacking a centralized and autonomous capacity to make and implement foreign policy, but it is precisely the absence of these features that have made possible the reciprocal and consensual exercise of American power.
24. Geir Lundstad, 'Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952,' in Charles Maier (ed.), The Cold War in Europe: Era of a Divided Continent (New York: Wiener, 1991), pp. 143-68.
25. The incomplete nature of Japanese liberalism and the difficulty that transnational forces have in influencing the Japanese policy process suggest that Japanese hegemony would be more resisted and more coercive.
26. These characteristics of the American state have been described by many scholars. David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1952); Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961); and Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority (New York: Norton, 1969).
27. These characteristics of the American state have been described by many scholars. David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1952); Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961); and Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority (New York: Norton, 1969).
28. These characteristics of the American state have been described by many scholars. David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1952); Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961); and Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority (New York: Norton, 1969).
29. See Samuel P. Huntington, 'Transnational Organizations in World Polities', World Politics, 25 (April 1973); and Robert Gilpin, US Power and the Multinational Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1975).
30. See Samuel P. Huntington, 'Transnational Organizations in World Polities', World Politics, 25 (April 1973); and Robert Gilpin, US Power and the Multinational Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1975).
31. See, for example, Wolfgang Handreider, 'Dissolving International Politics: Reflections on the Nation-State', American Political Science Review, 72:4 (1978), pp. 1276-87; and James Rosenau, 'The State in an Era of Cascading Politics: Wavering Concept, Widening Competence, Withering Colossus?' in James Caparaso (ed.), The Elusive State: International and Comparative Perspectives (Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 1989), pp. 17-48.
32. See, for example, Wolfgang Handreider, 'Dissolving International Politics: Reflections on the Nation-State', American Political Science Review, 72:4 (1978), pp. 1276-87; and James Rosenau, 'The State in an Era of Cascading Politics: Wavering Concept, Widening Competence, Withering Colossus?' in James Caparaso (ed.), The Elusive State: International and Comparative Perspectives (Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 1989), pp. 17-48.
33. For an exception, see Susan Strange, 'Toward a Theory of Transnational Empire', in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau (eds.), Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 161-76.
34. On the connection between domestic structures and transnational relations, see Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
35. See G. John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan, 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', International Organization, 44:3 (Summer 1990), pp. 283-315.
36. See Peter J. Katzenstein and Yutaka Tsujinaka, '"Bullying", "Buying", and "Binding": US-Japanese Transnational Relations and Domestic Structures', in Risse-Kappen (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In, pp. 79-111.
37. Pat Choate, Agents of Influence: How Japan Manipulates America's Political and Economic System (New York: Touchstone Books, 1990).
38. See Michael Ross Fowler and Julie Marie Bunck, Law, Power, and the Sovereign State: The Evolution and Application of the Concept of Sovereignty (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1995).
39. See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (Columbia University Press, 1977); Barry Buzan, 'From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory meet the English School', International Organization, 47:3 (Summer 1993), pp. 327-52.
40. See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (Columbia University Press, 1977); Barry Buzan, 'From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory meet the English School', International Organization, 47:3 (Summer 1993), pp. 327-52.
41. See Leopold von Ranke, The Great Powers', in Theodore von Laue (ed.), The Writings of Leopold von Ranke (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Jack Levy, War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975 (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1983); and Martin White, Power Politics, edited by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1978).
42. See Leopold von Ranke, The Great Powers', in Theodore von Laue (ed.), The Writings of Leopold von Ranke (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Jack Levy, War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975 (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1983); and Martin White, Power Politics, edited by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1978).
43. See Leopold von Ranke, The Great Powers', in Theodore von Laue (ed.), The Writings of Leopold von Ranke (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Jack Levy, War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975 (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1983); and Martin White, Power Politics, edited by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1978).
44. See Peter J. Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semi-Sovereign State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987).
45. On American and Western efforts to liberalize postwar German and Japanese political institutions, see John Montgomery, Forced to Be Free: The Artificial Revolution in Germany and Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu (eds.), Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation (University of Hawaii Press, 1987); and Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), ch. 6.
46. On American and Western efforts to liberalize postwar German and Japanese political institutions, see John Montgomery, Forced to Be Free: The Artificial Revolution in Germany and Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu (eds.), Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation (University of Hawaii Press, 1987); and Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), ch. 6.
47. On American and Western efforts to liberalize postwar German and Japanese political institutions, see John Montgomery, Forced to Be Free: The Artificial Revolution in Germany and Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu (eds.), Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation (University of Hawaii Press, 1987); and Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), ch. 6.
48. See Ian Buruma, The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan (New York: Meridian, 1995).
49. Robert Gilpin, The Politics of Transnational Economic Relations', International Organization 25 (Summer 1971); Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973); Stephen Krasner, 'State Power and the Structure of International Trade', World Politics 28 (April 1976), pp. 317-47.
50. Robert Gilpin, The Politics of Transnational Economic Relations', International Organization 25 (Summer 1971); Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973); Stephen Krasner, 'State Power and the Structure of International Trade', World Politics 28 (April 1976), pp. 317-47.
51. Robert Gilpin, The Politics of Transnational Economic Relations', International Organization 25 (Summer 1971); Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973); Stephen Krasner, 'State Power and the Structure of International Trade', World Politics 28 (April 1976), pp. 317-47.
52. See Gilpin, 'Economic Interdependence and National Security in Historical Perspective', in Klaus Knorr and Frank Trager (eds.), Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence, KS: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), pp. 19-66.
53. For variations of this argument, see Joanne Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Edward D. Mansfield, Power, Trade, and War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
54. For variations of this argument, see Joanne Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Edward D. Mansfield, Power, Trade, and War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
55. See John Gerard Ruggie, 'International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order', in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).
56. Conversely, if states abandon their commitment to the welfare state then this motivation for their support of a liberal economic system would decline. Or structural changes in the international economy might be less congenial to domestic welfare commitments, in which case states would also pull back from the pursuit of open foreign economic policies. In either case, the liberal order would become 'disembedded' and much less robust.
57. For systematic discussion of this logic, see Joseph Grieco, 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of Neoliberal Institutionalism', International Organization, 42 (1988), pp. 485-507.
58. An example of this phenomenon is the high technology sectors. In the late 1980s, Germany and Japan were leading the United States in many areas, but more recently this pattern has been reversed.
59. This is a variation on the argument made by Snidal, that multiple actors (in this case sectors and firms rather than states) complicate the simple calculation of relative gains and therefore mitigate its influence over policy. See Duncan Snidal, 'International Cooperation Among Relative Gain Maximizers', International Studies Quarterly, 35:4 (December 1991), pp. 387-402. The sector focus also yields mixed results in Michael Mastanduno, 'Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy', International Security, 16 (Summer 1991), pp. 73-113.
60. This is a variation on the argument made by Snidal, that multiple actors (in this case sectors and firms rather than states) complicate the simple calculation of relative gains and therefore mitigate its influence over policy. See Duncan Snidal, 'International Cooperation Among Relative Gain Maximizers', International Studies Quarterly, 35:4 (December 1991), pp. 387-402. The sector focus also yields mixed results in Michael Mastanduno, 'Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy', International Security, 16 (Summer 1991), pp. 73-113.
61. See Robert Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).
62. See G. John Ikenberry, 'Liberal Hegemony: The Logic and Future of America's Postwar Order'.
63. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1955).
64. George Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).
65. See Susan Strange, States and Markets (New York: Blackwell, 1988).
66. For an analysis of global cultural formations, see Mike Featherstone (ed.), Global Culture (Newbury Park: Sage, 1990).