Behavioral Game Theory

Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 485-503

  Gächter, Simon ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST GALLEN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Coordination; Game theory; Learning; Mathematics; Nash equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 84889465594     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1002/9780470752937.ch24     Document Type: Chapter

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