Segregated cooperation

JASSS

Volumn 16, Issue 4, 2013, Pages

  Waldeck, Roger ^a  

^a TECHNOPÔLE BREST IROISE   (France)

Author keywords

Agent based simulation; Norms; Prisoner; Segregation; Social emotions; Spatial interaction structures

Indexed keywords

EID: 84887014426     PISSN: 14607425     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.18564/jasss.2363     Document Type: Article

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